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Abstract

Along the banks of the Susquehanna River in early July 1778, a force of about 600 Loyalist and
Native American raiders won a lopsided victory against 400 overwhelmed Patriot militiamen and
regulars in the Wyoming Valley of Pennsylvania. While not well-known today, this battle—the
Battle of Wyoming—had profound effects on the Revolutionary War and American culture and
politics. Quite familiar to early Americans, this battle’s remembrance influenced the formation of
national identity and informed Americans’ perceptions of their past and present over the course
of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.
From the beginning, however, Americans’ understanding of what occurred in the Wyoming
Valley in July 1778 was strongly influenced by reports from partisans not present at the battle,
reports which wildly differed from eyewitness accounts. In the aftermath of the battle, a
fabricated myth about Loyalists and Native Americans massacring women, children, and
wounded soldiers quickly took root in the public imagination and influenced the Patriot war
effort. Despite having no evidence backing it up, the myth eventually outlasted its Revolutionary
context, coming back to shape political dialogue and popular culture in the early nineteenth
century. Indeed, this Revolutionary fabrication was only the beginning of the historical distortion
related to the Battle of Wyoming. By mid-century, a whole new myth about the battle arose,
featuring a Native American woman known as Queen Esther who murdered prisoners around a
rock. Made possible by the cultural atmosphere of the period, this myth proved equally
sensational.
This thesis explores how these myths about the battle formed, spread, and influenced American
society on national and local levels from 1778 to around 1878. Tracing and analyzing how
Americans have remembered and misremembered the Battle of Wyoming, more popularly
known as the Wyoming Massacre, its primary focus is to look at the meaning behind the
narratives that formed around this event and what those meanings say about the individuals and
cultures that created them. It also scrutinizes some of the ways Americans have tailored their
remembrances of Wyoming to speak to their present. Ultimately, this thesis points to how
historical distortions can easily enmesh themselves into popular memory and how they can
influence national and local identities.
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Introduction

On July 20, 1778, a New York newspaper editor named John Holt published a gruesome
and shocking report about the war on the frontier. “Collected” from “many of the distressed
Refugees…who escaped the general massacre” and “have passed this way,” this report told of a
violent battle and massacre in the backcountry of northeastern Pennsylvania. According to Holt,
1600 Loyalist and Native American raiders descended on the Wyoming Valley in late June and
early July, destroying several small forts and demanding that all Patriot forces in the region
surrender.1 Though significantly outnumbered, the obstinate Patriots refused and left the safety
of their main fort, Forty Fort, to face the enemy on the evening of July 3, 1778. The Patriots,
unfortunately, marched right into an ambush. After 45 minutes of fighting, they retreated in
disarray, and “a total rout ensued” in which many perished. The next day, the Loyalists and
Native Americans returned to Forty Fort and demanded that the remaining defenders surrender,
threatening the indiscriminate killing and scalping of all the fort’s inhabitants. Eventually forcing
entry, the attackers proceeded to slaughter women, children, and wounded soldiers by burning
them alive within their own homes. In the coming days, the raiders’ reign of terror extended even
farther across the region. Holt reported that they burned numerous crops while killing or
maiming nearly everything that moved—from cattle to their own families.2

1

While situated in modern northeastern Pennsylvania, the Wyoming Valley was also claimed by Connecticut at the
time. The two states and their settlers quarreled and intermittently fought over possession starting in the 1760s and
continuing into the first decades of the 1800s. See Anne M. Ousterhout, “Frontier Vengeance: Connecticut Yankees
vs. Pennamites in the Wyoming Valley,” Pennsylvania History: A Journal of Mid-Atlantic Studies 62, no. 3 (1995):
330–63. The Wyoming Valley should not be confused with the state of Wyoming, established later in the nineteenth
century. Interestingly, the Wyoming Valley did provide inspiration for the state’s name. See, Jim Brown, “The First
Wyoming: What’s in a Name?” WyoHistory.org, Wyoming State Historical Society, 2014,
https://www.wyohistory.org/encyclopedia/wyoming-name.
2
“Poughkeepsie, July 20,” Pennsylvania Packet (Philadelphia), July 30, 1778, 1, 4. All the details about the battle
within this paragraph come from Holt’s account. As a result, they are not all accurate. For instance, closer to 500 or
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Horribly gruesome, John Holt’s account of this event reached thousands across the
American colonies during the Revolutionary War, achieving wide circulation in Patriot
newspapers and helping inflame public opinion against Great Britain. There was only one
problem—much of his account simply had no basis in evidence coming from eyewitnesses. Most
glaringly, no massacre occurred at Forty Fort on July 4. While British-backed raiders did win a
lopsided victory against Patriot militiamen and regulars on July 3, Forty Fort, in fact, surrendered
peacefully and without bloodshed the next day. In war and politics, however, accuracy does not
always matter, and the tale of a massacre at Wyoming spread rapidly as Patriot publicists
capitalized on the propaganda value of this sensational story. Even after the Revolutionary War,
the narratives advanced by Holt and other Patriots lived on, becoming the basis for many flawed
accounts about what happened in the Wyoming Valley on July 3 and 4, 1778. Holt’s report
proved to be only the beginning in a long cycle of historical distortion, resulting in narratives of
enduring power that shaped Americans’ understandings of the Revolution, and cultivated lasting
notions of the war’s villains and their allegedly innocent Patriot victims.

While the Battle of Wyoming amounted to a small-scale conflict that only had minor
effects on the military situation during the Revolutionary War, this brief encounter along the
Susquehanna River took on massive proportions in the American imagination that reached far
beyond its limited military significance.3 Ignited by sensational rumors in the aftermath of the

600 Loyalists and Native Americans attacked Wyoming—not 1600. Chapter 1 provides a reconstruction of the battle
that corrects these smaller details while also tackling the larger historical distortions found in Holt’s report.
3
I use the term the Battle of Wyoming over the Wyoming Massacre because of the tendency to label any act of
violence by Native Americans against whites as a “massacre.” Thus, within this thesis, the Battle of Wyoming refers
to the actual battle fought on July 3, while the Wyoming Massacre refers to the sensational legend about the events
of July 4 that emerged a few days and weeks after the battle. Whether or not the aftermath of the battle constituted a
massacre may be debated, especially considering the slaughter of retreating Patriot soldiers by Loyalists and Native
Americans alike. Though I personally use “battle” to avoid the common tendency to disparage Native Americans
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battle, an incendiary myth took root just days later that paved the way for the fabricated story of
John Holt and others to influence the Patriot war effort. This myth, which this thesis terms the
legend of the Wyoming Massacre, played an integral role in the struggle for independence, the
formation of national identity, and the outcome of the war on the frontier. Perhaps Wesley
Johnson, writing close to a hundred years after the event, said it best: “The battle of Wyoming
was not a great battle directly in its results, as affecting” the struggle for independence or in
terms of the number of men who fought, but “it was great in this: the exaggerated story of the
atrocities committed by the British troops and their allies…fired the heart and nerved the arm of
every American patriot.”4 Through continued use, the Wyoming Massacre became a central part
of Patriots’ partisan arguments and assisted in the formation of a shared narrative of American
victimhood that helped shape national identity.
The exaggerated myth of the Wyoming Massacre did not just influence the Revolution,
however. Rather, the fabrications of the 1770s outlasted their original partisan context and came
to influence political discourse over thirty years later in the era of the War of 1812. Fearing
Indian war in the backcountry and suspicious of British meddling on the frontier, Americans
during the War of 1812 turned to the vivid example of British and Indian savagery at Wyoming
to draw parallels between their current situation and the Revolution. In a very real sense,
Americans’ understanding of the battle based on this legend influenced both their conceptions of
the Revolution and their interpretation of their present conflict.
The legend of the Wyoming Massacre reached its apogee in these tense years during the
1810s, but it gradually diminished in the later 1800s under the assault of mid-nineteenth-century

and as a more succinct shorthand, perhaps the organizers of the 1878 commemorative observance were more
accurate in calling it both.
4
Wesley Johnson, Wyoming: A Record of the One Hundredth Year Commemorative Observance of the Battle and
Massacre, July 3, 1778-July 3, 1878 (Wilkes-Barre, Pa: Beardslee & Co., printers, 1882), 25-26.
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historians. A new myth, however, quickly rose to take its place. Starting in the late 1820s and
fully blossoming by the late 1840s, this new myth centered around a murderous Native American
woman popularly known as Queen Esther. While not as featured in political discourse as the
original legend, this myth still resonated with many Americans and found its way onto the pages
of numerous histories, works of fiction, and travel narratives. As in 1778 or 1812, a powerful
legend about the Battle of Wyoming—one now more capable of meeting the needs of antebellum
and postbellum Americans—continued to color the public’s understanding of the Revolution and
by extension contemporary society, just in a new guise.
Though largely forgotten today, the memory of the Battle of Wyoming had profound
effects on the Revolution and nineteenth-century American culture and politics. In the late
eighteenth and nineteenth century, the battle remained a well-known event and an integral part of
the nation’s Revolutionary mythology, often included along with other more well-known events,
such as the reading of the Declaration of Independence in Philadelphia or the Battle of
Lexington.5 Americans were indeed quite familiar with the battle, having read about it in
newspapers, popular histories, poems, short stories, and travel accounts throughout the century.
Reflecting their familiarity with the battle, Americans utilized its memory for a variety of
purposes in the years between 1778 and 1878. From using it to justify independence in the 1770s
to relying on it to explain Native American removal in the mid-nineteenth century, Americans
connected the battle to numerous national and regional narratives in attempts to explain current

5

This can be seen visually on the bronze doors for the House chamber in the United States Capitol. Drawn up in the
1850s, molded in the 1860s, but not installed until 1905, this door features the Battle of Wyoming alongside a public
reading of the Declaration of Independence, the Battle of Lexington, and the signing of the Treaty of Paris in 1783—
among others. That Wyoming was included among these events points to its importance in nineteenth century
Americans view of the Revolution. Thomas Crawford and William Rinehart, House Bronze Doors, bronze, 1905,
U.S. Capitol East House Portico, https://www.aoc.gov/art/doors/house-bronze-doors.
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reality. Narratives about the extreme atrocities of the Battle of Wyoming indelibly shaped earlier
generations’ understanding of the Revolution and American history.
Despite its significance during the Revolution and in the nineteenth century, very few
scholars have examined the memory of the Battle of Wyoming in a detailed way. This thesis
aims to add to this scholarship, providing new insights into the evolution of this specific
historical memory. As one of the few others to examine the battle’s lasting effects, Lisa Ann
Francavilla explored the Battle of Wyoming’s importance to regional identity and briefly
discussed how different historical actors portrayed the battle from the 1770s to the 1920s in her
2002 master’s thesis. Building upon her work, this thesis also investigates how the memory of
Wyoming reflected societal perceptions, but it differs in several important ways. For one, this
thesis concentrates more on why different people used Wyoming, and it more thoroughly places
this memory into a wider national context. This work also pursues a divergent chronological
scope, focusing most of its attention on the Revolution and the early nineteenth century. In her
work, Francavilla fleetingly mentions these decades before examining the large celebrations that
commemorated the battle in 1878 and 1928. While these celebrations proved vital to shaping
Wyoming’s memory, the development of this memory in the earlier parts of the nineteenth
century was equally, if not more, important. Filling this gap, this thesis analyzes the years
between 1778 and 1878, specifically detailing the development and effects of the myth of the
Wyoming Massacre and that of Queen Esther.6
This thesis additionally draws on scholarship that has explored the ways that fear and
rhetoric emanating from the frontier played an integral role in the Patriot war effort and in the

6

While this thesis briefly discusses the large celebrations in 1878 and 1928, these celebrations do not constitute the
main object of inquiry as they did in Francavilla’s work. See, Lisa A. Francavilla, “The Wyoming Valley Battle and
‘Massacre’: Images of a Constructed American History” (M.A. thesis, United States -- Virginia, College of William
and Mary, 2002), iv, 21-25, 59- 63.
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formation of American identity in the Revolution and beyond. Reports of savagery committed by
the British, Loyalists, and Indians abounded in Patriot discourse, and these reports shaped
American attitudes. Peter Silver, in Our Savage Neighbors, details how rhetoric helped solidify
hate in Patriot minds. According to him, anti-Indian rhetoric united fractious groups of white
settlers and townspeople together and helped shaped ideas about racial difference. The
Revolution saw the summation of this process as Patriots associated Great Britain with its
“savage” allies and perceived their struggle as a defense of home against monstrous enemies.7 As
scholar Robert Parkinson has similarly argued, stark representations of both the British and
natives aided Patriot attempts to create a unified national identity separate from Britain and
harness support for the war.8 Misinformation played a large role as well. In the larger battle to
control public opinion, Gregory Dowd demonstrates, both prominent statesmen and average
citizens advanced unsubstantiated rumors about atrocities and misdeeds to advance the Patriot
cause.9 Negative representations of the British or Native Americans, far from being passive or
neutral, possessed serious political value.
These representations also had long-lasting effects on American identity and conceptions
of the past. As Parkinson argues, negative and often racialized depictions of Native Americans
became integral to the nation’s founding narrative and forcefully reemerged during the War of
1812. Dowd similarly maintains that rumors, even if groundless, could endure for generations
and become incredibly influential in shaping public attitudes.10 Indeed, the exaggerations and
myths formed from the Revolution and from conflict in the backcountry proved especially

7

Peter Silver, Our Savage Neighbors: How Indian War Transformed Early America (New York: W.W. Norton,
2008), xx, 227-260.
8
Robert G. Parkinson, The Common Cause: Creating Race and Nation in the American Revolution (Chapel Hill,
NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2016), 9-10, 17-19.
9
Gregory Dowd, Groundless: Rumors, Legends, and Hoaxes on the Early American Frontier (Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins University Press, 2015), 1-2, 175-201.
10
Parkinson, The Common Cause, 655; Dowd, Groundless, 1-5, 177.
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powerful in the American imagination—often not for the better. In his seminal Regeneration
Through Violence, Richard Slotkin explores the development and power of frontier myths in
early America. According to him, these myths gave birth to the idea that the frontier could
provide regeneration for American society. This restoration, however, came at the cost of
incredible violence against Native Americans, which these myths had to find a way to justify.11
The myths that formed around Wyoming illustrate some of the ways this justification occurred
and how Americans used them to reframe the violence of the past in an understandable way.
From Silver to Slotkin, these scholars’ works offer insight into how false narratives, like those
that formed about Wyoming, could have massive effects on American mindsets.
Works on Revolutionary memory similarly inform this analysis, providing needed
context on how political and cultural shifts influenced Americans’ perceptions of the Revolution.
For instance, Sarah Purcell’s Sealed with Blood provides a compelling examination of the halfcentury after independence that details how the Revolution changed meaning in response to
growing partisan divides and increasing democratization. Her work also describes how
Americans used public events, histories, plays, and even material culture to craft an
interpretation of the Revolutionary past.12 Michael Hattem’s recent book sheds further light on
the dissemination of historical memory. Exploring how memory interacts with politics and
culture, Hattem chronicles how Americans created a shared and usable past out of the historical
experiences of the Revolution. On a methodological level, this thesis also utilizes what Hattem
calls “history culture,” an approach that examines historical memory not just through written

11

Richard Slotkin, Regeneration Through Violence: The Mythology of the American Frontier, 1600-1860 (1973;
repr., University of Oklahoma Press, 2000), 3-5.
12
Sarah J. Purcell, Sealed with Blood: War, Sacrifice, and Memory in Revolutionary America, (Philadelphia:
University of Pennsylvania Press, 2010), 1-10. Emphasizing the importance of journalist portrayals and popular
history to both the remembering and forgetting of different aspects of the Revolution, Janice Hume likewise
highlights the importance of media to the Revolutionary narrative. See, Janice Hume, Popular Media and the
American Revolution: Shaping Collective Memory (New York: Routledge, 2013), 1.
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histories but through a variety of media found within a culture.13 James Paxton’s analysis of
Revolutionary memory in the Mohawk Valley of New York during the nineteenth century
similarly influenced this thesis’s approach. With its attention to the role of local context in
creating historical memory, Paxton’s essay demonstrates the complex interplay between regional
and national narratives at work in historical memory and the need to understand both to fully
grasp a memory’s meaning.14
Building upon these works, it is this thesis’s purpose to show the significance of this
small frontier defeat to Revolutionary history and memory over the course of the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries. Though Loyalists and Native Americans also remembered the event, this
thesis focuses on the dominant memory of Wyoming among white Americans who supported
independence. Paying particular attention to the historical actors who shaped this memory and
the political and cultural climate they inhabited, this thesis will trace how and why this historical
memory ebbed and flowed in the American imagination over these decades. While Americans
repeatedly drew on similar themes of patriotism, sacrifice, and savagery when discussing
Wyoming from 1778 to 1878, their deployments of this memory were always historically
contingent and thus require attention to chronology and context. Placing this memory into that
context, this thesis examines how Americans drew deeper meaning from this defeat along the
Susquehanna and how the memory of the battle changed over time as a result of both local and
national developments.

13

Michael D. Hattem, Past and Prologue: Politics and Memory in the American Revolution (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 2020), 1-7. Like Hattem, I primarily utilize a cultural history approach.
14
James Paxton, “Remembering and Forgetting: War, Memory, and Identity in the Post-Revolutionary Mohawk
Valley in Michael McDonnell, et. al., eds., Remembering the Revolution: Memory, History, and Nation Making from
Independence to the Civil War (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 2013), 179-195.
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Tracing how earlier Americans have recalled the Battle of Wyoming requires a diverse
array of primary sources from multiple eras. Just as Americans used Wyoming for numerous
purposes, they similarly wrote about or referenced the battle in many different media, often with
very distinct objectives in mind. Any reconstruction of the battle and the development of its
subsequent myths must recognize that these objectives and the worldview of each observer
informed each account; it would be impossible to recapture “what really happened” because each
observer and commentator brought their own biases to their reports, even when they were
eyewitnesses. The first references to the battle occurred in military correspondence, diaries, and a
few depositions from 1778. Written or given by firsthand witnesses just a few days after July 3
and 4, these accounts provide useful information about the battle. As with all sources, one must
contend with inherent bias, reporting error, and the desire for some military men, especially
commanders, to exaggerate their successes and minimize their failures. Ultimately though, such
accounts allow for a composite account of what participants on both sides of the battle claimed to
have witnessed. Further away from the battlefield, letters and depositions from those who did not
witness the event also offer tantalizing evidence of the rumors about Wyoming that quickly
spread throughout the colonies during the summer of 1778. These sources show how Americans,
working off limited information, often circulated wild rumors for a range of reasons, a trend that
Revolutionary newspapers only compounded when they saw advantage in doing so.
As a primary means for communicating news and partisan information across the
colonies, Revolutionary and eventually early national newspapers serve as some of the most
important accounts for tracing Wyoming’s memory. Exaggerating the carnage and reporting
inaccurate information, Patriot newspapers provided sensational accounts of Wyoming, which
magnified earlier rumors and significantly contributed to the creation of the legend of the
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Wyoming Massacre. From one paper to the next, fantastic fabrications about the battle and its
aftermath spread across the colonies, cementing the Massacre in Patriot arguments for
independence as well as in the popular imagination. Three decades later, newspapers printed
political speeches and editorials that referenced the Massacre and used it in ways almost
indistinguishable from their Revolutionary counterparts. Like in the Revolution, American
newspapers in the era of the War of 1812 underscored the untrustworthiness of the British,
Loyalists (or at least those accused of Loyalism), and Native Americans while encouraging
Americans to stay vigilant against them. These newspapers sources highlight the importance of
the battle to political discourse in the Revolution and beyond, demonstrating how the legend of
the Wyoming Massacre endured and adapted in new contexts.
Published histories similarly inform this analysis. Of these, this thesis relies on two
distinct sets of histories: early accounts of the Revolutionary War and local or regional histories
in the antebellum period. Revealing changing attitudes about the Revolution and showing how
different authors conceptualized Wyoming as part of larger regional or national narratives, both
sets of histories provide a window into the mindsets of their makers. In this case, these histories
expose differing interpretations of the Revolution, especially as it relates to British and Native
American savagery. These histories also allow one to trace the development and spread of ideas
about the battle and the legend of the Massacre. By following early Revolutionary histories from
the late 1780s to around the turn of the century, a clearer picture emerges about how the
exaggerated narratives first found in Revolutionary newspapers became an authenticated part of
the historical record. Early historians of the Revolution, uncritically accepting sensational
Revolutionary accounts, helped the myth of the Wyoming Massacre to persist into the era of the
War of 1812. Antebellum histories tell a similar story that elucidate the process through which
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the legend of Queen Esther emerged. While local historians replaced the legend of the Wyoming
Massacre with what they believed was a more accurate description of the battle’s aftermath,
many of these authors reproduced that equally hyperbolic myth in their attempted correctives. As
with earlier historians, these later authors’ acceptance of historical falsehoods paved the way for
artists, writers, and politicians to spread these fabrications to a wider audience.
Along with histories, works of popular literature and commemorative events are essential
to telling the story of the Battle of Wyoming’s place in American myth and memory. As in the
twenty-first century (and much to the chagrin of historians then and now), many Americans in
the nineteenth century learned their history from sources of popular reading and entertainment.
For one, travel narratives—increasingly popular in the antebellum period—often featured
accounts of the Battle of Wyoming. Tapping into the tragic and romantic aspects of the region’s
history, these narratives used the history of the battle to attract visitors or to tell compelling
stories for the reading public. Fiction played an even larger role in the transmission of this
memory. From poetry to short stories, Wyoming remained a popular literary topic throughout the
nineteenth century.15 Literature, like history and newspaper reports, provides insight into how
Americans conceptualized Wyoming and the Revolution. As literature allows for creative
fabrication to a greater extent than history, it also indicates how different individuals derived
meaning from this historical event. In the antebellum period, local commemorative events also
became an essential aspect of the battle’s memory. Knitting together the local community and
occasionally reaching others around the country through newspaper and periodical reports,
commemorative events shaped the battle’s memory and the lessons that Americans took from it.

15

See, for example, Thomas Campbell, Gertrude of Wyoming; or, The Pennsylvanian Cottage (New York: D.
Appleton & Co, 1858). While not well-known today, Campbell’s 1809 poem, which featured the Battle of Wyoming
as its climax, remained immensely popular in America throughout the nineteenth century. The poem reproduced
several misconceptions to readers over the century and became a touchstone to the battle for average Americans.
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Organized chronologically based on key moments in time when the Massacre reappeared
in popular consciousness, this thesis will begin by discussing what firsthand witnessed said about
the battle and the development of the myth of the Wyoming Massacre in Chapter 1. This chapter
starts with a thorough reconstruction of the battle and its aftermath, creating a basic outline of
what witnesses said happened on the days of July 3 and 4, 1778. It then shifts to how the myth
emerged and how Patriots utilized it to their advantage. Starting in the backcountry, the myth
grew out of exaggerated and misinformed stories of survivors and backcountry settlers who fled
east in fear. These lurid stories then found a wide audience in newspaper reports, where some
editors embellished these already sensational rumors for partisan effect. Tapping into a budding
American narrative of atrocity and victimization, the rumors and newspaper accounts that
produced the legend of the Wyoming Massacre drew from the conventions of anti-Indian
rhetoric and stressed the savagery of their enemies—whether British, Loyalist, or Native
American. As a result, the Wyoming Massacre became a potent political weapon. In the arsenals
of the Patriot publicists and partisans, Wyoming helped provoke the public’s ire against Great
Britain and justify frontier attacks against Britain’s Native American allies.
Chapter 2 focuses on how the Wyoming Massacre became an integral part of
Revolutionary history and memory for the next generation, especially during the War of 1812.
The chapter first draws attention to the role of early historians in legitimizing and then spreading
the myth. Though forged amid the uncertainty and vagaries of war, massacre narratives of the
Revolution indeed proved remarkably resilient, and the legend of the Wyoming Massacre did not
die with the Revolution. Instead, as this part of the chapter argues, the real and fabricated
atrocities of the battle endured and gained further legitimacy through early histories, which too
readily accepted Patriot reports at face value. These histories’ endorsement of these narratives
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had lasting consequences as other writers and artists drew from these accounts in creating their
own works, further spreading the legend. Early nineteenth century Americans’ familiarity with
the event enabled a new generation to return to the legend of the Wyoming Massacre when they
found themselves once again at odds with Great Britain and their native allies on the frontier.
The second part of the chapter picks up in the early nineteenth century as tensions with
Great Britain worsened and eventually erupted in the War of 1812. During this fraught time—a
second Revolutionary War to some—the relevancy of Wyoming to the republic’s political
discourse increased. Political commentators, like in the Revolution, turned to memories of the
battle and Massacre to again disparage the British or encourage frontier violence. In this era of
provocative and inflammatory rhetoric, political writers did not merely use Wyoming’s example
to denounce the British and Native Americans, however. Some of the most vociferous rhetoric
was instead reserved for members of the other political party, who many tried to depict as secret
Loyalists bent on destroying America. Even after the threat from Great Britain dissipated,
Wyoming remained ideologically valuable, either to criticize foreign interventions on the frontier
or to reinforce the nation’s founding mythology. In showcasing Patriot suffering at the hands of
the British and Indians, Wyoming helped sanctify the American cause.
Shifting to the period after the War of 1812, Chapter 3 details the creation of the myth of
Queen Esther and the Bloody Rock, examining the role mid-nineteenth century historians and
culture played in its growth and acceptance. The first half of the chapter traces how local
historians from the late 1820s to around 1860 worked to discredit many of the Revolutionary
fabrications that informed the myth of the Wyoming Massacre. It also details how certain
cultural ideas influenced their interpretations. Dedicated to authenticity, these historians took
pains in their search for truth and partially succeeded in dismantling the Wyoming Massacre, but
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they simultaneously allowed Queen Esther’s legend to arise. After showing how historians
attacked the myth of the Wyoming Massacre, the chapter outlines the nebulous origins of Queen
Esther’s myth before showing how these new historians—much like their earlier counterparts—
advanced a myth about the battle in their own work.
Historians were not the only means through which the myth of Esther grew, however, and
the second half of Chapter 3 explores how several cultural currents converged to increase
Esther’s relevancy in this period. Americans’ desire for regional romance and the continued
literary use of Wyoming’s history, for instance, created an atmosphere where the fantastical story
of Queen Esther could flourish. Local commemoration, which increased considerably in the
1830s and 1840s, also contributed to Esther’s acceptance and later dissemination by encouraging
locals to look for and possible even fabricate interesting stories about their region’s history. An
interest in stories about Native Americans within popular literature contributed to Esther’s
emergence on a national level as well. For purposes of entertainment or making meaning out of
the past, Esther’s myth fit antebellum needs quite nicely.

The significance of the Battle of Wyoming in history and memory ultimately reaches far
beyond the Wyoming Valley of Pennsylvania. Relevant to the political and cultural life of early
Americans, Wyoming had an outsized influence in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.
Understanding its effects remains important as the story of Wyoming’s place in the culture and
politics of this period illuminates some of the ways Americans have tailored their history to
speak to the present and how they forged national and local identities in the process. As scholars
of historical memory have long realized, memory “is an active, constructive process” that entails
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reshaping recollections of the past to serve current conceptions.16 Wyoming’s memory proved no
different, adapting to the purposes of several generations living in markedly different contexts. A
reminder of the malleability of historical memory, this exploration of Wyoming accentuates how
the present continually exerts an influence on the retelling of the past.
Such present-minded manipulation of the past had consequences for identity formation in
this era. Then as now, the memory of the Revolutionary War remained important to the
articulation of a shared past and a common national mythology. “Military memory, especially
memory of the Revolutionary War,” wrote Sarah Purcell, stands “at the heart of American
national identity.”17 An example of Patriot suffering and sacrifice, the Battle of Wyoming fit
nicely into this mythology, helping Americans make sense of the suffering of war and imparting
patriotic lessons to future generations. On a regional level, local interpretation of the battle
helped reaffirm community identities while simultaneously reinforcing national narratives about
the Revolutionary past. Often hopelessly intertwined, local and national identities gained
strength through reference to each other.18 More nefariously, such stories of suffering at the
hands of savage enemies, especially the exaggerated myths of the Massacre and Queen Esther,
could also work for exclusionary purposes. As historians like Parkinson have related, negative
founding narratives about native people became the basis for their political exclusion and
physical removal.19 Put bluntly, in defining what it meant to be an American or who was or was
not an American, Revolutionary memories of events like the Battle of Wyoming mattered.
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Indeed, they still matter in that they can illustrate how past Americans perceived the Revolution,
themselves, and others.
Along with accentuating the influence of the present on conceptions of the past and the
significance of Wyoming to identity formation in early America, the story of the Wyoming
Massacre’s staying power in the American imagination points to how the exaggerated rhetoric of
wartime and the fabrications of a few can enmesh itself into history and popular memory. Even if
fabricated, the myths about the Battle of Wyoming wielded tremendous influence over many
decades. Born from exaggerated rumors, partisan reports, and local folklore, these narratives
became lasting aspects of the battle’s historical remembrance that informed the public’s
understanding of the Revolutionary past. These exaggerations, often legitimized by historians
and spread by popular media, wielded tremendous influence over many decades. In the end, the
pervasive effects of these sensational myths offer a warning about the danger of uncritically
accepting and reproducing information, especially information formed in the uncertainties of war
or intended for partisan effect.
In an era of fake news, acrimonious political partisanship, and countless cases of
misinformation, modern readers would do well to remember the example of Wyoming.
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Chapter 1
“These monsters in human shape”
Transforming a Battle into a Massacre

When Patriots collided with Loyalist and Native American raiders in the Wyoming
Valley in July 1778, bloodshed ensued. Outnumbered and outmatched, Patriot troops suffered
horrendous casualties in the subsequent battle and lost control of frontier forts across the region.
In the aftermath of this inglorious defeat, distressed frontier families and those soldiers who
managed to escape the slaughter fled the area, spreading fear and distorting the details of the
failed defense of Wyoming and the fate of the valley’s inhabitants. The histrionic stories and
rumors from these survivors served as the basis for even more embellished newspaper coverage
of the event. Sensationalizing the narrative about the Battle of Wyoming, newspapers cemented a
lasting, if hyperbolic, view of the event into the public mind. In effect, as this chapter
demonstrates, they created the legend of the “Wyoming Massacre,” an exaggerated tale of
murder, arson, and parricide. This portrayal of the battle, especially in the largely unsubstantiated
depiction of its aftermath, had real uses and consequences for Revolutionary Americans.
From humble frontier petitioners to the highest civilian and military leaders, supporters of
the Patriot cause quickly subsumed the Wyoming Massacre into pre-existing and interconnected
arguments about independence and British savagery. At the same time, a similarly diverse cast of
characters evoked the example of Wyoming to justify retaliatory strikes on the frontier against
Native Americans and those Loyalist and British militants who allegedly instigated the attacks.
In its many iterations within Patriot discourse, the story of the Massacre often encouraged
additional violence by perpetuating a lasting American narrative of atrocity, suffering, and
victimization. Depicting their enemies as monstrous villains and savages harming innocent
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backcountry families, Patriots utilized the real and imagined details of the Wyoming Massacre to
support a simplified narrative of frontier war that vindicated their own political positions on both
national and more local levels. As they used the example of Wyoming to advance their own
aims, Patriot revolutionaries and backcountry settlers alike fabricated a frontier horror story that
possessed an enduring mythic appeal for generations of future Americans.
In tracing the evolution of the story of Wyoming from a battle to a full-fledged massacre,
this chapter offers a thorough reconstruction of the reports as they initially appeared in military
accounts and their eventual transformation in anecdotal and newspaper reports. Focused on the
growing popularity of narratives demonizing Loyalists and Indians as barbaric enemies, this
composite account draws on the insights about anti-Indian rhetoric made by Robert Parkinson
and Peter Silver, as well as a vast scholarship on Native Americans, frontier warfare, and the
Wyoming Valley during the Revolution. Though others have briefly touched on the
transformation of Wyoming into legend, this chapter more extensively details the process,
seeking to explain how different narratives emerged and how they influenced contemporary
attitudes.

The Battle
To understand the Battle of Wyoming’s place within local and national memory, it first
becomes necessary to understand what participants in the battle said they witnessed in early July
1778. What they recorded and what later backcountry residents and newspapers reported often
proved to be at odds.
As the Revolutionary War entered its third year in 1778, violence had engulfed the
backcountry of the mid-Atlantic. In a brutal war that pitted neighbors, families, and tribes against
each other, Patriot and British forces battled for control over the valuable borderlands of New
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York and Pennsylvania. The preceding year had seen two large British expeditions traverse the
New York countryside, attempting but ultimately failing to bifurcate the colonies along the
Hudson River. After the disappointment of the botched expedition against Fort Stanwix in
central New York and Burgoyne’s disastrous defeat at Saratoga in 1777, the conduct of the
frontier war changed. While Burgoyne had brought a large army into the frontier, his costly
failure forced British military commanders to reevaluate their strategy. Their revised approach,
characterized by irregular warfare and raiding, aimed to minimize expenses while maximizing
destruction to vulnerable frontier settlements.1
Thinly manned yet vitally important, the settlement in the Wyoming Valley was an ideal
target within this new strategic conception. Situated along the banks of the Susquehanna River in
northeast Pennsylvania, Wyoming defended a crucial waterway and produced a significant
amount of grain that helped feed the Continental Army. While the Patriot government recognized
the importance of defending the valley, the settlement still lay exposed to attack. From 1776 to
1778, the Continental Congress had passed several acts related to this frontier region’s
protection, setting aside funds for the raising of companies as well as the construction and
arming of forts.2 The companies organized for Wyoming’s benefit, however, instead served with
General Washington, providing fresh manpower to the depleted Continental Army. The defense
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of Wyoming thus fell mostly to the local militia, a much less disciplined and battle-tested
adversary than their Continental counterparts.
Coupled with the valley’s lackluster manpower, the inhabitants of the region were also
internally divided. This was not new. Starting in 1769 and as recent as December 1775, different
groups of settlers from Connecticut and Pennsylvania had briefly come to blows over conflicting
claims to the land. Tensions remained high in the community throughout the Revolutionary War,
with the added political divide over whether to support independence or the crown
“superimposed” onto “the existing division” between Connecticut “Yankees” and “Pennamite”
Pennsylvanians over claims to land in the valley. As historian Anne Ousterhout has argued, the
Revolution exacerbated this societal partition within Wyoming and gave both sides opportunities
to seek revenge against their neighbors.3 By employing several Loyalists from the region within
his army as well as utilizing disaffected locals to garner military intelligence, Major John
Butler’s military expedition to Wyoming in late June and early July of 1778 readily exploited
these old animosities.4
Traveling along the Susquehanna River, Major John Butler and his combined force of
Loyalist rangers and Native American auxiliaries reported arriving in Wyoming on the last day
of June 1778. His small army, whose Indian component was commanded by the Seneca chief
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Sayenqueragtha, consisted of roughly “500 rangers and Indians” ready to make war upon the
valley.5 As they camped on a nearby cliff overlooking the frontier settlement, Butler sent out
scouting parties to report on the strength of the nearby Patriot defenses. His scouts, along with
two local Loyalists, provided him with valuable information as well as a small number of
prisoners and scalps. According to their reports, about 800 Patriot defenders were spread out
among several forts in the nearby vicinity. Armed with this intelligence, Butler and his men set
out the next day to accomplish their objective: destroy these frontier posts and prevent
Wyoming’s inhabitants from harvesting their crops.6
On July 1, the British expedition quickly and bloodlessly captured the two poorly manned
forts of Wintermoot and Jenkins. At Fort Wintermoot, Lieutenant Turney of Butler’s command
demanded the Patriots’ immediate surrender, and the beleaguered defenders quickly complied.
Turning over all public and private stores and promising to not “bear Arms” for the duration of
“the present contest,” the surrendering Patriots obtained Butler’s promise of protection for
themselves and their families. The aged defenders of Jenkins Fort, numbering just about
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seventeen, likewise accepted Butler’s terms. They refused, however, to swear that they would
never rejoin the Patriot military.7
After the British successes at these locations, John Butler then demanded the surrender of
the remaining 400 or so Patriot troops stationed in Forty Fort, the largest and best defended of
the region. The commanding American officer Colonel Zebulon Butler (no relation to the British
commander) and his men refused and remained within their fortifications. Despite the initial
objections of Colonel Butler and his second in command, Colonel Nathan Denison, however, the
Patriots did not stay put for long. Understandably, most of the militiamen and many of the
subordinate officers wished to attack the British in order to prevent further damage to their
homes and preclude a lengthy siege. Colonel Butler, against his better judgment, eventually
acquiesced to this plan.8 Moving out for an attack at 5 P.M. on July 3, about 400 Patriots left the
safety of Forty Fort to engage the enemy, or to use the more dramatic phrase of one historian,
“having refused terms,” Zebulon Butler’s men “sallied out of the fort and into history and
legend.”9
Once committed to the battle, Zebulon Butler hoped to catch his adversary unprepared.
Several British scouting parties, however, foiled this design and gave John Butler’s men ample
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warning. Unfazed by Forty Fort’s obstinacy or the news that 400 American troops were on the
march, Major John Butler cunningly burnt the captured fort in his possession to give the
impression that his men had withdrawal from the valley. He and his native allies then chose an
ideal battleground “in a fine open wood” that would allow for concealment and cover. Lying
down for the greatest protection, John Butler’s Loyalist rangers and Sayenqueragtha’s warriors
waited to spring a deadly trap on the unsuspecting Patriots.10
Thus, lured onto the battlefield with hopes of driving off the retreating invaders, Zebulon
Butler’s troop moved quickly to attack. Focusing on the Loyalists who had been specifically
positioned to draw the Patriots’ attention, Zebulon Butler’s men berated their enemies with
insults and called out: “Come out ye villainous Tories! Come out if ye dare and show your
heads…to the brave Continental Sons of Liberty.”11 They then fired three ineffectual volleys at
the Loyalist rangers’ position from about two hundred yards away, which did little damage to the
prone British forces. Unaware that each movement forward drew them deeper into the ambush,
the Patriots advanced towards the rangers who remained behind their cover instead of returning
fire. When the American army had advanced to just 100 yards away, the Loyalists and Native
Americans finally struck back. With a brutal close-range volley, the Loyalist and Indian army
exacted a heavy toll, and the ambush’s success quickly became apparent. The Native American
wing soon flanked, or in some reports surrounded, part of the American army and engaged in
close-quarter combat with the Patriots.12 When a Patriot officer ordered his men to fall back to
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escape from the Native American flanking maneuver, many confused and undisciplined
militiamen misinterpreted this as a sign of retreat, and they quickly broke ranks.13
What started as retreat swiftly transformed into a rout. Many Patriots fled and attempted
to cross the Susquehanna back to Forty Fort, but Native American soldiers cut off their escape.
In the brutal type of warfare that characterized the frontier conflict by both sides, the Native
Americans killed as many of the retreating soldiers they could.14 A few desperate militiamen
attempted to avoid this fate by jumping into the river, and several saved themselves from death
and dismemberment by swimming to safety. Others, either drowned or got shot while in the
river. Many never made it to shore.15 Still more, according to some improbable testimony, were
ritually tortured by an Indian queen.16 In the end, the entire battle, the retreat of the Patriot
forces, and the decimation of their numbers had lasted only about thirty minutes.17
Predictably, the casualty numbers at the Battle of Wyoming matched the lopsided nature
of the fighting. John Butler and his Indian allies lost almost no soldiers; in his letter to his
superior, Butler maintained that he suffered only about three killed and eight wounded.18
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Recalling the battle many years later, Blacksnake, an Indian veteran of the conflict, put the
Indian losses at close to eight, while Loyalist Richard Cartwright reported that “Major Butler’s
loss was only seven wounded, two of who died of their wounds.”19 The Patriots suffered much
greater loses. Two different Patriot officers claimed that the American dead numbered close to
200, while Loyalist accounts place the loss at well over 200. According to the testimony of one
witness, “the number of those who escaped did not exceed thirty men.”20 Indeed, other reports
corroborate this ghastly toll. Writing to his superior, John Butler reported that his men had
“taken 227 scalps and only five prisoners” during the action. Considering that many Patriot
militiamen drowned or were killed in the river and thus did not suffer the ignominy of scalping,
this conservatively puts the number to at least 250.21 Ultimately, historians will probably never
uncover the exact number of those who died, but they can comment on the battle’s effect by
discussing the ranges of casualties typically ascribed to it. In the words of military historian
Joseph Fischer, “Regardless of whose figures one accepts, put in perspective, this means the
engagement [at Wyoming] ranks as one of the most costly frontier battles in the nation’s
history.”22 In fact, one could consider Wyoming to be one of the American military’s most
lopsided frontier defeats.
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In the wake of this military disaster, Forty Fort capitulated the next day: July 4. Filling
the place of Zebulon Butler, who had escaped the carnage the day before and fled to safety away
from the valley, Colonel Denison now negotiated for the badly beaten Patriots. In no real
position to offer resistance, Denison readily signed Butler’s terms.23 The articles of surrender
ordered Denison’s men to lay down their arms, destroy their garrison, give up their prisoners,
and commit to not serving in the Patriot military for the duration of “the present contest.” In a
nod towards Pennamite Loyalists in the valley, John Butler also made Denison promise to give
back “the properties taken from the people called Torris” and allow them “to remain in peaceable
possession of their Farms and unmolested in a free Trade.” For surrendering peacefully, the
British victors agreed to do their best to protect the private property of the valley’s inhabitants
and promised to allow the occupants to live peacefully on their farms.24
Although some later reports propagated vastly different notions of what occurred during
the surrender, most evidence suggests that John Butler’s men did not harm any of Forty Fort’s
inhabitants during its capitulation. Bragging to his superior about his men’s conduct, John Butler
wrote “what gives me the sincerest satisfaction is that I can with great truth assure you that in the
destruction of this settlement not a single person has been hurt of the inhabitants but such as
were in arms.”25 While Butler potentially stretched the truth in writing to his superior, his
statement still stands out as more substantiated than later reports, which describe lurid scenes of
destruction and bloodlust levied against civilians. Reporting that their Native American allies did
not engage in wanton massacre of civilians, other accounts, such as those from Loyalist soldiers

23

Denison to Trumbell, July 28, 1778, 342-344.
Articles of Capitulation, Q15, p. 225-27, Public Archives of Canada, as quoted in Graymont, The Iroquois in the
American Revolution, 171. Butler’s use of language here is interesting. He does not say that Tories should get their
land back, rather he says that people called Tories should. This suggests that some false labeling was likely
occurring. For quotes throughout this thesis, I have retained the source’s original spelling.
25
Butler to Bolton, July 8, 1778, 166.
24

Tharp 31
Richard Cartwright and Richard McGinnis, support Butler’s recollection that there was no
civilian massacre at the fort.26 According to the questionable testimony of one former inhabitant,
however, Butler did briefly lose control of his Indian allies while negotiating the initial
surrender. They stole minor effects from the fort’s inhabitants.27 Regardless, this indicates that
only a negligible amount of plundering and destruction occurred within the fort.
While Butler’s men did not likely harm the fort’s occupants, they did break their
promises regarding protecting private property and allowing the region’s occupants to remain
peacefully in the surrounding countryside. After the surrender, Butler’s forces ravaged the
Wyoming Valley, driving off droves of frontier families and setting much of the region’s
infrastructure alight. Having eliminated Patriot resistance by July 7, the expedition’s raids
continued, crippling the ability of the region to produce needed foodstuffs for the Patriot army.28
Not only did Butler’s men target farms and homes, but they also stole or killed large numbers of
livestock. Commenting on the success of his expedition in a letter, Butler estimated that “we
have taken and destroyed eight palisaded forts and burned about 1000 dwelling houses, all their
mills, etc. We have also killed and drove off about 1000 head of horned cattle, and sheep and
swine in great numbers.”29 Native American soldiers additionally plundered houses, and some
returned home with their canoes laden with stolen goods.30 Some Loyalist and Indian soldiers
took the devastation yet one step further when they killed fleeing frontiersmen on the roads out
of the region.31
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To the Patriot inhabitants of Wyoming, the disastrous battle brought immense loss,
dislocation, and terror. Reflected in tax records from the valley, the extent of the physical
destruction reached far and wide. Before the raid in 1777, the valley had £20,322 worth of
taxable property. Afterwards in 1780, it had only £2, 353, or about one tenth of the prewar
total.32 In just a few short days, Butler’s men had destroyed much of the frontier community’s
farms, crops, and equipment. Even more damaging to the prosperity of the region, however, was
the mass exodus and psychological terror engendered by Butler’s victory.
From Wyoming, Butler traveled down the Delaware River, destroying a settlement along
his way before returning via the Susquehanna to the British stronghold of Fort Niagara by midJuly 1778.33 While this ended Butler’s Wyoming expedition, the story of the Wyoming Massacre
was only just beginning.

Distressing News
Understanding the full influence of reports and news about the Battle of Wyoming on the
wider Patriot public requires seeing it within a larger cultural context that focuses not on the
details of “what really happened” but on why certain narratives about Loyalists and their native
allies easily proliferated at this point in time. Notably, the battle occurred during a period that
saw a dramatic increase in anti-Indian rhetoric. Focusing on victimization at the hands of
“savages” and fueled by fear of Indian war, colonists had long cultivated what scholar Peter
Silver calls the “anti-Indian sublime,” the propensity to use atrocity-filled stories to argue for a
variety of social and political goals. In the Revolutionary War, Patriots applied this rhetoric to
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Great Britain, connecting the British with their “savage” allies and presenting themselves as the
victims of numerous “barbarities.”34 The language used in such frontier accounts had immense
power. To communicate the inhumanity of Indians and those perceived as engaging in “savage”
behavior, atrocity stories and news from the northern frontier consistently utilized words such as
“slaughter,” “defenseless,” “butchered,” and “scalped.” These and similar words worked on
multiple levels. Not only did they suggest the cruelty and monstrous nature of Patriot opponents
on the frontier, but they also presented settlers as innocent residents undeservedly suffering from
violence and inhumane mutilation.35 In the aftermath of the Battle of Wyoming, the anti-Indian
sublime and its histrionic language often colored Patriot reports with an eye towards provoking
governmental action or encouraging continued opposition to Great Britain.
Before the news of Wyoming reached the papers, it underwent an initial transformation in
the backcountry. As settlers and survivors fled in the aftermath of the battle, they disseminated
accounts that played up the extent of destruction and death that occurred in the valley. Suffering
from emotional trauma and the discomfort of forced migration, historian Barbara Graymont
notes, grieving settlers “easily…embellished their own very real misfortunes with tales of even
greater horror.” These embellished accounts informed Patriot reports on the battle, presenting the
aftermath in such a way that did not bear much resemblance to the course of events reported by
eyewitnesses. Moreover, when “others who had not been there” got hold of such information,
they “readily fill[ed] in the details [that] they lacked to the greatest extent that their imaginations
permitted.”36 Indeed, James Fenimore Cooper’s description of the response to a military defeat in
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The Last of the Mohicans mirrors the reaction of many on the Revolutionary frontier to
Wyoming:
A wide frontier had been laid naked by this unexpected disaster, and more
substantial evils were preceded by a thousand fanciful and imaginary dangers.
The alarmed colonists believed that the yells of the savages mingled with every
fitful gust of wind that issued from the interminable forests of the west. The
terrific character of their merciless enemies increased immeasurably the natural
horrors of warfare. Numberless recent massacres were still vivid in their
recollections; nor was there any ear…so deaf as not to have drunk in with avidity
the narrative of some fearful tale of midnight murder…the blood of the timid
curdled with terror, and mothers cast anxious glances even at those children
which slumbered within the security of the largest towns.37
As Cooper’s passage relates, frontier disasters like Wyoming produced distress and set off the
anxieties of much of the populace at the same time that they confirmed a longstanding pattern of
portraying Native Americans as barbaric. By seemingly confirming previous tales of massacres
and “midnight murder” as well as stereotypes about their adversaries, such news could shake the
confidence of entire towns and set Patriot imaginations on fire. Already awash in tales of frontier
violence, many unquestioningly believed the worst.
When the news of the disastrous defeat at Wyoming reached the inhabitants of the region,
dozens of settler families fled eastward, away from the invading army. While the July 4 treaty at
Forty Fort offered relatively conciliatory terms to the settlers, most Wyoming inhabitants either
did not put much stock in John Butler’s promises or had simply fled before his men descended
on the fort the day after the battle. Fearing for their lives, some settlers quickly formed an
impromptu convoy of “boats, canoes, hogtroughs, [and] rafts hastily made of dry sticks” to
escape. Guarded on both sides of the river by “the men of the settlement,” this panicked convoy
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illustrates the fear that gripped the countryside after the battle.38 In the numerous recollections of
former inhabitants, eyewitnesses uniformly made mention of the general confusion and fear that
accompanied their flight from the valley. Like many other loaded frontier accounts, the plight of
women and children featured prevalently in these narratives as did rumors of grisly death and
dismemberment at the hands of savage enemies. As they emphasized “the suffering of the day”
brought about by the defeat and subsequent panic, the valley’s survivors repeated similar sets of
stories about destruction and suffering. Capturing the displacement that many felt, former valley
resident Ishmael Bennet recalled that “the loss and ruin seemed universal; the distress no tongue
can tell.”39
As fearful settlers left the valley and spread their often groundless stories of loss and
dislocation, the panic engendered by the Patriot reversal at Wyoming quickly spread across the
northern frontier. Though the first newspapers only reported on the battle starting on July 16,
several earlier documents indicate that news of a costly defeat began to disseminate almost
immediately across the backcountry, sowing panic wherever it went. Just two days after the
battle on July 5, citizens of the frontier town of Goshen, New York invoked “the disagreeable
news of Wyoming” to petition Governor George Clinton for guns and ammunition to protect
their vulnerable town. Reporting that the settlement of Wyoming had totally surrendered after an
ill-fated battle, the authors of the petition attested to the effect this intelligence had on the
condition of the backcountry. In their own words, this news “gives the people…so much
uneasiness that many families are moving off and we have the greatest reason to believe that

Robert Covenhoven’s Account of the Great Runaway, n.d., Journals of Fort Augusta, vol. 21, as quoted in
Fischer, A Well-Executed Failure, 28.
39
See Hayden, The Massacre at Wyoming, 42-75, esp. 53-54. In general, these stories revolved around a woman
giving birth while fleeing, the vast destruction of farms and livestock, and the murder of many frontier men at the
hands of Native Americans.
38

Tharp 36
unless something be done…our frontiers will soon be reduced to the greatest distress.” This
petition’s bleak picture of the frontier effectively demonstrates how news of Wyoming’s
surrender influenced settlers and contributed to an atmosphere of fear that caused many in nearby
regions to flee to the coast like their Wyoming counterparts.40
For several days, news continued to trickle out about Wyoming, first to other frontier
towns and then quickly to Philadelphia. By July 8 and 9, several prominent Patriots reported
information about the battle.41 On July 10, the Loyalist deserter Jacob Wise related his
experiences with Butler’s expedition to the Patriot judge John Cleeve Symmes in Minisink, New
York. Roughly fifty miles east of Wyoming, Minisink lay directly on the path of many panicked
frontier settlers trying to leave the backcountry. Presenting Butler and his allies in a negative
light and commenting on the slain Patriots, Wise’s account likely exaggerated the immoral
actions of Butler’s Native American soldiers during and after the battle. In particular, he focused
on how the Indians “complained because they could not get the scalps of the drowned” from the
battlefield and how many left the region loaded with stolen goods.42 As it accentuated Indian and
British misconduct, Wise’s account foreshadowed later retellings of the Wyoming Massacre,
which would ascribe even greater horrors to the Patriots’ opponents.
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Along with Wise, other travelers, many of them former residents of Wyoming, also
spread news of the Patriot defeat, amplifying the attendant horrors. On the same day that
Symmes recorded Wise’s testimony, several Patriot officers also located in the town of Minisink
referred to Wyoming in a letter to Governor Clinton. Upon their arrival a few days earlier, the
officers reported that they had “found things in the greatest confusion” as a result of the upheaval
on the frontier. According to their account, “some few men with women and children by [the]
hundreds [were] flocking from Wyoming where by the concurrent testimony of numbers the
most horrid scenes of savage barbarity ha[ve] been exhibited.” After considering this information
as well as other distressing news, these officers, like the townspeople of Goshen, recommended
that the governor take offensive action as soon as possible.43 As terrified settlers fled and
disseminated the grisly news about Wyoming, they thus not only helped create a general panic
across the northern frontier but also encouraged other Patriots to begin thinking about retaliation
as a way to defend themselves.
Informed by fear and rumor, frontier men and women told stories of destruction and
bloodshed about Wyoming that were both gripping and wildly exaggerated. As Graymont writes,
“almost as soon as the [British] invaders left, the rumors began to fly, magnifying the horrors of
the battle and fabricating atrocities.”44 For example, along with showcasing the frontier panic,
the Goshen petition from July 5 illustrates how quickly new details could suddenly emerge in
narratives about Wyoming. Within their appeal, the townspeople maintained that both John
Butler and Joseph Brant, a prominent Mohawk leader who despite his role in much of the
frontier war was almost certainly not present at Wyoming, had attacked the valley. This
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groundless detail about the battle would have a major impact as it was eventually repeated in
popular histories and fiction well into the next century.45 Even more egregious cases of this
hyperbole plagued early depositions as well as Patriot newspapers. In particular, one Patriot
militiaman’s testimony, first recorded by a judge and later disseminated through a widely
circulated account published in a Connecticut newspaper, illustrates the wide-reaching effects
that such reports had on popular understanding of the battle.
No stranger to exaggeration, the Patriot militiaman Solomon Avery contributed
significantly to the atmosphere of misrepresentation surrounding the Battle of Wyoming. Avery
first told his story to Judge Symmes on July 8 in northern New Jersey, nine days before a
somewhat similar printed account by him emerged in a Connecticut newspaper.46 Presenting a
rosier picture of American conduct on the battlefield than Loyalist accounts, Avery’s deposition
recalled the Battle of Wyoming and the rout of Patriot forces through a decidedly partisan lens.
The Patriots in Avery’s account, for instance, did not retreat like cowards after only thirty
minutes like they did in John Butler’s report to the British high command. Instead, they fought
for “some time” until “all prospect of success was over.” Small embellishments aside, Avery’s
description of the battle and retreat remained consistent with other non-Patriot sources. His
comments about the aftermath, however, wildly exaggerated the death and destruction suffered
by the valley’s residents. As he quickly fled “the night after the action of the third,” Avery
claimed to have seen the settlement at Wyoming “all on fire” from his overlook to the east.
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Moreover, he liberally estimated that 2000 inhabitants had “perished in the carnage.”47 His
guesses proved wrong on both counts, yet his comments would have long lasting effects.
In a widely reprinted newspaper account printed a few days later, Avery repeated many
of the same details from his deposition about the Battle of Wyoming but added yet more
embellishments to his portrayal of the aftermath. Within the newspaper retelling, Avery first
accentuated the plight of the inhabitants of the valley who left everything behind as they made
“their escape naked through the wilderness.” Following the language conventions of frontier
accounts, he particularly drew attention to the “most forlorn condition” of the women and
children, and he used certain keywords, such as “distressed,” “naked,” and “escape,” to present
Patriots as pitiable victims. Though he doubtlessly exaggerated the nakedness of the emigrants,
this aspect of his expanded testimony speaks to the fear that gripped the northern frontier after
the battle and the deplorable state that many frontier refugees found themselves in as they moved
away en masse. Avery followed with his most shocking information, which significantly
diverged from his earlier deposition that had circulated to a much smaller number of readers. Not
mentioning any fire this time, he estimated that about 2500 people, or one half of the settlement
and 500 more than in his original approximation, were “killed” or “taken by the enemy [as]
prisoners.” The other half, he maintained, attempted to escape the region by any means
necessary.48 Once again, Avery’s claims about the days after the battle deviated significantly
from what other participants claimed to have seen.
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While Avery had witnessed the Battle of Wyoming firsthand, his knowledge of the
aftermath was at best confused and at worse fabricated for political effect. Since he left by his
own admission relatively soon after the battle, it is tempting to disregard the information in
Avery’s testimony and his newspaper account about this stage of events as completely flawed
and pass him over for other accounts. His suppositions about the aftermath of the battle,
however, speak to Patriot attitudes about the frontier war and the politicization of information.
Of course, his claims that a large fire engulfed the settlement, that 2000 or more died, and that
the inhabitants fled naked through the wilderness should not be taken at face value; none of these
things likely occurred, especially considering that no eyewitnesses from July 4 reported any
similar events. Nonetheless, through Avery’s comments, one can better understand the attitudes
and responses of many Americans in reference to Wyoming and similar instances of frontier
violence.
As he worked without much concrete information about the events of July 4 and after,
Avery may have reported what he believed had happened, thus demonstrating his ignorance of
the actual occurrences in the days after July 3. Probing deeper into his account from July 8, one
must first wonder what flames or smoke he mistook for fire, since John Butler’s Loyalist and
Indian army did not set Forty Fort or any major settlements alight on the night of July 3.49 With
only a brief description of a fire in the valley from Avery, a definite answer does not present
itself. Most likely, however, as the frightened and exhausted soldier viewed the valley from a
distant mountain, he mistook the smoke leftover from the battle or perhaps the blaze of Fort
Wintermont for the general settlement. As for the casualties of this alleged fire, Avery’s estimate
clearly had no basis in fact. Nowhere in the document does Avery explain how he reached this
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number, and since he left town on the night of July 3, he likely could not have received any
reliable intelligence from anyone in the settlement.50 Rather, his contention that a fire occurred
and that thousands died could come from his misreading of events. Similarly, the belief espoused
in the newspaper account that John Butler’s forces killed or captured 2500 civilians and that
many fled completely naked likely emerged from his own misinterpretations or from information
he heard from other settlers as he traveled away from Wyoming. Politics and the exigencies of
war could have also played a role in Avery’s depictions. Possibly hoping to encourage Patriot
retaliation against the victorious Loyalist and Indian force or to convince the government of the
need to better protect the frontier, Avery might have possessed political motivations to
exaggerate the damage inflicted upon the valley.
The leaps made in Avery’s account speak volumes to his mindset and those of many
Patriots. If he had simply misread the evidence, then Avery not only believed that his enemies
could commit such horrible atrocities on civilians, but he naturally assumed they would carry
them out. Recognizing the intense violence of the frontier war and that Avery had just witnessed
the deaths of hundreds of his fellow soldiers, suggests that such a hyperbolic response would
make sense within this context. He may well have been one of the many who conceived of their
Loyalist and Indian adversaries as villainous murderers. In turn, this type of thinking colored his
interpretation in the face of limited concrete information, leading him to make sensational
inferences about the destruction wrought by Butler. Amplified by the hyperbolic accounts of
settler emigrants, whom Avery almost certainly encountered in his trek east, this proclivity for
extrapolation could have led him to report high casualty numbers without verification. Even if
solely political motivations drove Avery to sensationalize his account of the aftermath, his
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portrayal would still demonstrate that he thought others would believe Loyalists and Indians
capable of enacting such violence. These documents from Solomon Avery thus showcase how
fear, rumor, and shock worked on the Patriot mindset, creating an environment conducive to
imaginative and political fabrication and detrimental to the truth.
Demonstrating the power of fear in feeding rumor and exaggeration, Avery’s account and
other early reports about Wyoming show how the process of transforming the Battle of
Wyoming into the Wyoming Massacre began: it started with settlers and survivors before
moving out to others who similarly distorted Wyoming to fit their own preconceived notions
about frontier violence, Native Americans, and the morality of the combatants on both sides.
Though most informants remained anonymous, their accounts still influenced Patriot reporting.
Since these news bearers were fueled by grief, anger, and despair over the humiliating defeat and
sudden upheaval as well as political animus against the British and their allies, it is easy to see
why they may have reported and responded in these ways. Nonetheless, such exaggerated stories
from fearful settlers contributed to a general sense of panic and misinformation not only in the
backcountry but also further east. In an emotionally charged atmosphere, rumors of real and
exaggerated horrors from survivors “grew [even more] monstrously in rumor” as an information
hungry public got hold of them.51 As newspapers transmitted the news of Wyoming to the
broader Patriot public, the hyperbole of frontier settlers soon found its way into such accounts,
often in even more embellished forms.

Once newspapers took up the story of Wyoming, the dynamics of the Patriot press began
to play a significant role in seeking to sway the opinions of Americans about the event. Central
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to the Patriot war effort and the fashioning of a new American identity, Patriot newspapers
served as crucial sources of information and important ideological weapons during this period.
As historian Robert Parkinson relates, Patriot publicists, particularly newspaper printers, worked
to convince the wider public to support independence or what they considered to be the common
cause. In creating that cause, they often relied on negative depictions of the British assisting or
encouraging Native Americans to commit depredations on the frontier.52 As Parkinson has
demonstrated, the political necessity of creating a common enemy dovetailed nicely with antiIndian rhetoric already in widespread use. Appealing to deep-seated cultural fears,
newspapermen commonly used Native Americans as negative reference points for articulating a
nascent American identity.53 Tellingly, Patriots also dissociated themselves from Loyalists and
the British by accusing them of engaging in “savage” behavior and thus connecting them to the
negative cultural stereotypes associated with Native Americans. The hyperbolic coverage of
Wyoming fits within these trends as Patriots used widely-circulated published tales of massacre
to convince others of the need for continued dedication to the war effort, argue for political and
cultural separation from Great Britain, and distance themselves from Loyalists and the British.
As the first two newspaper mentions of the action at Wyoming appeared on July 16
within New York and Pennsylvania papers, both authors used their stories in service of the
Patriot cause by utilizing atrocity-filled depictions to describe the battle and its aftermath.54
Likely drawing on intermittent pieces of news from the settlers who had arrived in Fishkill after
escaping the frontier, the July 16 account from the New York paper only provided its readers
with a few lines about the event. While the paper gave only a basic outline of the course of the
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battle, it made effective use of this small amount of space to craft a thoroughly effective partisan
narrative. Most notably, when detailing the Revolutionary soldiers’ retreat and loss at the hands
of John Butler’s Native American forces, the author noted that the defenders of the settlement
“being overpowered with numbers” had been “scalped and butchered by these inhuman allies of
Britain.”55 Turning to powerful atrocity language to demonize Loyalist and Indian conduct, this
paper presented a clear example of British barbarity that would have encouraged Patriots and
even those on the fence to distance themselves from Britain.
The July 16 account from the Pennsylvania Packet even more explicitly argued that the
news from Wyoming showcased British inhumanity and illustrated the necessity of supporting
the Patriot cause. As it broadcasted the anxiety that many Pennsylvania felt about a joint
Loyalist, Indian, and British “incursion” into the interior of the state, the paper painted a vivid
and distressing picture of the Pennsylvania backcountry. Within its report, the British-backed
invaders emerge as clear villains, “committing the most horrid murders on defenceless farmers,
women and children, and also laying waste and destroying the plantations of the inhabitants.”
The message the paper drew from these actions was unequivocally clear. Using the deplorable
state of the frontier and the misconduct of the British at Wyoming and beyond as evidence of
insidious British designs, this article harshly criticized Great Britain’s overtures for peace in
1778. In aiming to convince others of this, the author caustically wrote “thus, while our
defenceless wives and children are cut off by merciless savages…is the humane King of Britain
offering his idle and delusive propositions of peace!—Let this fresh act of his cruelty and
wickedness stimulate every good man to support, with redoubled vigor, that Independence which
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Nature, Necessity, and Reason have dictated to us.”56 The onslaught of overwrought terms
characterizing the Patriot residents as “defenceless” and the Loyalists, Britons, and Native
Americans as “merciless savages who la[id] waste and destroy[ed]” the Patriots’ property drew a
sharp moral line between the two sides. For this paper, British depredations on the frontier like
Wyoming simply confirmed their belief that complete separation through independence was the
best course of action for the young nation.
Over the next few days, Solomon Avery’s exaggerated newspaper account started to
circulate. As it encouraged Patriots to believe that massive numbers of civilians had been
slaughtered, it set the stage for a second and even more influential (and sensational) account to
emerge on July 20. This account, a narrative written by New York Journal editor John Holt,
“became the standard tale of the Wyoming Massacre” despite its woeful exaggerations. Printed
by “nearly every active American paper…in full,” as Robert Parkinson has explained, Holt’s
telling of the Wyoming Massacre deserves an in-depth analysis.57
Like Solomon Avery’s account, John Holt’s description embellished the course of events
at the Battle of Wyoming and even more significantly exaggerated in its depiction of the
aftermath. Beginning with a brief description of the natural abundance of the Wyoming Valley,
Holt moved into a partisan retelling of the battle. In his version, Zebulon Butler and his men
fought valiantly against 1600 Loyalist and Indian troops—more than double the actual number.
As the Patriots almost forced their numerically superior enemy to fall back, a cowardly or
traitorous soldier spread confusion in the Patriot ranks by yelling for a retreat. This act doomed
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the Patriot army and started the rout. Portraying the battle as a heroic and almost successful
attempt that was brought to ruin through treachery, Holt reframed this embarrassing loss to
explain away Patriot blundering and exonerate Zebulon Butler and his men from blame.58
While Holt used facts creatively in his depiction of the battle, his story of what happened
on July 4, the day after the battle, presented a largely invented narrative of death and destruction
that in turn became a potent American legend.59 According to Holt’s account, upon gaining entry
to the fort, the Loyalists and Indians proceeded to burn down most of its buildings, gathering up
women, children, and wounded soldiers to burn alive within their homes. They then went across
the river to another fort and repeated their atrocities.60 Not content with merely destroying these
forts, Holt reported, “they proceeded to the destruction of every building and improvement…that
came within their reach.” Nothing, not even crops and livestock, remained safe from the
invaders. The Loyalists and Indians even went so far as to cut out the tongues of cattle, leaving
them to die a pitiable death from thirst. The enemy’s depravity did not stop there though, as
several Patriot officers endured horrific torture at their hands.61 Most infamously, however, Holt
reported that John Butler offered only one term of surrender to the beleaguered Forty Fort: “the
Hatchet.”62 This threatening phrase, a creation of Holt’s imagination or perhaps gleaned from
settlers’ rumors, implied that Butler had encouraged atrocities against Patriots in the valley and
had done nothing to contain his savage auxiliaries.
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As Holt tapped into anti-Indian rhetoric and the language of frontier atrocity in crafting
his narrative, he mostly used these rhetorical weapons to attack the conduct of fellow “whites.”63
While perhaps surprising to modern readers, the British and Loyalists—not Native Americans—
received the most vitriolic criticism for engaging in frontier violence in these years. As Peter
Silver notes, “At least through 1778, the revolutionary press’s fascination with Loyalists who
tried to cross over to the Indians and conspire with them…still easily exceeded its interest in
Indians.”64 Holt’s account reflects these attitudes, and his descriptions often blurred the line
between Loyalist and Native American. For instance, he reports that the Tories present at the
battle overwhelmingly dressed like Native Americans and even decorated themselves with
Indian war paint. The Loyalists additionally engaged in many of the same behaviors as the
Indians, such as torture and the mutilation of fallen combatants.65
Sometimes, according to Holt, Loyalists even surpassed native cruelty. As Holt wrote in
a later article about Wyoming, “the behavior of the Tories to our people was abundantly worse in
every respect than that of the Indians.”66 This emerges most egregiously in his description of the
murderous “Partial Terry,” the Loyalist son of a respectable Wyoming family. After sending
horrific threats to his father about bathing in his blood, “the monster [Partial]…murdered his
father, mother, brothers, and sisters, stripped off their scalps, and cut off his father’s head.”67
Alongside Holt, other Patriots indulged in spreading similar tales of Loyalists killing and
mutilating family members. The story of Henry Pensell, a Patriot soldier shot in cold blood and
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then scalped by his Tory brother in the aftermath of the battle, lived on in the American
imagination for decades. According to one 1779 account, Henry begged his brother to spare him,
yet his brother John simply loaded his gun and called him “a damned rebel.” After one final plea
from Henry, John shot his brother and collected his scalp.68 However fantastic, such gruesome
reports about Loyalists killing their own families held immense political power.
Though these stories about Loyalist and Native American brutality at Wyoming had
power, many of the tales were simply invented with little or no evidence to support them. Holt’s
narrative again illustrates this larger trend as his story peddled unverified claims about many
aspects of the event. For instance, Holt claimed that John Butler only offered “the Hatchet” and
that Butler’s forces burnt Patriot civilians alive within the fort. Most participants in the
surrender, however, said that the troops at Forty Fort surrendered peacefully, accepted Butler’s
lenient terms, and suffered no civilian casualties during the capitulation. That John Holt accepted
groundless claims about Loyalist and Indian depravity at Wyoming should come as no surprise.
Twice in the first three years of war, British actions compelled him to relocate his newspaper
business after they captured the two places he worked: New York City and then Kingston, New
York. Both times, British and Loyalist troops destroyed his equipment and printing press, forcing
him to rebuild and eventual settle in the frontier town of Poughkeepsie. In debt and doubtlessly
angry at the British for his misfortunes, Holt had plenty of reason to propagate wild stories about
a cruel massacre committed by Loyalists and their Indian allies—and perhaps to believe those
stories as well.
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As other information came in though, even the bitter John Holt recognized some of the
ways his earlier report had erred. Three weeks after his initial article, he printed a correction,
noting “that the account…published in our paper of the 20th July, tho’ right in general, was in
sundry particulars erroneous.” In this retraction, Holt slightly modified his account, informing
his readers that the fort surrendered and that the British army did not indiscriminately kill women
and children. Even the story about Partial Terry, the supposedly murderous Loyalist, proved
wrong. While Terry had cursed and stolen from his family, “he did not actually murder…any of
the family,” as Holt admitted in his retraction.69
Despite walking back his initial information, the damage Holt had unleashed regarding
the wider public’s understanding of Butler’s attack on Wyoming had already been done. The
idea of a barbaric Wyoming Massacre quickly embedded itself into American consciousness, and
John Holt’s correctional letter did little to alter this trend. In fact, the notice only achieved
circulation in a third as many newspapers as the initial report.70 Across the colonies, Patriots
believed the most sensational accounts of Wyoming, and these became the baseline for a
sensational legend. One New York doctor’s August 5 letter illustrates how widespread this tale
became. Certain that his wife had access to similar information from “the Boston papers,” Dr.
Samuel Adams wrote “the unparalleled barbarity and worse than diabolical behavior of the
Tories and Savages at Wyoming on Susquehanna, you will no doubt have account of.”71 The
Wyoming Massacre had become a national story.
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As the event quickly became embedded into the national imagination, Patriots harnessed
the rhetorical power of the Wyoming Massacre for a variety of political purposes in the coming
months and years. For one, these accounts of Wyoming helped Patriots morally distance
themselves from the Loyalists and the British. For many Patriots, Loyalist and British
involvement with Native Americans and frontier violence signaled their former countrymen’s
descent into barbarism. Indeed, many accounts disparaged Loyalist and British conduct on the
frontier and used it to equate their white enemies with murderous Indians. As one Pennsylvanian
wrote in reference to the destruction of the settlements in the Wyoming Valley, “the devastations
and murders of the British and Indian savages, are not to be paralleled.”72 Other accounts about
Wyoming further denigrated the character of the British and Loyalists by describing them as
“merciless villains” or “monsters in human shape.”73
In accusing the British and their allies of succumbing to savagery, Patriots attempted to
articulate a distinct identity by differentiating themselves from their former neighbors and
compatriots. Moreover, within a culture increasingly anxious about the cultural degeneration of
whites as a result of living on the uncivilized frontier, Patriots worked to address these cultural
worries by casting their new white enemies into the role of “new-made Indians,” who “contract
the vices of both” white and Indian society.74 Especially in the focus on the gruesome family
murders of those like Partial Terry or in the erroneous rumors that John Butler and Zebulon
Butler were cousins, frontier accounts tried to show how their opponent’s tendency towards
betrayal and brutality matched that of Native Americans. According to Silver, such accounts
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gave “pro-revolutionary readers a satisfying feeling of moral distance…it was a relief to see that
the real parricides were on the other side.” Far from a model of enlightenment, Great Britain and
their similarly polluted Loyalist allies had become base and depraved in Patriot eyes.75 As part of
a wider Patriot discourse about the frontiers, the attention given to Loyalists and the British in
hyperbolic renditions of Wyoming ultimately helped Patriots articulate a separate identity and
justify their support for independence.
The themes of British misconduct and American tragedy at Wyoming readily fit within
the larger revolutionary narrative that Patriot publicists and newspapermen had constructed to
convince others to support independence. As a now well-known example of the British
encouraging Indian depravities and supposedly engaging in the atrocities themselves, the
Wyoming Massacre reinforced the chief arguments of those advocating for political
independence, who painted the British as diabolical and unfit to rule. The last line of Holt’s
lengthy account encapsulates this idea. Arguing unabashedly for independence, John Holt wrote
“this [the Wyoming Massacre] it is hoped will be the concluding scene of the tragedy acted by
the British tyrant and his murderous diabolical emissaries, in a part of his late kingdom, which he
has justly forfeited, and which is now forever departed from him.”76 For Holt, the atrocities at
Wyoming discredited the British and illustrated why Americans should control their own fate.
A shameless promoter of the American cause abroad, Benjamin Franklin also recognized
how incendiary tales about British cruelty, like the Wyoming Massacre, advanced the cause of
independence. Around May 1779, Franklin planned to weave such portrayals into a partisan
depiction of the war for foreign and domestic audiences, drafting a list of twenty-six potential
illustrations to include in a book for children. Though never produced, the images he proposed
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utilized the common atrocity tropes of the period to support separation from Great Britain and
the Patriot cause. Intended to accentuate the depravity of the British, Franklin’s illustrations
would have drawn attention to their wrongdoings including the burning of cities, the abuse of
prisoners, and the use of formerly enslaved men as soldiers. Alongside these perceived injustices,
the frontier loomed large within Franklin’s negative portrayal of “British Cruelties.” While
critical of Indians, Franklin’s frontier images mostly focused on British collusion with Native
Americans and how such actions perpetuated injustices on the frontier. Harnessing the antiIndian sublime to harshly condemn his former country, Franklin envisioned several provocative
illustrations that would have shown British officials and even the king endorsing brutal violence,
scalping, and cannibalism. Within his draft, Franklin painted a grisly picture of “Savages killing
and scalping the Frontier Farmers and…Women and Children, [while] English Officers mix’d
with the Savages…giving them Orders & encouraging them.”
The Wyoming Massacre, especially in its most exaggerated forms, naturally fit within
this histrionic narrative of British backcountry atrocity. Indicative of the Wyoming Massacre’s
national clout among Patriots, Franklin mentioned the settlement by name in his draft, stating his
intention to commission an illustration of the British commander at Niagara paying for “the
Scalps of the Wioming Families.”77 Franklin’s description implicitly accepted exaggerated
accounts of civilian death at the settlement further entrenching popular misperceptions of the
event. Moreover, his words illustrate how Patriots quickly integrated this sensationalized view of
the massacre into their arguments for independence and in their overarching critique of Great
Britain. A visceral example of British savagery and American suffering, the Wyoming Massacre
became an integral part of the pro-independence argument.
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Patriot accounts of Wyoming additionally encouraged retaliation in the backcountry. In
the wake of the Battle of Wyoming, many appealed to the government and army to defend the
frontiers, invoking the language of frontier victimization and stressing the inhumanity of
Loyalist, British, and Indian troops to galvanize governmental action. Discussing rumored
pockets of Loyalist and Indian raiders, Holt commented, “it is hoped speedy and effectual
measures will be taken to punish and extirpate these monsters in human shape from the face of
the earth.”78 Connecticut governor Jonathan Trumbull echoed these sentiments in an appeal to
General Washington. Stressing “the distressed situation of the Inhabitants…who survived the
more than barbarian cruelty of Indians and Tories,” Trumbull hoped to convince Washington to
act on behalf of the Connecticut settlers still in the valley and send roughly 2000 men to “pursue
that detestable Banditti [the Loyalists and Indians] into their own Country.” He further
admonished Washington to “chastise them for their insolence and cruelty towards the innocent
Inhabitants…and effectually prevent their making any further Depredations on that, or any other
of our back settlements.”79 Presenting Wyoming as a tale of settlers suffered at the hands of
monstrous invaders, Trumbull ultimately argued that the Loyalists and Indians deserved
punishment for their crimes and that the defense of the frontier required a retributive strike.
Starting in late September 1778, Colonel Thomas Hartley took up the task of punishing
Loyalist and Indians for the massacre at Wyoming with his own expedition into the interior of
Pennsylvania. Hartley, clearly influenced by the news coverage of the battle, began his account
by reminding his readers about the dangerous state of the frontiers after the destruction of the
settlement in the Wyoming Valley. Utilizing the common frontier tropes of fleeing settlers, the
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murder of women and children, and “villainous Indians and Tories,” Hartley presented his
offensive action as a defensive measure aimed to prevent another Wyoming Massacre. Like
Trumbull, he believed retaliation was necessary to punish former atrocities and safeguard the
backcountry from future attack. As he envisioned his men’s movement as “an aid and
assistance….to the distressed people” on the frontier, Hartley detailed his men’s destruction of
Native American settlements without any sense of contradiction. In his encounters with Native
Americans, Hartley revealingly saw “no alternative but conquest or death.”80 Stories of violence
at Wyoming allowed Hartley to endorse a morally unambiguous view of the frontier war that
justified his punitive expedition.
For national military leaders, exaggerated reports from Wyoming played a crucial role in
convincing them to approve an even larger expedition in 1779. Indeed, from the time the news
about Wyoming broke, national politicians had called for a concentrated attack on the frontier.
As the Patriot James Lovell wrote just five days after the battle, “The Indians and Tories have
cut off Wyoming; and They must be eradicated Root and Branch as soon as ever we get a little
Relaxation from War on the Sea Coasts.”81 Other Patriots concurred, arguing that a frontier sortie
might provide “a breathing spell for the People” and that a successful attack against Indian
country might prevent the Indians “from acting hostily against us” for the rest of the conflict. 82
George Washington, the architect of the large expedition that set off in the summer of 1779,
endorsed these arguments in his justification for a raid. Ordering General John Sullivan,
commander of the Patriot troops in the raid, to demolish Indian villages and take as many
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prisoners as possible, Washington asserted that “our future security” rested on driving the
Indians away and in leaving them “in the terror with which the severity of the chastisement they
receive will inspire them. Peace without this would be fallacious and temporary.”83 In other
words, Washington presented invasion and the destruction of Indian towns, farms, and
communities as a necessary precursor to peace on the frontier. Influenced by reports of
destruction and chaos engendered by Wyoming and other similar frontier disasters late in 1778,
Patriots advocated for offensive invasions and total war on the frontier, rationalizing them as
justifiable retaliatory maneuvers meant to prevent future atrocities. Ironically, such actions, far
from securing the frontiers as Washington and other Patriots had hoped, only deepened the cycle
of violence and encouraged ravaged Native American populations to seek revenge.84
While Patriots used the example of Wyoming to reinforce the national cause of
independence or endorse violence, their arguments and depictions had local import as well. From
the beginning, local and national currents intertwined within the struggle over the Wyoming
Valley. Of course, the battle was part of the larger Revolutionary contest, but it was also an
intensely local affair in which older conflicts between Pennamite and Yankee settlers reemerged
with new window dressing. As Patriots conflated Tories and Indians for a more national
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audience, settlers on the ground in the Wyoming Valley saw their neighbors, whom they
mislabeled as Tories, in the same light. Imbibing and spreading stories of Loyalist depravity, so
Paul Moyer writes, Yankee settlers and Patriot publicists alike “portrayed Tories [and
consequently Pennamites] as people who possessed the same savagery, mercilessness, and
brutality that supposedly characterized Indians.” Such “white savagery,” as historian Gregory
Knouff terms it, was seen as even worse than traditional Indian savagery, since by acting like
Indians white Loyalists betrayed their communities and race.85 In the Wyoming Valley, these
depictions allowed Yankee settlers to justify brutal treatment of their Pennamite neighbors.
Though Patriots and settlers primarily drew on exaggerated accounts of the Wyoming
Massacre to advance their own political goals, such reports also influenced Native American and
British perspectives on the battle and its aftermath. Most dramatically, as some Iroquois heard
about the cruelties Patriots accused them of committing, they “smoldered with…resentment” and
reacted most violently.86 Their resentment came to a head at Cherry Valley, New York in
November 1778, when a large Loyalist and Native American raiding party attacked the small
town and massacred most of its inhabitants. Unlike the Battle of Wyoming, Cherry Valley
needed no exaggeration after the fact as Native Americans and Loyalists brutally killed any
Patriots outside of the defending fort. A far cry from the relatively peaceful surrender of Forty
Fort less than six months before, these murders signaled a shift in the frontier conflict, leading
both sides to commit violence against combatant and civilian alike.
In part, Patriot propaganda about Wyoming contributed to this shift. Though Indian
raiders expressed anger at the sight of Patriot soldiers violating their paroles during the attack,
Native Americans primarily reacted to popular misperceptions of their conduct at Wyoming. As
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British officer Walter Butler revealingly argued in a letter to his superior, the violence at Cherry
Valley resulted from Patriot reports that “falsely accused the Indians of cruelty at Wyoming.”87
Incensed by Americans’ accusations about the Wyoming Massacre, some Indians embraced the
violence that Patriots had earlier accused them of committing. Casting long shadows over
frontier relationships both during and after the Revolutionary War, exaggerated and
unsubstantiated accounts of the Battle of Wyoming contributed to the backcountry’s descent into
distrust and retaliation.

Conclusion
From rumors of frightened backcountry settlers to national newspapers to prominent
statesmen, the legend of the Wyoming Massacre spread rapidly across the thirteen colonies
during the Revolutionary War, accruing meaning and potency with each successive use. This
sensational story, which had been suspect to exaggeration from its very beginning, served a
variety of purposes to Patriots and more local settlers in the aftermath of the battle. On a national
level, Patriot propagandists used the Wyoming Massacre to bolster their arguments for political
and cultural separation from Great Britain, while national policymakers called on the recent
memory of Wyoming to either provoke action or rationalize punitive raids into the backcountry.
Seemingly confirming Patriots’ fears about Native American savagery and Britain’s part in
perpetuating it, Wyoming played an indispensable role in the larger propaganda war that raged
during the Revolution. As the emerging memory of the battle resonated with national audiences,
it struck a chord with locals and others on the frontier as well. While some, like the townspeople
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of Goshen, used the events in the valley to petition the state or national government for much
needed defense, others turned the rhetoric of savagery and the anti-Indian sublime against their
former neighbors and countrymen. As they denigrated their opponents as diabolical and evil,
Patriots and settlers commonly justified retributive frontier violence by referring to Wyoming.
Though firmly situated in the context of the Revolutionary War, the legend of the
Wyoming Massacre outlived the conflict. As the Revolution slowly receded into memory,
Americans still evoked this increasingly mythic event for their own political or rhetorical
purposes. Wartime narratives and arguments utilizing the characterization of Wyoming as a
massacre rather than a mere battle indelibly effected these later depictions. Indeed, the
exaggerations of the moment cast a long shadow over the remembrance of the Battle of
Wyoming as future historians, politicians, writers, and artists would uncritically affirm and pass
down the exaggerations of their forebears to succeeding generations.88 Due to its importance in
national and regional narratives, Wyoming remained entrenched within the country’s
Revolutionary mythology and the valley’s local politics. As one British paper perceptively noted
in 1781, the events in the valley “have only served to fix a bitter and lasting resentment in the
minds of the colonists.”89 Lasting indeed.
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Chapter 2
“Let Britain and Wyoming butchers tell!”
Authentic History, British Barbarity, and Frontier War in the Early Republic

The Revolutionary War officially ended in 1783, but the legend of the Wyoming
Massacre lived on in the Early Republic. In the immediate aftermath of the war, the battle did not
receive much attention in contemporary political discourse, but it remained a well-known event
for most Americans—in part due to the influence of the first historians of the Revolutionary
conflict. 1 Working to provide truthful and authentic accounts, these historians helped ensure that
Americans would not forget Wyoming and its role in the Revolution. What these historians
wrote and what Americans remembered about July 1778, however, often relied on the
embellishments of wartime Patriot propaganda. The ephemeral, often groundless reports from
the Revolution thus became verified parts of the historical record, bolstering the credibility of the
legendary massacre narrative and allowing it to spread in new ways.
As historians reaffirmed unsubstantiated narratives from 1778 and assisted their ongoing
dissemination, they made it possible for the Massacre to return to national political attention.
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With relations with Britain deteriorating, especially after 1807, older accounts of British
misconduct regained much of their political import, and they served as a way for Americans to
tie past British barbarity to new circumstances. Once again assisting Americans in calling for
unity against the British and their “savage” Native American allies, the legend of the Wyoming
Massacre returned in full force for the War of 1812. Like Patriots before them, however,
Americans during the new conflict did not simply utilize Wyoming’s example to attack the
British or even Native Americans. Rather, they also turned its rhetorical force against each other,
using it for partisan advantage in one of the most divided moments in American history.
Throughout the war with Britain and even later as Americans continued to fight against
native tribes in the West and South, the familiar language of atrocity consistently accompanied
depictions of Wyoming. The legend of the Wyoming Massacre readily spoke to white fears of an
Indian war on the frontier, a fear shared with many Patriots during the Revolutionary War.
Repeatedly invoking the Massacre in ways indistinguishable from their Patriot counterparts,
Americans used it to justify retaliation and blame the British for inciting the violence. In 1812 as
in 1778, Wyoming’s tale of British and Indian savagery packed a powerful punch.
This chapter seeks to explain how and why Americans elected to remember the myth of
the Wyoming Massacre during the first two decades of the nineteenth century. After examining
how historians legitimized groundless accounts from the Revolution, this chapter then explores
how these reified narratives reemerged to influence national discourse. Informed by works on
Revolutionary memory and the War of 1812 by such scholars as Alan Taylor, Sarah Purcell, and
Robert Parkinson, this chapter aims to show how the legend of the Wyoming Massacre not only
survived into the early Republic but how it shaped a national conversation.
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“Authentic” Falsehoods
Exaggerated and unverified wartime narratives continued to foster misunderstandings
among the American populace about Wyoming long after the end of the Revolutionary War.
While newspapers of the early Republic rarely mentioned the battle before the nineteenth
century, the stories of the Wyoming Massacre were given new life in early histories of the war.
In the writing of these histories, especially in the period before 1815, American historians made
ample use of Revolutionary newspaper accounts.2 As media historian Janice Hume recounts,
these historians commonly relied on and even reproduced press stories from the Revolution in
their works, helping “ensure that the iconic narratives [of the Revolution] endured in American
collective memory.”3 Despite these historians’ professed aims to present truthful history, they
duplicated many of the uncorroborated claims presented in these wartime accounts, showing how
Patriot propaganda outlasted the fighting and continued to shape the public’s understanding.
According to Robert Parkinson in The Common Cause, the first histories of the Revolution
allowed “war stories, which Patriot publicists often crafted in frantic, anxious settings” to
transform into durable narratives by reaffirming them in supposedly “detached [historical]
volumes.” Like Hume, Parkinson maintains that history helped temporary, partisan news
accounts from the Revolution become a “permanent fixture” of the American Revolutionary
story.4 Forged in fear, nationally known, and having no basis in evidence, the Wyoming
Massacre—especially as related in Holt’s account—was exactly the type of war story passed
down in these early histories. Taking newspaper accounts at their word, these historians further
solidified the Wyoming Massacre’s place in the American imagination.

While I usually call the authors of these histories “historians,” they might more properly be called amateur
historians or amateur historical writers.
3
Hume, Popular Media and the American Revolution, xvi, 3-12.
4
Parkinson, The Common Cause, 598-612, esp. 604 and 612.
2

Tharp 62
One of the first influential histories set the stage by reproducing and reifying many of the
elements of Holt’s unsubstantiated narrative. First published in London in 1788, William
Gordon’s four-volume The History of the Rise, Progress, and Establishment, of the
Independence of the United States claimed in the preface to uphold a “sacred regard to truth,” yet
its retelling of Wyoming appeared to treat Holt’s 1778 newspaper report as a trustworthy
source.5 Gordon provided several details that he likely picked up from Holt. For instance, he
maintained that John Butler led 1600 Loyalist and Native American raiders, a wildly exaggerated
number that came directly from Holt’s account. Gordon’s description of the battle also resembled
typical Patriot narratives that stressed that Patriot troops had fought bravely, almost won, and
suffered defeat only because of the cowardice or betrayal of a soldier who called for a retreat.
Most importantly, Gordon reproduced the most infamous of Holt’s fabrications, the myth that
John Butler refused to allow Forty Fort’s surrender and then let a massacre occur. According to
Gordon, the commanding Patriot officer asked Butler for the terms of surrender for the fort, but
Butler, “with more than savage phlegm,” only “answered…[with] two short words—the
hatchet.” Gordon’s account then insists that the outmatched Patriot defenders fought
unsuccessfully against a besieging force of Loyalists and Indians, who after taking the fort
massacred the inhabitants and burned the remaining buildings. Gordon also illustrated the
brutality of the British and their Indian allies by focusing on how they cut out the tongues of
cattle, cruelly torturing the animals. Charges of parricide and the torture of Patriots at the hands
of Loyalists reemerged in Gordon’s account as well. In effect, he rehashed Holt’s overwrought
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narrative, giving it an enhanced status as part of a supposedly authenticated history that further
fueled a “bitter and lasting resentment…in the minds of the Americans.”6
Even without succumbing to Holt’s level of exaggeration, South Carolina historian David
Ramsey’s discussion of Wyoming largely legitimized American retaliation and highlighted the
depravity of Loyalists just as Patriot rhetoric had during the Revolution. Writing at the same time
as Gordon, Ramsey published his history of the American Revolution just a year later in 1789.
Unlike Gordon, however, he did not reproduce the hyperbole of Patriot news sources about the
battle, and his account of the course of events at the Battle of Wyoming and in its aftermath
aligned with most eyewitness reports.7 Indeed, Ramsey did not need Holt’s or Gordon’s
fabrications to explicate the lessons that Americans should take away from Wyoming and other
similar instances of frontier violence during the war. Just by showing how the Patriots had
“fought gallantly” and by mentioning the suffering of those fleeing Wyoming in fear, Ramsey
could expound upon how “the savage part of the war was carried out in America.” Emphasizing
its cruelty, horror, and waste, Ramsey placed the blame for frontier violence firmly on “the
savages, encouraged by British presents and agents, and led on by American refugees
[Loyalists].”8 Like they did a little more than a decade before, Americans like Ramsey still
referenced the events at Wyoming to justify their actions on the frontier and their conduct during
the war.
Ramsey’s account demonstrates that not all historians or writers of this period uncritically
accepted the Patriot press’s original reporting on the battle, but most authors writing about
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Wyoming before 1830 more closely followed Gordon’s account than Ramsey’s. Writing in the
1790s, John Lendrum’s history illustrates this larger trend as he took aspects of Ramsey’s
writing but mostly relied on Gordon’s history to craft his account of the battle. Lendrum’s
recounting of the Loyalists and Native Americans who had mustered under John Butler’s
command, for instance, more closely followed the numbers offered by Ramsey.9 In most other
ways, however, Lendrum clearly drew most of his material from Gordon and by extension John
Holt’s 1778 report.
This influence emerges clearly in Lendrum’s thinly veiled paraphrasing of Gordon’s
words. When he writes that “Butler, with all the phlegm of a real savage, answered [the query
about surrender terms], in two short words, ‘The hatchet,’” Lendrum just slightly altered the
earlier historian’s line about Butler’s “more than savage phlegm.”10 His subsequent description
of “barbarous conquerors” and “merciless ravagers” immolating defenseless women and children
before directing “their animosity against every part of animated nature” also clearly hewed to
Gordon’s and Holt’s narratives. Moreover, Lendrum’s account similarly painted an idealized
picture of life in the valley before the battle.11 In an era when authors commonly copied each
other without acknowledgment, this somewhat blatant plagiarism should not come as a
surprise.12 Nonetheless, Lendrum’s paraphrasing shows that he relied on Gordon and other
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flawed historical accounts for his own work. Utilizing extremely similar terms and phrases to
discuss the state of the settlement and the supposed massacre on the day after the battle,
Lendrum partially reproduced Gordon’s account, further reifying the story of the Wyoming
Massacre from the Revolution itself.
In legitimizing this story, Lendrum added other material that subsequent historians would
replicate in their own work, and with each successive use they rendered more support for the
legend of the Wyoming Massacre. For instance, Lendrum used the massacre to transition from
his discussion of the “reprehensible” behavior of the British and Hessians to the far worse
conduct of Native Americans and Loyalists. He especially expounded upon the evils of John
Butler and Joseph Brant, accusing the latter of participating in the attack on Wyoming.13 Writing
in the next decade, noted female historian Mercy Otis Warren employed the same transition in
her discussion of the Massacre. The beginning of her account closely followed Lendrum’s,
including this transition and a similar pastoral image of the Wyoming settlement as a fertile
“happy spot.”14 Her account of the battle likewise relied on hugely exaggerated numbers and
reproduced “the hatchet” myth, going so far as to claim that John Butler “had nothing human
about him, except a rough, external figure of a man.” In offering such portrayals, Warren clearly
based her interpretation on her reading of other amateur historians and the original reports.
Though she did not mention any other historians by name, her narrative choices and the use of
certain phrasing points to connections to Gordon and Lendrum, while the influence of Holt and
other similar Patriot accounts are explicitly referenced within the text. In a revealing footnote,
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Warren admits that “the transactions at Wyoming are recorded above, agreeably to the most
authentic accounts at the time.”15 By “authentic accounts,” she must have meant Holt and his ilk.
Warren’s “authentic” depiction of Wyoming advanced a partisan interpretation of frontier
violence during the Revolution. Noting, among other alleged atrocities, the enemy’s “internal
pleasure of seeing” women and children inside Forty Fort “perish promiscuously, in the flames
lighted by their bloody hands,” Warren drew a vivid picture of British and Indian savagery
during the Massacre. She then used this to partially justify American frontier reprisals. While
admitting that George Rogers Clark’s attack on Native Americans in Illinois country during the
war “awakes compassion,” Warren largely dismissed this act of violence perpetrated by Patriots.
Citing Wyoming, she commented that “perhaps the law of retaliation may, in some measure,
justify the depredations of Clark.”16 Like many Patriots before her, Warren called upon the
political power of the sensationalized tale of Wyoming to denigrate British and Indian conduct
while simultaneously defending the rectitude of Patriot frontier attacks. Justifications like these,
premised on fabricated evidence, had powerful ideological effects on an American readership.
As information from Holt’s and Gordon’s accounts got repeated, they gained the veneer
of truth and became adopted by other historians in the early nineteenth century. In 1803, John
Marshall’s multi-volume biography of George Washington again replicated earlier historians like
Gordon in describing Butler’s “more than cannibal ferocity” and repeating his hatchet story to
even more readers. Marshall also commented on the atrocities committed during the battle in a
list that mirrored Holt’s original recounting. Recalling instances of familicide and other “peculiar
instances of barbarity…at which human nature recoils,” Marshall lamented how political
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division could led to such violence.17 Even across the Atlantic, similarly histrionic retellings of
the Wyoming Massacre took hold. For instance, a history of North America published in Dublin
in 1820 referred to the Massacre by parroting John Holt’s account of 1600 Loyalists and Indians
killing inhabitants, burning residents alive, and ruthlessly maiming cattle.18 This development
would have major consequences for the public’s remembrance of the event.
While groundless accounts of the battle gained increasing acceptance by the amateur
historians of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, it did not go unchallenged. In
1806, Charles Miner, a congressman and later a local historian from the Wyoming Valley, wrote
to John Marshall to complain about his inaccurate depiction of the battle. Twenty-five years later
in 1831, John Marshall finally responded to Miner and revealingly acknowledged his reliance on
both Ramsay’s and Gordon’s early histories. Primarily blaming these historians for any
inaccuracies in his own work on Wyoming, Marshall directly spoke to how the wartime Patriot
press operated and how this later influenced the writing of history. “It is surprising that they
[Ramsay and Gordon] should have so readily given themselves up to the newspapers of the day,”
Marshall wrote. “It was certainly our [Patriot] policy during the war to excite the utmost possible
irritation against our enemy, and it is not surprising that we should not always have been very
mindful of our publications.”19 Acknowledging the partisan function of newspapers during the
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war, Marshall recognized the inherent issue with using these accounts to obtain the true course of
events, and his comments illustrate how such newspaper reports found their way into one history
after another. History’s supposed authenticity indeed gave the partisan stories of the Patriot press
credibility and even authority.
The acceptance of these unsubstantiated accounts by self-described truthful historians opened
the way for those less concerned with verifiable facts to further spread these stories. With the
increasing popularity of Indian atrocity literature after the Revolution, some disseminated these
narratives as part of larger works on Indian-settler relations. An 1800 publication, for example,
included the tale of the Wyoming Massacre with six other stories of encounters between whites
and Native Americans, most of which resulted in violence. To present these stories, such books
often simply reproduced Gordon’s account, considering it “authenticated in the most satisfactory
manner.”20 Presenting Native Americans in a negative light, this 1800 work and another book
that reproduced Gordon’s account of the massacre—appropriately subtitled the Outrages
Committed by the Indians in Their Wars with the White People—reflect a growing hostility to
Native Americans in the period.21 According to historians Philip Deloria and Colin Calloway,
white Americans increasingly saw Native Americans as enemies to the nation, ignoring the
sacrifices of loyal tribes during the Revolution and instead focusing on atrocities committed by
natives during the conflict. These books fit within this trend, and they used historians’ accounts
to advance a certain view of Native Americans as savage, less than human, and unfit to become
citizens in the new American nation.22 As they took historians’ accounts of Wyoming at face
Chapman Whitcomb, Affecting History of the Dreadful Distresses of Frederick Manheim’s Family (Leominster,
MA: Chapman Whitcomb, 1800), 1-4, 34-39.
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value, the authors of these works of atrocity literature used this largely unfounded history to
shape the public’s understanding of Indian-settler relations, assisting white Americans in
justifying the exclusion of native people from the body politic.
Poets also spread the sensationalized tale of the Massacre to the reading public, further
solidifying the legend of Wyoming as they used Revolutionary history for inspiration. In 1810, a
poem printed in The District of Columbia’s National Intelligencer spoke to the direct influence
that Revolutionary historians had on depictions of the battle in popular print culture. Detailing
the horrors of the Massacre in verse, this poem painted a disturbing picture of merciless “savage
bands” burning buildings and slaughtering innocents at Wyoming—an image that fit with most
historians’ accounts. Revealingly, the poet’s vivid description presented the event as a hellish
nightmare inspired by a nighttime reading of a Revolutionary history. “Thus far I read, and
clos’d the blood-stain’d page,” the poem began, “And sought in sleep my horrors to assuage.”
This nightmare-inducing page came directly from William Gordon’s history, which the poet
referenced in a footnote to the piece. Even more fittingly, another paper paired a reprinting of
this same poem with an excerpt from Mercy Otis Warren’s history about Wyoming.23 This
explicit reference to Gordon and the pairing of Warren with this poem shows the influence that
historians wielded in shaping Americans’ understanding of the battle. As historians uncritically
duplicated the baseless stories of Patriot publicists, poets and other artists likewise reproduced
these narratives, now authenticated by historical works, within their own creations. These
popular poems ensured that the legend of the Wyoming Massacre would live on.
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Scottish poet Thomas Campbell’s 1809 epic poem, Gertrude of Wyoming, exemplifies how
the legend of Wyoming passed first from newspapers to histories and then to works of popular
culture and literature. Based on the events of 1778 and reaching its climax with the battle, this
Romantic tale followed a young heroine, a noble patriarch, and a dashing hero as they witnessed
Wyoming’s settlement transform from a pastoral refuge to a place of horrors.24 Drawing from
popular history and adding dramatic flair, the poem embellished some events and invented a few
characters. Overall, though, Campbell based the poem on historical facts he gleaned from
popular histories and contemporary reports.25 The accounts he relied on, however, led him
astray, especially with who he chose to portray as the main perpetrator of the massacre: Mohawk
leader Joseph Brant, who had not been there according to the testimony of participants. No
matter, “the Monster Brandt,” as Campbell called him, became the chief villain of the work.26
Brant’s incensed family eventually wrote to Campbell about this major oversight in 1822,
eliciting revealing admissions from the poet that illuminate some of the ways that history and
partisan reporting from the Revolution negatively informed his and the public’s understanding of
Wyoming. Campbell responded by expressing regret that he had misrepresented Brant’s
character. He claimed that he had taken it “as I found in in popular history” and had “adopted
accusations against him [Brant] which had stood…uncontradicted, for thirty years.” Campbell
then directly spoke to how historians and other author’s repetition of these Revolutionary
narratives influenced his inclusion of those same accusations within his narrative. According to
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him, “A number of authors have repeated them [the accusations against Brant] with a confidence
which beguiled at last my suspicion, and I believe that of the public at large.” Campbell’s frank
admission reveals the massive extent to which historians reified these sensationalized narratives.
Repeated enough times by historians, these stories became disassociated from their original
partisan intent and emerged as indisputable historical fact for many in the American and even
British public. The sheer number of contemporary sources and historians who duplicated the
same falsehoods from Patriot accounts gave those hyperbolic details a plausibility that proved
difficult to question.
Even after admitting he mistakenly made Brant the villain of his poem, Campbell still
refused to accept the suggestion that the legendary version of the Massacre might rest on
baseless rumors. He argued, “an error about him [Brant] by no means proves the whole account
of the business [at Wyoming] to be a fiction…who would not wish its atrocities to be disproved?
But who can think it disproved by a single defender, who writes anonymously, and without
definable weight or authority?” In ascertaining the truth as to what occurred at Wyoming in July
1778, Campbell still trusted the collective judgment of historians over that of Brant’s family
despite the revelation that these same sources had led him to error. In the end, the authority
afforded to history by Campbell and “the public at large” gave the legendary narrative of
Wyoming an almost unassailable legitimacy.27
Gertrude of Wyoming increased the staying power of the sensationalized image of the battle
as it became popular in nineteenth century America. Despite meeting mixed reviews from
American critics at first, the poem found great popularity in the United States.28 Partially, this
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came from growing tensions with the British and Native Americans, especially on the frontier.
As Americans again worried about Anglo-Indian connections around the advent of the War of
1812, the poem’s story of British and savage barbarity in the backcountry fit many Americans’
preconceived notions and their growing suspicions of native people.29 Of course, this view of
native people and the historical and artistic works that supported it were not based in historical
fact but partisan fiction. That fiction, however, had gained legitimacy in its repetition, and
Campbell’s work simply cemented it further into American memory. As a result, Campbell’s
work became part of the very same cycle that led Campbell himself to portray Brant
inaccurately. One of the many authors to duplicate baseless narratives about the Wyoming
Massacre, Campbell passed on these stories to generations of readers. Supported by histories and
literature, the legend of Wyoming—and the lessons it imparted about both the British and Native
Americans—became firmly entrenched in the American imagination.
As more historians, writers, and even poets duplicated details from partisan accounts of
Wyoming in the years between the end of the Revolution and the beginning of the War of 1812,
the story became a fixture in early American’s historical remembrance. While national
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newspapers did not say much about the massacre before 1807, Wyoming, in the words of
Parkinson, “never really left the American vernacular.”30 In part, the legend of Wyoming
remained known and its sensationalized aspects more ingrained because of these historians and
those influenced by their work. Of course, as historian Sarah Purcell rightly points out, history
was not equivalent with popular or collective memory of the Revolution.31 These histories did,
however, influence that memory by replicating some of the hyperbolic narratives of that period,
allowing Revolutionary stories such as Wyoming to reemerge in different media. The
perpetuation of the legendary version of the battle through history and then fiction set the stage
for Wyoming’s narrative to return to political relevancy as Anglo-British relations soured in the
first decade of the 1800s. As the political winds shifted, even more Americans returned to the
example of Wyoming to speak to the present, nurturing misconceptions that these histories had
further entrenched.

New War, Same Enemies
If American newspapers rarely discussed the Battle of Wyoming in the first few decades
after the Revolutionary War, they changed their tune during the eight years between 1807 and
1815. This considerable upswing in national attention to the memory of Wyoming resulted from
rising tensions with Great Britain and the growing fissure between American political parties in
the first decades of the nineteenth century. As the British continued to impress American sailors
into their navy and supply hostile Native American tribes on the frontier with arms, AngloAmerican relations noticeably declined in these years, and memories of British savagery during

30

Parkinson, The Common Cause, 648.
Purcell, Sealed with Blood, 6. See also, Len Travers, Celebrating the Fourth (Amherst: University of
Massachusetts Press), 58-59. According to Travers, historians shaped Americans’ historical consciousness.
31

Tharp 74
the Revolution became increasingly relevant once again. As Purcell has noted, politicians,
especially Democratic-Republicans (also known as Republicans), cultivated a “bloody
patriotism” based on memories of British misconduct to turn the public against Great Britain and
maintain the people’s resolve first for anti-British policies and later for war starting in 1812.
Even years after the Revolution, she contends, “carefully deployed memories of the
Revolutionary War had the power to make resistance to the British seem like a national
imperative.”32 Along with anti-British sentiment, the fervently partisan political climate of the
day also affected the usage of highly charged Revolutionary memories like that of Wyoming. In
a nation divided on party issues, especially as they related to foreign policy and conflict with
Great Britain, past stories of British savagery like the legend of the Wyoming Massacre could
have quite the political force.
Diplomatic relations between the United States and Great Britain remained strained in the
post-Revolutionary period. They only worsened starting in the 1790s as Britain’s continued
presence in the northwestern frontier and disagreements over shipping rights and impressment
pushed the countries closer to war.33 Locked in a virtual cold war starting in 1783, both nations
attempted to gain the upper hand in the strategic Great Lakes region throughout this period. 34 As
the British hindered American expansion into the region by continuing to man frontier forts and
supplying weapons to resistant native tribes, many Americans grew increasingly resentful and
often blamed the British for inciting Indian attacks on the frontier. Tensions over shipping,
neutrality, and impressment also heightened in the early 1790s as the French revolutionary wars
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began. Attempting to defeat France, Britain further angered Americans by infringing upon their
shipping neutrality and turning to the impressment of United States’ merchant sailors to
supplement the Royal Navy’s numbers. In 1794, the two countries narrowly averted war through
diplomatic talks that resulted in Jay’s Treaty, which bettered relations for a brief period and
accomplished some American goals, such as the removal of British troops from some forts in the
northwestern frontier.35 While Jay’s Treaty produced a brief thaw in Anglo-American
interactions, the same issues revolving around rights on the high seas and the British role on the
frontier reemerged in the next decade and only became more volatile as partisan politics remade
the American political scene.
With a growing suspicion of the British and each other, Americans turned to memories of
Revolutionary violence to advance their own political aims in the years leading up to war. The
United States’ first two-party system reshaped the political landscape of the nation, and it opened
the way for a more divisive rhetoric to emerge—a rhetoric where Wyoming gained increasing
resonance.36 As Americans divided into separate parties, the conservative and pro-British
Federalists and the more populist and anti-British Democratic-Republicans (also known as the
Republicans), newspapers became a key weapon in the fight to sway public opinion and gain
partisan support. Within this newspaper coverage, Revolutionary stories such as Wyoming often
featured, either to challenge British aggression, denigrate political enemies, or accomplish a
combination of these aims.37
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Republicans needed only to mention the legendary Wyoming Massacre to sully Britain’s
reputation and by association that of the Federalist Party in the minds of many Americans. A
1798 editorial speaks to this dynamic and Wyoming’s place within the partisan divide of the
period. Criticizing “those…known by the name of Federalists” for refusing to condemn “the
perfidious conduct of the British,” this writer attempted to highlight the hypocritical and
treacherous nature of the Federalists by accusing them of collaborating with Great Britain. This
invective particularly utilized negative memories of the British during the Revolution to discredit
the Federalists. As it recalled “the horrors of a Jersey prison-ship, the massacres at
Wyoming…and such other trifles as we experienced a few years since,” the editorial used
examples of past British atrocities to paint Federalists as “homebred lordlings[s]” beholden to
Britain.38 The memory of the battle invoked by this editorial clearly had potent political uses,
helping turn public opinion against the British and by extension the Federalists. An early
example of what was to come in force just a decade later, this 1798 inclusion of Wyoming
demonstrates how the battle’s remembrance regained political relevancy because of political
division and the deterioration of relations with Britain.
While the Massacre reentered national political rhetoric briefly in the 1790s, it truly
reemerged as a potent political weapon around 1807, a year marked by an inflammatory incident
off the coast of Virginia that almost led to war. With war in Europe raging again starting in 1803,
the Royal Navy turned once more to impressment to man their ships in the fight against
Napoleon. Britain’s navy worked to acquire the necessary men as the conflict renewed, yet they
lost many able sailors to American vessels which offered consistently better pay. In late June
1807, this cycle of competition, desertion, and impressment reached its culmination in the
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Chesapeake-Leopard Affair. When the British warship HMS Leopard stopped the USS
Chesapeake, demanded to search it for deserters, and then fired on the merchant vessel, it
incensed Americans across the country even in typically Federalist locales.39 Americans seemed
unified in anger—even if only temporarily.
Just as when Britain threatened the nation more than thirty years prior, Americans
invoked the memory of Wyoming in the aftermath of the Chesapeake Affair to demonstrate the
insidious nature of the British and encourage a unified resistance. In the Federalist stronghold of
Luzerne County, which included the site of the Battle of Wyoming, locals reacted with outrage.
Responding angrily to the news, the editor of the regional paper drew on the local memory of the
battle to influence national dialogue. In an editorial first printed on the anniversary of the battle
and later reprinted in other cities, the Luzerne editor argued for a decisive response against the
British. Railing against them for dishonoring the nation and shedding “the blood of American
citizens,” he called his countrymen to arms by connecting the present injustice of the Chesapeake
with the past actions of the British in 1778. The editor used familiar, revolutionary-era language
to do so. He claimed that while “many a brave man fell beneath the knife of the Savage and the
British” during the battle, “the savage has [since] become humane, while the British, with greater
professions of civilization, retain all their ferocity.” Reminiscent of the anti-British and “white
savagery” rhetoric that Gregory Knouff identified in Revolutionary accounts, these remarks
reveal a remarkable rhetorical continuity.40
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Like the response of the Luzerne editor in 1807, Republican arguments and the prominent
place of Wyoming within their rhetoric resembled Patriot discourse during the war, especially in
how it emphasized American victimhood and argued for unity. One 1810 article, for instance,
drew a link between British wrongdoing during the Revolution and the post-Revolutionary
period. Including Wyoming within a lengthy list of British transgressions, this article
incorporated the Massacre into a larger narrative about America victimization, mimicking
Revolutionary rhetoric as it defended the Republicans’ anti-British stance.41 Indeed, one of the
most colorful Republican diatribes against Great Britain could have just as easily been written in
1778 as 1808. “The conduct of the British, or as they have been aptly termed the Brutish,” wrote
one Republican, “were totally unworthy of a civilized people. Remember the massacre at
Wyoming.”42 Venomously attacking the British like his Revolutionary forefathers, this
Republican articulated why the United States must resist British aggression. This critique
noticeably employed the Massacre to illustrate British savagery and promote a unified response
in the same way that John Holt’s narrative used his account of the Massacre to urge Americans
to support independence. The story of Wyoming still shaped public attitudes as it had in the
Revolution.
This moment of agreement between Federalists and Republicans would not last long.
Despite the bellicose statements and calls for unity in 1807, Great Britain and the United States
did not go to war, and the Federalists and Republicans returned to their bickering, reviving the
partisan usage of Wyoming in the process. “Unwilling to compromise and unable to fight,” in the
words of George Herring, President Thomas Jefferson “fell back on an embargo of American
commerce” after the Chesapeake Affair. Jefferson had hoped to force France and Britain to
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respect American neutrality with the embargo. Instead, he severely damaged the American
economy and did not secure any major concessions from the two foreign powers.43 This lack of
concessions from the British further damaged relations, while Native American activity on the
frontier added to the list of American grievances.44 The embargo and differing responses to
frontier concerns created internal division as well. Reflected in the disparate rhetorical uses of
Revolutionary memory, these political occurrences drove the Federalists and Republicans further
apart. Although both parties employed this memory to call for unity in response to foreign
indignities, as Sarah Purcell has argued, they fundamentally disagreed on what adherence to that
memory should look like.45 As a result, Americans, especially Republicans, just as commonly
used highly charged Revolutionary memories—like that of Wyoming—to defame their fellow
countrymen as to attack British aggression.
Always more likely to deploy emotional memories of the Revolution, Republican
denouncements of Britain, while genuine, pointedly targeted Federalists and sought to expose
their “treasonable devotion” to Great Britain.46 The same Republican who spoke of “the
Brutish,” for instance, presented “the atrocities of the” British to counteract Federalist critiques
about Republican foreign policy. Arguing that Federalist concerns about Napoleon were simply
“a chimera,” this writer insisted that Federalists worked “to advance the British interest…[and]
destroy the American administration.”47 Other Republicans even more directly utilized the
memory of Wyoming to condemn the Federalists. One “old Whig of 76,” as he styled himself,
recalled when some Federalists or their fathers “were arrayed in arms against us, when they were

43

Herring, From Colony to Superpower, 119-121. See also, Taylor, The Civil War of 1812, 117-118.
Taylor, The Civil War of 1812, 125-126.
45
Purcell, Sealed with Blood, 154.
46
Marcus Morton, An Oration, on American Independence (New Bedford, MA: Elijah Billings, 1806), 16.
47
“Paragraph Second,” The Public Advertiser (New York City), August 13, 1808, 2.
44

Tharp 80
united with the English, Hessians, and Indians in the work of murder, conflagration and ruin.”
The old Whig then cited the legend of the Wyoming Massacre to express his doubt in current
Federalists. “How can I forget the capture of Wyoming in 1778, when man, woman, and child
were indiscriminately burnt together,” he wrote. “And how can I command my patience when I
see many of this infernal gang now claiming confidence as patriots and power as legislators and
statesmen?”48 Casting modern Federalists as the new Tories by utilizing the Massacre, this
Republican attempted to delegitimize the opposition. Amazingly, some Republicans even more
bluntly connected Federalists to Tories through the example of Wyoming. Attacking Federalists
in Luzerne County, one Republican paper wrote, “The farmers of Luzerne…should remember
the Wyoming Massacre, the TORIES of that day—and then MARK the conduct of the TORIES
of the present day.”49 Using the memory of Wyoming as a weapon to paint their political
enemies as in league with the villains of the Revolution, Republicans simultaneously vilified
Britain and their Federalist rivals.
Republicans in this period clearly evoked Wyoming with an eye towards their own
political agendas. During the lead-up to the 1810 midterm elections, for example, a Republican
paper courted Irish immigrant votes by creating a narrative of shared oppression between Ireland
and the United States that utilized the example of Wyoming. Claiming that “We were born the
subjects of one king” and “have been the fellow victims of a common oppressor,” this
Republican contended that “the assassins at Wyoming…were instruements of the same ferocious
tyrant who has spread havook, death and desolation in Hibernian fields.” The editorial then
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stressed that good Irish and American patriots should support the Republicans over the
Anglophile Federalists.50
Memories of Wyoming could likewise assist Republicans in justifying their anti-British
policies. In the face of flagging support for the embargo, some utilized historical accounts of the
battle to tilt public opinion in their favor. Directly reproducing an excerpt from an English
historian’s work, which replicated most of the groundless stories from Holt’s account, a few
Republicans used this excerpt to show how the embargo remained viable and to cast their
Federalist opponents as modern-day Tories.51 The reprinting of this historical account—based on
unsubstantiated narratives from the Revolution—as a piece of political commentary highlights
the role history played in perpetuating and authenticating Patriot propaganda. Finding their way
into political discourse, the exaggerations of Holt and the historians who reproduced his account
influenced the way that Americans conceptualized current events. By this time, the legendary
story of the Massacre was so ingrained in the American imagination that most Republicans only
needed to reference Wyoming to accomplish their aims.52
Wyoming also found a ready place within Republican commentary about the nation’s
frontier. The frontier and Native Americans featured heavily within Republican rhetoric,
especially as the party drew considerable support from western states and as the charismatic
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Indian leader Tecumseh threatened the country’s expansion in the west.53 As both the British and
Indians remained enemies with American settlers in the backcountry, Americans in this period
lived in a context comparable with their Revolutionary forebearers. Instances of frontier violence
from the Revolution thus remained relevant and capable of speaking to early nineteenth century
concerns.54 One Republican in 1808, for instance, referenced the Battle of Wyoming to
encourage compliance with the embargo on the frontier. Urging his countrymen to not engage in
smuggling with the British, this man recalled the horrors of the Revolution to highlight the
“hostile designs of the English, [as] manifested in their stirring up the Indians against us.”
Mentioning his memory of Wyoming, he argued that Americans must remain true to Republican
policy to prevent the British and their savage allies from perpetrating another frontier massacre. 55
Upon hearing of fresh instances of Indian attacks, an 1812 editorial similarly lamented that “the
murdered innocents at Wyoming bleed afresh” and insisted that only a strong American response
could “prevent a repetition of slaughter and death.”56 Another article from the Lexington
Reporter also utilized Wyoming to highlight Britain’s perfidious designs in the backcountry.57
Though decades distant, the legend of Wyoming still spoke to deep-seated backcountry fears
about Britain’s savage allies.
These Republican examples of frontier rhetoric show that a younger generation of
partisans used Wyoming in ways that Revolutionary Patriots would have recognized and likely
approved. Like in the Revolution, these Republican accounts tapped into the legend of the
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Wyoming Massacre and the accompanying language of atrocity to enhance their arguments.
Republicans used this language and the example of Wyoming to provoke action on the frontier
or to argue for resistance against the British, just as Patriots like John Holt had in the late 1770s.
Republicans also ignored Native American agency, often claiming, as the Lexington Reporter
did, that “the Indians are instigated to war by the British.”58 Blaming the British for the massacre
and other instances where Native Americans attacked settlers, Patriots and Republicans alike
presented themselves as innocent victims of outrageous aggression and ignored their own
culpability in provoking such responses. As one Republican claimed without any sense of irony,
“all our difficulties with the Indians have originated with the British.” 59

While Americans consistently evoked the example of Wyoming before the War of 1812,
the outbreak of war provided new opportunities to use the battle’s memory as a political tool.
With violence escalating in the backcountry, especially after the Battle of Tippecanoe in 1811,
and without concessions from the British on shipping rights, President James Madison finally
asked Congress to declare war in early summer 1812. In the closest vote on a declaration of war
in United States history, Congress passed the motion on strictly partisan lines. While Federalists
opposed the war, Republicans supported it and hoped that it would unify the country behind their
party.60 Political unity ultimately eluded the nation, however, and partisan divides grew more
evident during the conflict; indeed, some Federalists even considered secession from the Union.
With the onset of war, the first party system and relations with Great Britain thus met their
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breaking points. Similarly, the trends affecting political rhetoric and Revolutionary memory
during the previous half-decade reached their culmination in this same period, affecting the use
of Wyoming within national discourse. As in the five years leading up to the War of 1812,
Wyoming still served as a rhetorical weapon that could accomplish many of the same political
aims, but American usage of the battle’s remembrance took on an added urgency with the higher
stakes of war.
For many Republicans, richly embroidered memories of the Revolution assisted them in
waging a propaganda war to garner support for the fight against Great Britain. According to Alan
Taylor, the War of 1812, like the Revolution, was a “highly political war, waged in newspapers
as well as on the battlefield.”61 Republicans thus used news coverage to attack the enemy and
bolster American resolve, like Patriots had done in the struggle for independence. In fact,
Republicans relied on many of the same foundationless war stories from the Revolution to
discredit the British.62 Republican editorials claimed that the British had traded in scalps or
encouraged the wanton murder of women and children in both the Revolution and the current
conflict. Unsurprisingly, they also evoked the legend of the Wyoming Massacre.63 Blending old
and new examples of British barbarity, Republican rhetoric during the war portrayed the British
as savage to demonstrate American’s own superiority and show why the American people must
support the war. This rhetorical continuity with the Patriot’s propaganda efforts demonstrates the
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durability of Wyoming’s memory and its ability, along with other revolutionary memories, to
bridge the past and present for early nineteenth-century Americans.
The legend of the Wyoming Massacre featured in Republican denouncements of Britain
and helped connect memories of the Revolution with current events. About a month after the
beginning of the war, for instance, two papers printed an excerpt about the supposed history of
the Massacre. Far from simply printing this history for its own sake, these papers intended the
excerpt to speak to the present conflict. As one editor wrote in an introduction to the piece, “The
following dreadful picture is one of the most horrid exploits of our present enemy” and “is more
peculiarly interesting at this time and in this state… [as] the same course of cruelties [has] been
recommenced.” Republicans readily drew on such resonate memories and easily connected them
to the nation’s current situation. They based their comparisons, however, on uncorroborated
rumors solidified by historians in the years after the Revolution. Reproducing most of the Holt
account’s and in language that Lendrum copied into his own work, this reprinted excerpt
indicates how historic accounts shaped political conversations and disseminated unverified and
explosive narratives to the public.64
With a faulty understanding of what occurred at Wyoming in July 1778, Republicans
continued to associate the sensationalized account of the battle with recent examples of British
misdeeds to argue that the British were no different now than during the war for independence.
As the Baltimore Patriot caustically wrote in October 1813 after tying “the shocking massacres
of Cherry-Valley and Wyoming” to the latest British atrocities in Maryland, “let him [the reader]
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determine for himself how far these noble English are consistent with their former character.”65
While this Maryland article linked Wyoming with violence between whites, Republicans more
commonly partnered the battle with instances of racial warfare in the backcountry. These
accounts again accused America’s white opponents of succumbing to Indian barbarism and
pushed for governmental action. A July 1812 article from the Lexington Reporter, for instance,
explicitly referenced Wyoming with other instances of frontier bloodshed to argue that the
British stirred up the Indians to frontier murder “as in 1777” and 1778. According to the
Reporter, “the old revolutionary soldier…can well recollect the massacre of Wyoming. He has
not forgotten that a horde of Tories and Indians…inflicted a barbarity of torture, unequalled in
the annals of human history” there. Nor could he forget “who hired and paid those savages and
tories…The BRITISH.” Calling for a defense of the west, this article claimed that Britain had
instigated another Indian war.66 For Republicans, the example of Wyoming thus provided ample
evidence of Britain’s continued brutality and supported their arguments about the necessity of
defending the frontier. To the question of “who gave the Indians tomahawk and knife? Who
started first the daring savage yell?” many Americans would have agreed with one poet’s reply—
"Let Britain and Wyoming butchers tell!”67
The Battle of Frenchtown in January 1813 provided the readiest parallel for Republicans
to link the massacre with the current day. Also known as the River Raisin Massacre, this battle in
the Michigan Territory saw 500 Kentucky militiamen overwhelmed by a combined force of
British and native troops. Hundreds of Kentuckians died in the attack, and many more were
taken prisoner and forcibly marched to Fort Malden in Canada. Those too wounded to move
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remained behind in two houses, which Native Americans burned the next day with the
inhabitants still inside. Caught in the flames or escaping the conflagration just to be scalped, the
wounded Americans perished.68 As a frontier massacre perpetuated by the British and their
Indian allies that included the burning of helpless individuals inside buildings, the River Raisin
Massacre fit the script of Holt’s Wyoming account, and Americans took notice. One Republican
orator lamented that “The bloody tragedy of Wyoming has been repeated on the banks of [the]
Raisin, and throughout our western frontier.”69 The similarities between the well-known account
of the Wyoming Massacre and the recent occurrence upon the Raisin certainly helped Americans
link the two events.
Just like Wyoming in the Revolution, events at the River Raisin justified revenge in the
backcountry and continued resistance to the British. “Remember the Raisin” became a popular
rallying cry and a type of rhetorical “trump card” for Americans in the coming months of the
conflict.70 Republicans proved particularly eager to use the memory of the Raisin to justify
retaliatory measures. This memory was also powerful in the backcountry and led Kentuckians to
commit their own atrocities on natives during the Battle of the Thames in October 1813.71 One
Enquirer correspondent in April 1813 predicted the Kentuckians’ angry response as well as the
propagandic usage of the Raisin. He wrote, “the massacre of the Raisin will be inscribed on the
same imperishable page of history with…the destruction of Wyoming. But the only effect, which
it will have upon the war, will be to rouse” the people to action “and call forth the Kentuckians to
revenge the assassination of their Kinsmen.”72 Each time they likened the Raisin massacre to
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Wyoming, Republicans used these backcountry atrocities to perpetuate a familiar narrative of
victimhood that allowed Americans to see themselves not as aggressors but as innocent victims
who retaliated against the fiendish British and Indians only in righteous self-defense.
As during the leadup to war, Republican denouncements of Great Britain and their
rhetorical deployment of the memory of Wyoming served partisan purposes intended to not only
help in the struggle against Britain but also meant to further the interests of the current
administration. In a highly divided political climate, Republicans worked to defend their
handling of the war, win reelection, and discredit their opponents. Facing mounting criticism as
the war progressed, Republicans tapped into incendiary frontier language and a well-spring of
hatred for the British and Indians to divert attention from military failures and retain control.
Expounding upon frontier atrocities both past and present or “waving the bloody scalp,” as
Taylor puts it, “Republicans shifted the focus away from their mistakes [and] onto the misdeeds
of the British and their Indian allies.”73 Again following in the footsteps of Revolutionary
Patriots, Republicans used the example of Wyoming to distract from the sagging war effort and
unite the nation behind their cause, as one 1812 editorial shows. Referencing the battle to prove
that “the British government has always been deliberately cruel and base,” this Republican called
for every American to unite in the face of British barbarity. This editorial writer used Wyoming
to rally the public behind the war effort and subtly asserted that good Americans must assist the
Republican administration waging it.74
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Republicans also utilized Wyoming and the language of atrocity to malign their political
opponents in newspapers and speeches, sometimes portraying the opposition as “wretches calling
themselves Americans.”75 Many Republicans tried to quash attempts to criticize their leadership,
and they commonly accused critics of supporting the British or worse—their savage allies.76
One, for instance, directly evoked Wyoming—and the horrors of Indian war attached to it—to
personally attack a political enemy. Condemning a Federalist orator for forgetting “the victims of
stimulated Anglo-Indian ferocity” at Wyoming and supporting “the abettors…[of] the bloody
deed,” this Republican portrayed Federalists as hypocrites at best and Loyalists at worse.77
Another utilized Wyoming and other instances of “savage cruelty” in defense of a proclamation
that threatened Canadians “should they employ the Savages.” Painting a nightmarish scenario of
frontier atrocity replete with Native American “prowlers” butchering women and children in the
night, this writer emphasized the necessity of the proclamation. Most important, however, he
shamed the opposition for ignoring the suffering that frontier inhabitants would experience in the
ensuing frontier violence.78 An example of combined British, Native American, Loyalist, and
now Federalist savagery, Wyoming remained malleable for Republican political ends.
Republicans more typically utilized Wyoming in their rhetoric, but they faced opposition
from Federalists who occasionally referenced the battle’s memory in their defense. Generally
hailing from the region where the battle occurred, those few Federalists who utilized Wyoming
evoked its memory during Independence Day celebrations, right after the battle’s anniversary.
While Federalists and Republicans had long competed for attention during Fourth of July
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festivities, according to Len Travers, this party conflict reached its climax during the War of
1812, and it shows in each parties’ respective usage of Wyoming in their holiday orations.79
Referenced in a few Republican orations after the Chesapeake Affair, Wyoming typically
emerged as an example of British savagery intended to inflame both partisan and anti-British
passions.80
Federalists in the Wyoming region, however, recalled the battle on the Fourth of July to
resist attempts to squash their free speech and paint them as Loyalists. Local politician Charles
Miner’s oration, for instance, employed the battle to show how locals had suffered in the
Revolution and insisted that Federalists had remained true Americans. Miner, however, still
asserted his opposition to the war and maintained that the constitution protected dissent.81 A July
4 editorial letter in Luzerne similarly opposed the war and advocated a “change of rulers.” The
author of this editorial tied Wyoming to current events yet drew different conclusions than
Republican writers. Aware of “the horrid massacre [that] took place at Wyoming” and the
current “bloody news…of the inhabitants on our frontiers” who have suffered “in a similar
manner to those who fell at Wyoming in July 1778,” this author advocated not for continued war
but for unity to “bring about an honorable peace.” For him, the failures of American arms in
Canada and across the Great Lakes merely prolonged the suffering on the frontier and brought
dishonor to the nation.82 Instead of galvanizing support for the war as it did for Republicans,
Federalists invoked the memory of Wyoming to hasten peace.
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When war ended and the peace treaty was signed in early 1815, the Wyoming Massacre
retained some of its political immediacy in a new era of territorial expansion, especially as
Americans continued to fight Native Americans on the frontier. While ostensibly a draw, the
United States largely won the peace in the aftermath of the War of 1812, securing its spot on the
continent and ensuring future westward expansion. As the war allowed the Americans to cut off
natives from most foreign allies on the continent, the real losers of that war in Taylor’s
estimation were Native Americans.83 With the conflict against Britain over, Republicans largely
pardoned former Federalists for their opposition. The nation entered an era of “good feelings” in
the aftermath of the conflict, characterized by an awakened nationalism and a brief lessening of
partisan divides—partially a result of the Federalist Party’s effective collapse after the poorly
timed Hartford Convention.84 Many Americans, however, never forgave Indians for their
perceived role in the conflict of 1812 and even 1776. Indeed, the continuing usage of these
stories, first employed for independence and later revived for the renewed conflict against
Britain, had tragic consequences for native people. Convincing many Americans that Indians
were enemies of the nation and unworthy of citizenship, these durable narratives, as Parkinson
rightly points out, portrayed Indians as “founding traitors.”85 The legend of Wyoming continued
to play into this idea, painting a lasting image of natives as bloodthirsty and easily manipulated
monsters that would last far into the nineteenth century.
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Conclusion
The War of 1812 had ended, but the ideological value of invoking the Wyoming
Massacre did not, particularly on the frontier. Wyoming continued to reappear in writings
seeking to criticize vicious actions by the British and “savage” Indians, particularly against
“helpless females” and “tender infants.” One of the most striking examples of this appeared
during the Seminole War at the end of the 1810s, when Gen. Andrew Jackson executed two
British captives accused of assisting the Seminoles in their battle against the United States. When
he justified the deaths of Alexander Arbuthnot and Richard Armbrister as just retaliation for
horrors enacted against whites, his supporters hastened to remind newspaper readers of the long
pattern of British and Indian atrocities. One of these was a congressman and newspaper
correspondent using the pseudonym Wyoming who called for the extermination of native people
because of their propensity for extreme violence. Because Arbuthnot and Armbrister had “made
themselves savages,” they were “more deeply stained with guilt than any painted Seminole,” and
thus deserved execution. 86 Clearly, the constructed memory of British and Indian collusion at
Wyoming still had the power to galvanize Americans to retaliate and see themselves as the true
victims on the frontier.
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certainly lived up to his pseudonym.
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Entrenched in American culture through histories, popular culture, literature, and politics,
the legend of the Wyoming Massacre remained relevant in the early Republic. Used to attack the
British and Indians, bolster American resolve, discredit political opponents, or argue for action
on the frontier, the battle’s memory spoke to a variety of Americans’ concerns in the era around
the War of 1812. As Americans faced similar enemies and situations first in the War of 1812,
they turned to the same arguments and examples from the Revolution to support their aims and
defend their positions. These powerful narratives, passed down and legitimized by early
historians and literary works, stayed influential and were ripe for use by the politically savvy. In
the new propaganda war of 1812, the legendary version of the Massacre remained a powerful
rhetorical weapon against the British, Native Americans, Federalists, and Republicans. Through
Wyoming, Americans connected the Revolutionary past with their present, a trend that continued
even when the hostilities with Britain and the Seminoles ceased.
The Wyoming Massacre became a key part of the Revolutionary story in the nineteenth
century. Even as the threat from Britain passed and Wyoming’s political relevancy declined, the
Massacre remained a part of American’s historical consciousness, thanks in no small part to the
popularity of Campbell’s Gertrude of Wyoming and the continued influence of early historians.87
Coupled with growing nationalism and a desire to preserve the experiences of the Revolutionary
generation as it began to pass away, Americans remembered the sacrifices at Wyoming and
considered it a part of their Revolutionary heritage.88 These trends in history, popular culture,
and Revolutionary memory converged in the remembrance of Wyoming, illustrating the wideAs one historian aptly summarized in 1838, “So long as English poetry exists, will the imaginary tale of Gertrude
of Wyoming be read, admired, and wept; and thousands, in every generation to come, will receive the beautiful
fiction for truth, while the details of fact by the faithful historian, rejecting the exaggerations of Ramsay and Gordon,
and their associate writers of the revolutionary era, together with compilers more modern, who have taken no pains
to inquire for the truth, may be regarded as too common-place and unimportant for attention.” See, William Leete
Stone, Life of Joseph Brant—Thayendanegea (New York: A. V. Blake, 1838), I: 318-319.
88
Purcell, Sealed with Blood, 193-195.
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reaching influence of histories and literature in helping Wyoming become part of the
Revolutionary mythos. One 1823 article from Vermont, for instance, began with a line from
Campbell’s poem and provided a historical excerpt that duplicated the legend of the Massacre
before reminding its readers of the sacrifices made during the Revolution.89 Similarly citing
Campbell and then giving an excerpt “in the language of America’s great historian,” whom the
editor considered to be John Marshall, an 1827 article from Philadelphia also encouraged its
readers to remember the sacrifices of Wyoming and the “almost sacred charge” its survivors had
left behind.90 Immortalized in history and fiction, the Massacre had become a part of Americans’
Revolutionary mythology. The memory of Wyoming reminded a new generation of the sacrifice
and vigilance needed to protect the nation’s freedom.91
As a new generation of Americans worked to commemorate the triumphs and sacrifices
of their Revolutionary forebears, the focus of the Massacre’s remembrance gradually turned
more inward towards the local community near Wilkes-Barre and Luzerne County,
Pennsylvania. Desiring to memorialize those slaughtered in July 1778 and record the
recollections of those who had experienced it, locals worked to preserve and shape the memory
of the battle in new ways in the coming decades of the nineteenth century. Some in the
community even began to question the popular version of the battle, attempting to discredit the

“Battle of Wyoming,” Vermont Gazette (Bennington), September 30, 1823, 3.
“From the Philadelphia Ariel: Old Wyoming,” Torch Light (Hagerstown, Maryland), May 17, 1827, 1. While the
article did not name Marshall, the reprinted excerpt was from Marshall’s biography of George Washington. See
Marshall, Life of Washington, 556-560.
91
See, “Spark for the Altar of 76’,” Norwich Courier (Connecticut), August 27, 1828, 4. An elderly orator in 1828
considered Wyoming as part of the Revolutionary “inheritance.” He directly referenced Wyoming in what he clearly
believed would be one of the “the last time[s]” his generation “will ever tell you…the story of our sufferings.” He
urged the upcoming generation to “defend your inheritance” with virtue. For Wyoming’s continued place in
Revolutionary mythology, see, for example, Thomas Crawford and William Rinehart, House Bronze Doors, bronze,
1905, U.S. Capitol East House Portico, https://www.aoc.gov/art/doors/house-bronze-doors. These doors, crafted in
the 1850s and 1860s but installed in the early 1900s, included Wyoming with other important Revolutionary events,
such as the signing of the Declaration of Independence. Its inclusion points to the battle’s continued importance in
nineteenth century America.
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narratives that Patriot publicists, authentic histories, and political commentaries had all
reproduced down the decades. Their efforts, as we shall see, only gave rise to a new narrative of
an equally unverified nature.92 Of course, the legend of the Wyoming Massacre would not easily
be discredited, and by no means did Wyoming fade from national discourse even as locals
exerted more control over its memory.93 Rather, as it had during the years surrounding the War
of 1812, Wyoming’s memory remained malleable in new circumstances.
The legend of the Wyoming Massacre had aged quite well.

See, for example, Francavilla, “The Wyoming Valley Battle and ‘Massacre,’” 21-25.
As late as 1878, a local historian criticized school textbooks for handing down “monstrous falsehoods” about the
battle and massacre. The historian wrote, “That such an account should be published as late as 1871 for instruction
in schools and the edification of families, is an unmitigated, unpardonable outrage.” Clearly, the legend of the
Wyoming Massacre lived on far into the nineteenth century. See Harry Hakes, Wyoming: Synopsis of the Battle and
Massacre for the Information of the People, 1878, from the collections of the Luzerne County Historical Society.
This source can also be accessed via the Library of Congress at https://www.loc.gov/item/rbpe.16001200/.
92
93
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Chapter 3
“A fury in the form of a woman”
A New Legend Takes Hold

A new legend about the Battle of Wyoming emerged in the mid-1800s, equally as
sensational as the first. This myth eventually replaced the long-lived narratives of John Holt and
his Revolutionary counterparts. As regional historians finally discredited those Revolutionary
accounts starting in the 1820s, they enabled this other legend to materialize, continuing the cycle
of historical distortion for a new generation. They had help, of course. Influenced by national
attitudes about Native Americans, patriotism, and regionalism, locals eagerly and uncritically
adopted wild tales, which then allowed this new legend to spread through other media. Much as
early Revolutionary historians and Gertrude of Wyoming disseminated the legend of the
Wyoming Massacre in the era of the War of 1812, historians in the antebellum period and the
popular literature of the nineteenth century made it possible for a new legend to take hold.
This legend centered around a woman of probable French and Native American ancestry
named Esther or Catherine Montour, who became popularly known as Queen Esther. This native
leader, given the title “Queen” by colonists due to her position of authority, was likely a largely
fictional composite of three historic Native American women.1 According to some accounts and
later historians, Esther brutally massacred between seven and twenty-five Patriot prisoners after
the Battle of Wyoming as an act of revenge for the murder of her son on July 2. She allegedly

Warren Hunting Smith, “Queen Esther,” The Virginia Quarterly Review 29, no. 3 (Summer 1953): 400-404. In the
nineteenth century, authors usually considered Esther responsible, but they sometimes claimed that her sister
Catherine Montour carried out the killings. Some even argued that Catherine Montour went by the name “Queen
Esther.” For different names, see Campbell, Annals of Tyron County, 64 [appendix], and William Leete Stone, The
Poetry and History of Wyoming: Containing Campbell’s Gertrude, and the History of Wyoming, from Its Discovery
to the Beginning of the Present Century, 4th ed. (Wilkes-Barre: C.E. Butler, 1869), 207-208.
1
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slaughtered the prisoners about a mile away from the field of battle around a slightly raised rock,
which these new accounts came to call “Bloody Rock” or “Queen Esther’s Rock.” With a maul
in one hand and a hatchet in the other, Esther purportedly chanted an otherworldly dirge as she
killed the terrified Patriots, who were held captive by native warriors in “the fatal ring” around
the rock.2
Just like Holt’s earlier account, the story of Queen Esther found life in histories and
popular culture. Morphing from an obscure rumor referenced in a few contemporary accounts
and advanced by some elderly veterans, this myth started making its way into local histories
beginning in the 1820s, gaining gradual acceptance as historians repeated it. From there, the
myth disseminated to the community and then the nation. Capable of tapping into the currents of
regional romance and commemoration, fascination with Native Americans, and cultural
discourses on American identity, Esther’s legend perfectly fit mid-nineteenth-century tastes as
well as the public’s understanding of the Battle of Wyoming. As a result, Esther featured in
popular fiction, travel literature, and commemorative events that introduced her to even more
Americans. Able to connect Wyoming and Esther to larger regional and national narratives,
Americans turned to this legend for a variety of reasons.
This chapter examines the development of this legend in the antebellum period and its
continued influence later in the nineteenth century. Detailing where it originated, how and why it
became accepted, and how it spread, the chapter relies on a variety of primary and secondary
sources to explore the influences of history, literature, and local commemoration on the legend.
This chapter will use the terms “myth,” “legend,” and “story” interchangeably to describe the
various narratives that surround Esther or Catherine Montour’s supposed involvement in the
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Miner, History of Wyoming, 226-233, 53-55 [appendix]. See also, George Peck, Wyoming; Its History, Stirring
Incidents, and Romantic Adventures (New York: Harper and Brothers, Publishers, 1858), 48, 284-290.
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Battle of Wyoming. As Barbara Graymont and Amber Laubach have argued, Queen Esther’s
legend is likely “completely fictional” and should be treated as such.3 The author concurs with
this assertion and finds little evidence to suggest that executions occurred around the Bloody
Rock or that any Native American woman, especially Esther Montour, killed Patriot prisoners.
Of course, there is no way to definitively prove that this event never occurred, and some
passionately claimed it did; as a result, the author welcomes historical revision if new evidence
or interpretations come to light. Ultimately, however, this chapter contends that Esther’s legend
has little basis in fact and that it should be considered local folklore that locals, historians, and
authors legitimized for their own purposes during the mid-nineteenth-century. The accuracy or
inaccuracy of narratives about Queen Esther, nonetheless, does not constitute the primary focus
of this chapter. Instead, it principally seeks to highlight the complex interaction between local
and national ideas that affected the remembrance of the Battle of Wyoming as well as the
acceptance and diffusion of Esther’s myth. It explores why this myth suddenly appeared so
compelling and relevant more than half a century after the battle itself.

Historians at It Again
Just as earlier historians of the Revolution reinforced and perpetuated groundless
narratives of the Wyoming Massacre in the first three decades after 1778, many local historians
working in the mid-1800s disseminated equally unsubstantiated tales. While some claimed to

Indeed, in Laubach’s words, Esther “would not be the first Native person to be [falsely] accused of atrocities at
Wyoming.” For quote in text, see Graymont, The Iroquois in the American Revolution, 174. See also, Amber
Laubach, “Queen Esther Montour of the Munsee Delaware: An Ethnohistoric and Archaeological History of Esther
Montour and Queen Esther’s Town Preserve” (M.A., State University of New York at Binghamton, 2018), 50, 8182. I agree with Laubach’s assertion that Esther’s story seems about as accurate as Thomas Campbell’s poem. I
would disagree, however, that the story of Esther was used as a propaganda tool against native people in the late
1770s. While it could have motivated some of Sullivan’s men, the fact that no newspapers, the chief vehicle for
propaganda in the period, ever picked it up suggests that it was not well-known and thus likely not used as
propaganda in the 1770s.
3
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correct the falsehoods in earlier accounts, many of these efforts merely gave credence to
similarly baseless narratives.4 Most local mid-century historians, unlike the earlier generation of
authors, did not reproduce the hyperbolic narratives of the Patriot wartime press. In fact, these
historians worked hard to discredit what one called the “downright falsehoods” of John Holt’s
1770s report, which included the story of the hatchet and the burning of women and children
inside of Forty Fort.5 As they discredited the more lurid details of popular narratives, however,
many local historians helped a new myth about the battle gain traction by uncritically accepting
another long-lived rumor that reemerged around the 1820s and 1830s. This rumor, backed by the
testimony of a few aged veterans, scant documentation, and local folklore, would become the
basis for a whole new legend about the Battle of Wyoming.
Before a new legend could take hold, local historians first worked to discredit many of
the older Revolutionary accounts that lacked evidential backing. Though a few historians had
challenged these accounts from the beginning, many had simply reproduced the hyperbole,
ensuring that it persisted in popular narratives long into the nineteenth century. The prevalence
of these misconceptions encouraged many local historians, such as Isaac Chapman, William
Stone, Charles Miner, and George Peck, to “correct” these stories and try to uncover the true
course of events. As they presented their findings to dislodge these views, historians related what
they believed happened in the past, yet their narratives shed light on more than just that. Their
works inadvertently reveal larger cultural currents in the antebellum period that underpinned
both the history and memory of Wyoming, currents that influenced the telling of the story and
the use of evidence.

Francavilla, “The Wyoming Valley Battle and ‘Massacre,’” 21.
Peck, Wyoming, 58. Like their counterparts in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, these local
“historians” were also amateurs with little historical training. The term amateur historians or amateur historical
writers equally applies to these authors.
4
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Beginning in the late 1820s and early 1830s, local historians followed a similar pattern in
their coverage of the battle, first laid out by Isaac Chapman in his 1830 history of Wyoming.
Though Chapman still (erroneously) claimed Joseph Brant had been present, he provided a
retelling of the battle that did not reproduce the narratives that had become central to the popular
legend. Chapman began by describing of the beauty of the valley before detailing how Native
Americans and Loyalists triumphed through sheer numbers. An account of the retreat and the
suffering of defeated Patriots followed, concluding with the plight of distressed frontier families
fleeing from the carnage.6 Other historians from northern Pennsylvania and upstate New York
quickly followed Chapman’s lead, citing him within their own histories or even copying parts of
his work to challenge the misconceptions that had become so popular.7 Chapman’s successors
regularly included denunciations of John Holt’s 1778 report in their works, and they helped
finally dislodge this Revolutionary holdover from many histories of the region.
Chapman’s local situation and national ideas about commercialization, progress, and
Native Americans influenced his depiction of the battle and its place within Wyoming’s larger
history. At the end of his book, Chapman reminded his readers of the prosperity the valley now
enjoyed. Extolling the growth of towns, internal improvements, technology, and especially the
discovery of coal, Chapman painted a rosy picture of the valley’s present and future, highlighting
the region’s economic potential. His vision spoke to growing commercial prosperity, and his
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Isaac A. Chapman, A Sketch of the History of Wyoming (Wilkes-Barre: S. D. Lewis, 1830), 3, 121-128. While
Chapman’s work saw publication in 1830, he had worked on it much earlier. The preface is dated 1818, and both
Miner and Stone write that Chapman’s work was published posthumously and in an incomplete form. Chapman
became the first to write a history of Wyoming, but politician and later historian Charles Miner wrote John Marshall
about the inaccuracies of his depiction back in 1806. Miner did not publish until 1845, however.
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See, for example, William W. Campbell, Annals of Tryon County: Or, The Border Warfare of New York, During
the Revolution, 4th ed. (New York: Dodd, Mead, 1924), 64 of appendix, and Stone, Life of Joseph Brant, I: 319.
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work implied that the trials of Wyoming’s history had made modern improvements possible.8
Like other historians writing from the nearby Mohawk Valley of New York, Chapman endorsed
the idea of progress and “viewed history as a linear progression that drew together past, present,
and future.” This narrative of progress served an important cultural function. Helping make sense
of the violence of war and suggesting that those who perished did not die in vain, the linear
progression of local history made it seem, in Paxton’s words, like “the Revolutionary
generation’s sacrifices ushered in a new and better world for their children and grandchildren.”9
Indeed, within Chapman’s narrative, even the defeat at the Battle of Wyoming eventually
worked towards the good of the region. As it encouraged the devastation of the Iroquois thus
removing “the danger of Indian wars,” the author suggested, the battle indirectly created an
advantageous environment for the valley’s residents to quickly rebuild.10 This perspective was
not unusual. White Americans often linked progress and the removal of Native Americans.
Viewing natives as part of the past or as representing a previous stage of societal development,
many white Americans saw their removal as a sign of progress, and Chapman’s history followed
suit.11 His work ultimately shows how the exclusion and removal of Native Americans
undergirded the comforting narrative of progress. It also highlights how local histories endorsed
these larger cultural ideas and applied them to their own reading of the region’s past.
In the coming decades, other local historians would build off Chapman’s example,
dislodging the baseless narratives of the Revolution and advancing similar views of the relation
of history to both progress and Native Americans. One such author, Colonel William Leete
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Chapman, A Sketch of the History of Wyoming, 198-209. Purcell, Sealed with Blood, 173. According to Sarah
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Stone, built on Chapman’s history in 1838 but went much further to discredit the “gross
exaggerations” about the battle in his two-volume biography of Joseph Brant. Fully conscious of
the fiction of Gertrude of Wyoming and the “exaggerations of Ramsay and Gordon…together
with [those from] compilers more modern who have taken no pains to inquire for the truth,”
Stone set out to rectify the historical record. He first attacked the idea of a July 4th massacre. He
concluded, “it does not appear that anything like a massacre followed the capitulation,” and he
rejected the idea that there were “any specific acts of cruelty other than such as are usual in the
general rout of a battlefield.” Next, Stone rebuffed the long-standing notion that Brant led the
raid on Wyoming with John Butler, using sources that he believed proved Brant could not have
been present.12
Stone also took issue with another tendency common among white historians of this
period—the propensity to depict Indians “with the characteristics of demons.” Taking pains to
stress the prominent role of Loyalists in committing atrocities after the battle, Stone questioned
this idea by reminding his readers of the savagery exhibited by white men at Wyoming. “In a
domestic war marked by such atrocity, even among those claiming to be civilized,” he wrote, “it
becomes us to pause before we brand the untutored savage, who fights according to the usages of
his own people, with all that is revolting and cruel.” Returning to ideas about white savagery and
Loyalist depredations, Stone challenged the depiction of Native Americans as bloodthirsty
monsters that many of his contemporaries advanced. In fact, Stone even defended some Indian
actions like scalping, arguing that these acts were considered honorable in native culture.13 His

Stone, Life of Joseph Brant, I: 319, 336-339. In a footnote, Stone remarked, “Rarely, indeed, does it happen that
history is more at fault in regard to facts than in the case of Wyoming. The remark may be applied to nearly every writer
who has attempted to narrate the events connected with the invasion of Colonel John Butler, Ramsay, and Gordon, and
Marshall—nay, the British historians themselves—have written gross exaggerations” (339).
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desire to present natives sympathetically led Stone to believe native testimony more readily than
other historians, and his admiration of Brant emerges in his work.
Despite his more evenhanded interpretation, Stone ultimately remained a product of his
time in that he subscribed to the prevailing, if toxic, idea that natives would soon disappear. Like
many Americans on the east coast, most notably James Fenimore Cooper in his 1826 Last of the
Mohicans, Stone believed in the myth of “the vanishing Indian.” This myth held that Native
Americans, in Stone’s word, were quickly “melting away before the Anglo-Saxons like the snow
beneath a vertical sun,” destined to be replaced by white settlers bringing progress further west.14
Seeing the extinction of native people as inevitable in the face of progress, which equated to the
advance of white society, Stone and other proponents of this myth mourned the loss of natives
and found it easier to admire certain native attributes. Ironically, this occurred only after
government policies and war had effectively removed most Native Americans from the eastern
United States. More nefariously, this sentimentalization of dying Indians had “profound political
implications,” providing “whites with an influential narrative of [inevitable] Indian decline” they
could use to advocate for native removal throughout the nineteenth century.15 This myth subtly
helped conceal white complicity in this process. An example of what one scholar terms
“imperialist nostalgia,” the mourning or nostalgia expressed for disappearing Indians in the
antebellum period helped hide white involvement by presenting them as innocent or passive
bystanders to native extinction.16 Thus, while Stone did not present natives as heartless monsters,

Stone, Life of Joseph Brant, I: xiii. See also, Paxton, “Remembering and Forgetting,” 188-189.
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his adherence to this myth and the idea of progress ultimately supported the very expansion that
led to Native Americans’ disappearance.
Not all local historians agreed with Stone’s interpretation about Wyoming or Native
Americans. Stone’s friend Charles Miner, for instance, challenged Stone’s argument about
Brant’s participation in the battle in his own 1845 history of Wyoming. In a detailed footnote,
Miner claimed that Stone lacked convincing evidence to support his assertion about Brant.
Doubting the veracity of any testimony from Brant’s “Indian friends” as to his whereabouts at
the time of the battle, Miner argued that Brant’s infamy and his role in the rest of the war
suggests that he did, in fact, command the Indian contingent in July 1778. His suspicions of
Native Americans clearly colored his reading of certain evidence as well as his overall depiction
of natives.17 Despite his disagreements with Stone, Miner similarly recognized the problems with
the public’s understanding of the battle and built off Chapman’s example by seeking to present a
truthful account that discredited the sensationalized details built up around the battle. His own
interpretation of the battle followed closely with Chapman’s account, and it shared many features
with other contemporary works on the topic.18 Miner did not repeat Holt’s unfounded stories
about a July 4th massacre. Calling out William Gordon, David Ramsey, John Marshall, and other
historians for disseminating myths about the surrender of Forty Fort, Miner declared that “it is
time the truth of history should be vindicated.” He then asserted that these earlier accounts were
inaccurate and that no one died at the fort. Of course, this correction did not influence his
opinion of Butler, Great Britain, or any natives. For him, these actors remained tainted by their
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involvement in the battle and the murder of retreating Patriot soldiers.19 Correcting some of the
narratives of previous writers and historians, Miner’s account helped further discredit the old
legend of the Wyoming Massacre in the eyes of many locals.
Thirteen years after Charles Miner published his book, local minister George Peck added
his own contribution to Wyoming’s history that sought to dislodge popular misconceptions.
Peck’s 1858 book, titled Wyoming; Its History, Stirring Incidents, and Romantic Adventures,
aimed to not only conform to “historic truth” but also inspire future generations. In his coverage
of the battle, Peck stressed the contrast between Patriot bravery and the barbarity that Indians and
Loyalists exhibited against retreating men and prisoners. Peck also attacked Holt’s ideas about
the hatchet and the burning of women and children in Forty Fort. Though he understood how
many Americans could easily believe such lies about the Tories and Indians who “were with no
injustice regarded as a sort of demons incarnate,” he emphasized that “these [details] are not
mere exaggerations, but downright falsehoods.” After rejecting the central fiction of the
legendary version of the massacre, Peck turned to an even more disputed detail—the role that
Joseph Brant played in the battle. Weighing the evidence presented by “popular tradition” as
well as from Chapman, Miner, and Stone, Peck eventually sided with Stone, arguing that Brant
did not accompany John Butler. Not that this correction altered his estimation of Brant or Native
Americans. Even without Wyoming on his record, according to Peck, Brant remained a monster
because of his actions in the Mohawk Valley during the Revolution. In this regard, his disdain
for Native Americans more generally resembled Miner’s.20
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Peck may have showcased his devotion to uncovering the truth, but his history also
reveals his harsh attitude towards natives and Loyalists, an attitude that many Revolutionary
Americans would have shared. Just like earlier Patriots, Peck equated Loyalists and Native
Americans with savagery, and his coverage of Wyoming often focused just as much on “the
diabolical spirit of the Tories” as Indian depredations.21 Criticizing Loyalists for voluntarily
choosing “savagery over civilization” and emphasizing that Indians and Loyalists had committed
heinous acts, Peck helped justify the removal of Native Americans and their allies from the
region.22 By playing up the savagery of the enemy in contrast to Patriot bravery, Peck presented
the triumph of the United States and the expulsion of these enemies as a victory of good over
evil. He placed the Battle of Wyoming at the center of a narrative of the region’s history and
anchored it to an overarching narrative of progress. Like Chapman before him, Peck presented
Wyoming’s history as a liner progression and argued that the sacrifices of the past, especially
from the battle in 1778, ultimately paved the way for a more promising future. Referring to the
Wyoming Massacre Monument, Peck wrote, “while it points back to a stern, bloody period in
our history, it should indicate the fact of progress, and prophesy a glorious future.”23 Once again,
Peck’s work accentuates how locals actively shaped ideas from wider American culture to give
meaning to their own regional circumstances and history, combining a renewed concern for
historical accuracy with an adherence to a particular narrative of progress.

While these authors repudiated the legend of the Wyoming Massacre and criticized the
cycle of historical distortion that had spread it across the country, many of these same writers
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ironically contributed to a new form of distortion in their histories. Their writings fueled the rise
of a new legend: the legend of Queen Esther and the Bloody Rock.
Before analyzing how local historians perpetuated Queen Esther’s myth, it is necessary to
first trace, as much as possible, the legend’s origins. As one scholar attests, “the facts
surrounding Esther’s involvement in the events of the Battle of Wyoming are sketchy,” and no
firsthand accounts place her at the site.24 Nonetheless, some contemporary references to Queen
Esther and a murderous ritual after the battle do exist. The earliest mention of Esther after the
battle emerges from Colonel Thomas Hartley’s account of his late September 1778 punitive
expedition into the New York and Pennsylvania backcountry. Angered by the purported
massacre at Wyoming, Hartley set out to avenge Patriot losses, and he burned several Native
American towns during his expedition, including “Queen Hester’s [a corruption of Esther’s]
palace or town.” Hartley, however, never mentioned Esther’s involvement with Wyoming, which
would be unusual if she had in fact committed atrocities at that battle. Indeed, one would expect
Hartley to more fully emphasize the destruction of this Indian town to gain favor with his
superiors, even if there were only unsubstantiated rumors about her.25 No such rumors yet
existed, however. In fact, the presses that readily disseminated Holt’s sensational account during
the Revolution never printed a word about Queen Esther, the Bloody Rock, or prisoners
massacred in a ring.26
While the legend of Queen Esther received no newspaper coverage at the time, a few
contemporary journals from 1779 referenced rumors about Queen Esther and the killing of
prisoners around the fatal ring at Wyoming. In a journal from Sullivan’s expedition against the
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Iroquois in summer 1779, Reverend William Rogers wrote of visiting the Wyoming battlefield a
little more than a year after the battle. He recalled visiting “a spot where fourteen wretched
creatures [Patriot prisoners] …were…made immediately to sit down in a ring” before a group of
Native Americans “tomahawk[ed] the poor fellows one after another.” Amazingly, one prisoner
escaped this heavily guarded execution and reported the occurrence to Colonel Zebulon Butler,
who later “went to the spot and found the bones of the fourteen lying…in an exact circle.” Butler
allegedly then related this information to Rogers. Rogers also reported rumors about Esther,
though he did not explicitly connect her with the incidents at the ring. “It is said Queen Esther, of
the Six Nations, who was with the enemy, scalped and tomahawked with her own hands in cool
blood eight or ten persons,” he wrote.27 Another veteran of Sullivan’s expedition, Sergeant
Nathaniel Webb, provided another written mention of Esther’s purported role from before the
nineteenth century. On August 30, 1779, Webb claimed to have found “the body of Queen
Esther, who murdered many of the inhabitants of Wyoming last summer” while destroying
nearby cornfields in an Indian village.28 While far from conclusive, these journal accounts
suggest that rumors about Esther existed among some men in Sullivan’s army and that some in
the valley claimed to have witnessed Esther’s actions. Nonetheless, the veracity of these rumors
remains questionable at best, since no firsthand written sources place Esther at Wyoming or
mention the Bloody Rock in July 1778. In the end, the silence of most contemporary
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eyewitnesses and the Patriot press about these occurrences speak more loudly than the passing
references mentioned in these journals.
After these 1779 mentions, the story of Esther and the fatal ring did not again enter the
historical record until 1797 when a Philadelphia magazine printed excerpts from William
Rogers’s journal. Few evidently took notice. The next reference to Queen Esther appeared some
twenty-six years later when a few Eastern newspapers again reproduced Roger’s journal, helping
this rumor reach a slightly wider audience.29 Nevertheless, the story remained relatively
unknown for much of the 1820s until locals from the Wyoming Valley gave it new life.
The real emergence of Queen Esther in histories occurred because of developments on
the local level. In 1829, Israel Skinner, a resident of the Wyoming Valley, became one of the
first historians to include the legend of Esther in his history. Dedicating a few pages to the battle,
his verse account of the Revolutionary War provided a description of Esther and the fatal ring:
A squaw, the Indians did queen Esther call,
Was set apart to tomahawk them all…
Fourteen lay dead and scalped upon the ground,
With feet towards each other, circled round.
Skinner revealed that he learned about these events from aged residents of the valley, who
claimed to have escaped and saved themselves “from savage vengeance” back on July 3, 1778.
Specifically, Skinner cited the testimony of Joseph Elliot and Lebeus Hammon (or Hammond),
two figures to whom later mid-century historians would commonly return in their own accounts
and who had evidently told others in the community about their experience.30 Skinner accepted

“From the Philadelphia Gazette: Extract from a Journal of a brigade Chaplain, written in the campaign of 1779,
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their testimony as truth and merely repeated the tale, inaugurating a pattern that many other
locals would follow. As with “Brant’s imagined participation in the Battle of Wyoming,”
according to one scholar, Queen Esther’s story grew as “word of mouth became fact, leaving
little room for doubt in the minds of locals.”31
Esther’s legend expanded after 1829, often morphing with successive use and quickly
jettisoning any evidential mooring. William Campbell’s 1831 history of Tyron County, New
York, for example, added a new spin on the legend in a brief appendix. Mistaking Esther for her
sister, Catherine Montour, and offering no sources for his commentary on her, Campbell
provided a fantastical account of this woman, who “might well be termed a fury.” Instead of
killing prisoners around a stone, Campbell’s Catherine supposedly slaughtered wounded Patriots
across the battlefield, “barbarously murdering the wounded who in vain supplicated for their
lives.”32 William Leete Stone’s 1838 biography of Brant presented a similar story of Catherine
ranging the battlefield “like a chafed tigress, stimulating the warriors of her adopted race to the
onslaught.” As with Campbell’s appendix, this mention of Catherine lacked any reference to the
tale’s origin and failed to mention the Bloody Rock. Unlike Campbell, however, Stone
recognized that “the story can hardly be credited,” and he labored to disprove it by describing
Catherine as a woman of dignity and solid upbringing. Coupled with Stone’s effort to dislodge
this view, the inconsistencies of Esther’s (or in this case Catherine’s) story and the absence of
sources on her involvement within these two histories suggest that Esther had fully entered the
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realm of popular folklore and romance during the 1830s. By 1838, Stone described her as part of
the “the unwritten history of this battle,” suggesting that her legend had grown considerably.33
Over the next few years, however, new testimony seemingly emerged as locals began to
record the remembrances of aged residents and veterans in the Wyoming Valley. In 1839, a local
committee published and sent Congress summaries of twenty interviews they had conducted
about Wyoming during the Revolution. Hoping to induce Congress to grant them land in the
West, the committee sent interviews meant to highlight the suffering and patriotism of the
valley’s older citizens. The committee’s strategy failed to sway Congress, but the interviews
recorded valuable firsthand accounts from the period. Three interviews from veterans repeated
stories about Queen Esther’s legend and the story of the Bloody Rock from Lebeus Hammond
and Joseph Elliot that Israel Skinner had first referenced in 1829. All three related the escape of
Patriot soldier Lebeus Hammond from the execution around the ring. Often citing Hammond as
their chief source of information, these recollections indicate that the initial rumors about the
fatal ring and Esther probably originated with Hammond sometime after the battle; his
recollections likely preceded Joseph Elliot’s, which fewer sources mentioned.34
From Hammond, the rumor likely spread to other veterans, who in turn introduced it into
the historical record through their testimony more than sixty years after the event.35 As more
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mentioned this story, some veterans, such as Colonel Nathan Denison—second in command at
the battle—and possibly also Joseph Elliot, even seemed to re-remember (or perhaps more
accurately misremember) the events of July 3 and 4, 1778. Adding Queen Esther to his story,
Denison “claimed that Esther led the Indians at Wyoming,” despite never mentioning her in his
official report from late July 1778.36 Giving credence to the idea that local rumor eventually
morphed into fact, locals accepted much of this testimony for the truth. In spite of the 1839
committee’s admission “that, in answer to their inquiries of the aged people for information, as
was inevitable from the great lapse of time, much that was learned from friends…was mixed up
with what was personally known,” few questioned the validity of these veterans’ recollections.37
Perhaps since the myth conformed to many residents’ understandings of the battle and the
Revolution, they chose to accept it. The story’s emphasis on Patriot sacrifice and the horrors of
Indian savagery would have certainly aligned with many people’s preconceptions, and the myth
would not have seemed incongruous with other more fictionalized portrayals of the region’s past.
A desire to honor and record the sacrifices of the Revolutionary generation may have also played
a role in its widespread acceptance, especially for historians. More interested in transmitting the
stories and values of the passing Revolutionaries than possibly confronting possible inaccuracies
in their accounts, many historians failed to challenge the veracity of these recollections and thus
helped the local rumors of Esther gain staying power in the local community as well as in the
national imagination.38
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Armed with newly recorded testimony, local historians began producing a more
consistent story about Queen Esther and the fatal ring starting in the 1840s. For instance,
William Leete Stone, now writing a history on Wyoming in 1840, discarded the story of Esther’s
battlefield antics. In its place, he wrote of Hammond’s escape, the fatal ring, and Esther around a
stone—all aspects of an emerging common narrative, which drew from the interviews collected
by the valley’s 1839 committee. Provided to Stone by Charles Miner, a fellow historian and a
member of the committee, these interviews began to reshape the historical record just a year after
their publication. As historians accepted the rumors or simply placed them in their histories, they
advanced the legend of Esther. To Stone’s credit, even with this testimony, he never wavered in
rejecting the story, a far cry from other historians of this period. He, nonetheless, still clung to
the idea that Native Americans tortured Patriots around the bloody rock after the battle and that
another Indian woman could have been responsible.39 Though far from wholeheartedly endorsing
the Esther myth, this interpretation gave credence to its general idea, namely that an Indian
woman massacred several prisoners around a stone after the battle.
Charles Miner also included the story of Queen Esther when he finally published his own
work on Wyoming’s history in 1845. In his coverage of the battle, he presented the now standard
narrative of Hammond’s escape and Esther’s executions, describing her as “a fury in the form of
a woman, [who] assumed the office of executioner with death maul, or tomahawk.” Unlike
Stone, Miner believed in this story’s validity and disputed Stone’s evidence, again allowing his
negative view of Native Americans to influence his interpretation. Playing a conspicuous role in
the battle, according to Miner, Esther conducted herself “like a demon.” Interestingly, his view
of women and his reading of history also contributed to his rejection of Stone’s argument.
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“Remember the kindred atrocities perpetrated by women during the French Revolution,” Miner
wrote in reference to Esther, “it required the purity of angels corrupted to make perfect devils.”40
Presumably considering proper females as pure and above violence, he interpreted Esther’s
corruption as a transgression of the normal gender order and further evidence of her demonic
nature.
Along with these racial and gendered attitudes, Miner’s extensive use of oral testimony
and interviews also furthered his acceptance of Queen Esther’s legend. Conducting dozens of
private interviews, Miner provided a total of forty-five interview summaries in one of his
appendixes, including one from Joseph Elliot—supposed survivor of the fatal ring. He relied on
much of this testimony in shaping his interpretation and seems to have taken it largely at face
value.41 As he cited Hammond and Elliot’s testimony based on his reading of the evidence,
Miner further legitimized this local legend, and his extensively sourced account increased the
likelihood that others in the future would take it for the truth. As a result, despite having decried
falsehoods about Wyoming in his work, Miner unwittingly became just like the Revolutionary
historians he so vehemently denounced as he forwarded this evocative but almost certainly
fantastic tale.
Just like Charles Miner, George Peck accepted dubious historical evidence and allowed
his biases to shape his 1858 history. Referring to Esther as “the priestess of the hellish orgies of
‘Bloody Rock,”’ Peck repeated the popular account of her deeds as told by Hammond and Elliot.
As he did for Brant, Peck again weighed the evidence for this claim about the Battle of
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Wyoming, eventually arguing that Esther participated. Several factors influenced his decision.
For one, he believed the testimony of Elliot and Hammond, whom he considered estimable
community members. Moreover, Peck allowed his view of Native Americans to inform his
portrayal. While acknowledging Stone’s point that Esther “had amiable qualities, and a certain
polish in her manners,” Peck maintained that Esther could not escape the tendencies of her native
ancestry. For “this ‘half-breed’ woman,” according to Peck, “the sound of the battle and the sight
of human gore aroused the demon within her,” and “according to the most approved Indian
forms,” she took “sweet vengeance upon the prisoners which had fallen into her hands.”42
As with their commentary on Brant, Peck and Miner’s take on Esther sheds light on the
cultural atmosphere of the mid-nineteenth century, specifically as it relates to Native Americans
and race. The story of Esther, representing how “Indians could be savages poisoned with rage”
and resistant towards “inevitable white settlement,” served as an image of the “bad Indian” for
both these historians and many in the valley—and a woman who had abandoned feminine
characteristics to boot.43 This image easily helped whites justify their triumph over native people
as a manifestation of progress over savagery. In addition, the appellation of “half-breed” attached
to Esther fits within the increasingly racist thinking of the antebellum period. As many white
Americans believed so-called “half-breeds” acquired the worse traits of both races, Esther’s story
attested to white arguments for racial separation.44 For Peck, Esther’s atrocities were no surprise
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considering her Indian ancestry, while her white ancestry allowed her to display some semblance
of manners when necessary—a portrayal where the message is hard to miss.
These depictions of Esther again point to the interaction between local histories and
national narratives. Influenced by but also informing national ideas, local stories, in the words of
Paxton, “did not remain local. They rejoined and influenced national conversations about the
related subjects of modernity, national unity, and Indian removal.”45 In the hands of Peck and
Miner, Esther’s story spoke to the need for progress and Indian removal in the valley and
elsewhere. Using national ideas to shape their community’s understanding of the Revolution,
these historians framed the story of Esther and the history of the Battle of Wyoming at large to
meet local purposes. At the same time, read by people across the nation, these histories seemed
to confirm national narratives about progress and the disappearance of Native Americans by
showing them at work on this well-known local scene.46
While regional historians crafted their narratives to fit local needs and replace baseless
stories from the Revolutionary era, many of them ultimately gave life to their own
unsubstantiated legend by writing about Queen Esther. Convinced by their own preconceived
notions about Native Americans, the pervasive influence of local folklore, and collective
misremembering by many in the valley community, historians fostered a new legend even as
they discredited Holt’s exaggerations. Uncritical of their source material, historians at midcentury fell into practically the same trap as earlier Revolutionary historians. As in the early
nineteenth century, the misconceptions furthered by history found their way into different media,
Paxton, “Remembering and Forgetting,” 181.
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such as in literature and on the local commemorative scene. Born from local hearsay and boosted
by historians, the myth of Queen Esther cast quite the shadow on the Battle of Wyoming’s
historical remembrance.

Regional Romance, Popular Literature, and Local Commemoration
While historians kickstarted Queen Esther’s myth, her legend benefitted from other
cultural forces at work, especially considering the timing of the myth’s development starting in
the late 1820s and fully blossoming by the 1840s. Several cultural currents contributed to
Esther’s rise. In a period marked by a rise in regional story-telling and mythmaking across the
country, Wyoming remained a household name and featured in popular history, literature, and
travel accounts. The Wyoming Valley particularly attracted those looking for this intersection of
fantasy and romance, especially since many Americans highly regarded the region for its natural
beauty, history, and the fictional accounts written about it. On the local scene, more residents
expressed interest in the Battle of Wyoming’s remembrance, eventually constructing a
monument and holding commemorative events to honor the sacrifices of the region’s Patriots.
Highly popular, these events attracted residents and visitors alike. The valley’s history with
Native Americans additionally brought attention as writers turned to natives for compelling
characters and to explore issues related to American identity and expansion during this time.
Easily manipulated for romantic effect, in line with most Americans’ view of their past, and
capable of speaking to contemporary issues, the Battle of Wyoming was also uniquely wellsuited for mythmaking in the antebellum period, and, as a result, many included it in regional
folklore, local speeches, and popular fiction. Esther’s myth grew in this fertile environment,
benefiting from the coalescing of these trends on regional and national levels.
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Queen Esther’s myth began in local rumor and history but quickly expanded into the
realm of popular culture. Akin to how early historians of the Revolution spread the first legend
of the Wyoming Massacre, regional historians and locals’ uncritical acceptance of Esther led
other kinds of authors to fall prey to these oft-repeated narratives and further the cycle of
historical distortion. A note at the end of the 1840 short story “Meantonimo,” for instance,
reveals how the embellishments of local rumor and regional history gained the veneer of
credibility and spread through popular fiction. Reassuring his readers of the historical accuracy
of the “hair breath escapes” described in his story about the Battle of Wyoming, this author
asserted his credibility by claiming that he received all his information “from the lips of an actor
in the scene who is still living.”47 While the testimony of an aged veteran ostensibly gave the
story’s depiction credibility, such testimony could err in significant ways as seen above in the
case of Colonel Dennison’s 1830s testimony or even in Solomon Avery’s deposition just a few
days after the battle. Nonetheless, this author readily accepted this testimony as true and then
disseminated it to his readers. While not specifically about Esther, this example shows how many
authors contributed to the spread of misinformation by uncritically reproducing local legend and
hearsay.
While Esther’s myth seems to have its origins in local rumor and regional history,
literature and the wider cultural atmosphere played an outsized role in the acceptance of Queen
Esther on a local and national level. In fact, the literary environment of the antebellum period,
especially with its emphasis on regional storytelling and American themes, partially explains
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why Esther’s legend flourished at this specific time. For instance, emerging during a period “ripe
for regional romance,” in the words of one scholar, Esther’s myth took form around the same
time that many Americans writers were crafting fictional or pseudo-historical accounts about
regions across the United States—including Wyoming itself. Most famously, Washington Irving
wrote several localized tales for New York, authoring “Rip Van Winkle” and “The Legend of
Sleepy Hollow.” In both short stories, published around 1820, Irving presented a regional culture
and infused its history with mythical elements. While Irving largely created fictional legends for
these places, it seems possible that locals in the Wyoming Valley could have adapted rumors
about Esther to enhance the romance of their own history.48 This is not to say that locals
necessarily endorsed falsehoods on purpose, but it does suggest a reason why residents may have
been more eager to accept (or at least not challenge) the stories about her.
Starting in 1809, as discussed in Chapter 2, Scottish poet Thomas Campbell set a
precedent for dramatic fabrication that encouraged other writers to embellish different aspects of
Wyoming’s history for literary effect. Gertrude of Wyoming, Campbell’s popular poem, took
several creative liberties, such as the creation of a “noble savage” character, and it provided a
basic narrative framework that many emulated.49 Over the course of the antebellum period, many
American authors drew inspiration from Campbell’s poem and Wyoming’s history, and, as a
result, the valley became a popular setting for poems, novels, and short stories. As one literary
reviewer remarked in 1830, “as a subject to writers in every department of composition—the
massacre of Wyoming; and that of the cruel Brandt; and remorseless Butler…are conspicuous
characters,” worthy of fiction and romance.50 Another reviewer agreed, “the tale of
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Wyoming…is well-adapted to call forth poetical effects.”51 By 1840, several authors, such as
Joseph McCoy and James McHenry, had created romantic poems or novels about Wyoming,
infusing romantic and melodramatic bits of fiction into the region’s history.52 This outflowing of
literature—from both locals and non-locals alike—only increased with the discovery of Frances
Slocum, a local woman who had been taken captive by Native American during the
Revolutionary War and who became known as the “Lost Sister.” Like the Battle of Wyoming,
Frances’ rediscovery inspired writers to produce emotional works of historical fiction centering
around the valley’s past.53 As these examples attest, antebellum Americans clearly saw
Wyoming’s history as especially fruitful for fiction and romance. In fact, perhaps too many
American authors saw it that way. In 1858, an American literary periodical complained that “two
or three weeks only have passed, since we [last] had to deal with the Valley of Wyoming.”54
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Accustomed to seeing the region through a semi-fictionalized lens, many Americans
viewed Esther’s myth as just another instance of romance in this storied vale. One 1850 article
vividly illustrates this idea. According to the author,
The imaginary Wyoming differs little from that which has a geographical position
on the banks of [the] Susquehanna. When the cursory narrator of strange events
has erred, he has seldom erred by exaggeration. When the poet has indulged in
fiction, his fiction has been strangely like the truth. They, indeed must have a
tolerably correct, however imperfect an idea, of Wyoming and its history, who
have read the romantic story of the Lost Sister, the Legends of Queen Esther, and
the Bloody Rock, and the sweet lay of the Caledonian bard [Campbell].55
Arguing that one could glean the proper history of Wyoming from popular fiction and local
fable, this author shows how the numerous stories based on Wyoming’s Revolutionary history
prepared the average American to uncritically accept exaggerated narratives. In this atmosphere,
misinformation could clearly flourish, likely first effecting local and then national audiences.
Regardless of their role in beginning the legend, locals spread and benefitted from it. As
Warren Smith has argued, “local writers can hardly be blamed for making the most of Queen
Esther. The annals of American villages are usually dull enough, and a picturesque villain is a
godsend.” Esther’s story surely added a new element of interest to the area’s history. As “the
priestess of mid-night massacre,” Queen Esther essentially became the region’s equivalent to
Sleepy Hollow’s Headless Horseman, helping residents make their history more exciting and
attract more visitors.56
Romantic literature and local boosterism about the region’s history continued unabated
after the development of this myth, both easily incorporating Esther’s story with the mythos
surrounding the valley. “Romance, or reality, or both, has made Wyoming the spot where
Catharine Montour or Queen Esther played the Hecate of the night,” wrote one 1841 traveler,
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giving voice to the how easily Esther fit into preconceived notions of the valley’s regularly
fictionalized history. Taking locals and regional
historians at face value, such articles disseminated
Esther’s legend across the nation and allured tourists
to come visit the region by accentuating these
fantastic tales. In fact, as the century wore on the
“Bloody Rock” became quite the tourist attraction. As
promotional material from the 1878 centennial
celebration of the battle declared, “all who are
Figure 1: Esther's Rock in the Mid-Nineteenth Century. From
George Peck, Wyoming: Its History, Stirring Incidents, and
Romantic Adventures (New York: Harper and Brothers, Publishers,
1858), 284.

interested in the history of the valley have a desire to
view the scene of savage slaughter” at the Bloody

Rock.57 The rock also became the focal point of local superstition. According to some, the blood
of Esther’s victims gave the rock its reddish hue.58
Again, this was part of a larger trend occurring in Wyoming—tourists came not just for
Esther but because of the other history and legends associated with Wyoming as well. This
becomes apparent from the variety of travel articles published about the region, which praised
Wyoming and described it as a beautiful and historic place to visit. As one author wrote, “The
bards of the Revolution embalmed it in song, and Campbell’s Gertrude made it classic ground.
The fame of it has ‘gone out into all the world,’ and no American tourist can be regarded as

“Queen Esther’s Rock Decorated: Historic Site of Executions of Battle of Wyoming Survivors Attracts Many,”
The Wilkes-Barre Record, June 29, 1928, 23, from the collection of the Luzerne County Historical Society. This
1928 article reprinted material first “printed during the centennial celebration of the Battle of Wyoming” in 1878.
58
For quote see, Erastus Brooks, “Wyoming Valley: The Susquehannah—Incidents of Travel—The Lost
Traveller—The Captive Maid,” Southern Literary Messenger 7, no. 7-8 (July/August 1841): 553. For rumors on the
rock’s color, see “Travels in the Dog Days,” New York Spectator (New York City), November 11, 1839, 4.
57

Tharp 123
having completed his task until he shall have visited Wyoming.”59 Making sure to mention the
exciting historical events of the region, which almost always included the Battle of Wyoming,
the Lost Sister, and now Queen Esther, travel accounts illustrate how Americans readily bought
into this local myth and historical fantasy. They also point to the important role literature and
travel accounts played in spreading regional myths to a national audience.60 One must not forget,
however, that local promotion and the anecdotes which filled travel narratives originated from
the region and ultimately served local purposes. To fully understand the legend of Queen Esther
then, a more detailed look at the regional remembrance of the Battle of Wyoming is warranted.

Developments on the local commemorative scene contributed to this legend’s rise by
similarly predisposing locals to accept Esther’s story before diffusing it far beyond the region.
For one, valley residents increasing interest in the battle’s remembrance in the 1830s and 1840s
partially explains their endorsement of the legend, since this interest almost directly coincided
with the growth of the myth. A community drive to construct a monument to the battle’s fallen
best indicates this amplified interest in the battle. While some locals had called for a monument
in the first decade of the 1800s, momentum for commemorating the battle on the landscape grew
considerably in the 1830s after a long period of neglect.61 In 1832, locals rediscovered the
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common grave of many Patriot soldiers, and in 1833 they laid a cornerstone for a monument in
their honor.62 The project stalled for close to ten years, but the all-female Luzerne Monumental
Association eventually came to the rescue. Raising funds through dinners, fairs, and other forms
of fundraising, they succeeded where earlier backers had failed. By October of 1843, contractors
put the finishing touches on the 62-and-a-half-foot tall marble obelisk, completing the Wyoming
Monument.63 Overlapping with the desire for regional stories, this uptick in community
involvement with the battle’s remembrance likely made residents more enthusiastic for stories
about the event, especially the exciting recollections of Hammond and Elliot. Local interest
could only benefit Queen Esther’s legend.
The commemorative events associated with the monument contributed to the diffusion of
Esther’s myth to the community and then the nation. Commemorative events at the monument
attracted large crowds, bringing the community together and even receiving national attention.
The 1833 grave uncovering and cornerstone laying, for example, brought two to three thousand
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to the grounds and featured in the Niles Weekly Register, an early national magazine.64
Especially upon the completion of the monument, commemorative events brought in attendees
from the surrounding area and beyond. The most noteworthy celebration occurred with the
centennial in 1878 when several prominent Wilkes-Barre citizens planned a massive two-day
event that featured processions, pageants, restored forts, artifact displays, fireworks, and even a
presidential appearance by Rutherford B. Hayes. As one of the largest events in the valley’s
history up to that point, it attracted over 60,000 people according to some estimates, and it
featured in newspaper articles from Washington to Philadelphia to Chicago to New Orleans.65
These types of commemorative events, along with histories, fiction, and local folklore,
helped solidify Esther’s myth into the public mind. At an 1832 event, for instance, one of the
speakers mentioned Queen Esther—perhaps for the first time at a public event. Heard by the
thousands of locals in attendance and reprinted for newspapers, his speech and subsequently his
discussion of Esther reached valley residents and national citizens alike.66 This process of
diffusion most conspicuously occurred during the 1878 event where Esther’s myth featured
prevalently. In fact, the first day processional ended at the Bloody Rock, and the keynote speaker
used “the account of the horrible orgies at what has since been known as Queen Esther’s Bloody
Rock…[to] close out” his description of the battle.67 Promotional material further capitalized on
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the public’s interest and often directed visitors to the Bloody Rock.68 Assisting the spread of
Queen Esther’s myth to locals and visitors in attendance, these commemorative events ensured
the legend’s diffusion to a wider audience.
These events did not simply utilize the interesting history and romance of Esther’s myth
or the Battle of Wyoming to attract visitors, however. Instead, as with regional history, certain
memories of the battle—and eventually Queen Esther—allowed locals to make sense of their
present and connect it with national narratives. Serving as the focal point for commemorating the
battle, the monument and the events centered around it illustrate how the local community
looked to the battle to define their identity as valley residents and Americans. Many supporters
of the Wyoming Monument, for example, envisioned it as a sacred space for the expression of
what Edward Linenthal calls “patriotic orthodoxy.” “Designed to ensure continued allegiance” to
the values of a “heroic past,” patriotic orthodoxy, according to Linenthal, warns against “falling
away from the ideals of cultural heroes who died in battle.” Throughout many wars, Americans
have employed battlefield monuments to convey this idea and influence the values of the
present.69 Several Wyoming residents seem to have understood that with both their permanence
and prominence on the landscape battlefield monuments can uniquely shape historical
remembrance and perpetuate a version of patriotic orthodoxy.
Beginning with Charles Miner, many residents looked to the Wyoming Monument to
properly enshrine the region’s past and pass down the Revolutionary generation’s values to
succeeding generations. With an eye toward the future, Miner argued in 1809 that the monument
would please not just “our old men” but instill pride in the past for “our young men” who “shall

68

D. Davidsburg, Pittston Gazette Centennial Hand-Book, 1778-1878: One Hundredth Anniversary of the Battle
and Massacre of Wyoming, July 3 and 4, 1878 (Pittston, PA: Gazette Print, 1878), 33-34.
69
Edward Linenthal, Sacred Ground: Americans and Their Battlefields, 2nd edition (Urbana: University of Illinois
Press, 1993), 1-5.

Tharp 127
gather round the tomb—reflect on the virtues of their fathers…[and] as at the altar—shall swear
a new devotion to liberty, and new fealty to their country.”70 Chester Butler, grandson of
Zebulon Butler, echoed Miner’s sentiment at the monument in 1833. He declared, “this [the
monument] shall be the shrine to which children yet unborn will be led, while they learn from
maternal lips the first lesson of patriotism.”71 Supporters of the monument clearly grasped that a
proper memorial to the Wyoming dead could provide inspiration to shape the region’s future and
ensure that no one would forget the ideals of the Revolution.

Figure 2: Photograph of the Wyoming Monument. Created by C.F. Cook, from Wesley Johnson, Wyoming: A Record of the One Hundredth Year
Commemorative Observance of the Battle and Massacre, July 3, 1778-July 3, 1878 (Wilkes-Barre, Pa.: Beardslee & Co., Printers, 1882),
frontispiece.
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Connecting local events with national mythology about the Revolution, locals understood
that the monument could help maintain patriotic orthodoxy in a uniquely material way. This
connection becomes most apparent through the monument’s full inscription:
Near this spot was fought
On the afternoon of Friday, the third day of July 1778,
THE BATTLE OF WYOMING
In which a small band of patriotic Americans
Chiefly the undisciplined, the youthful, and the aged,
Spared, by inefficiency, from the distant ranks of the republic,
Led by Col. Zebulon Butler, and Col. Nathan Denison,
With a courage that deserved success,
Fearlessly met and bravely fought,
A combined British, Tory, and Indian force
Of thrice their number.
Numerical superiority alone gave success to the invader,
And wide-spread havoc, desolation and ruin
Marked his savage and bloody footsteps through the valley.
THIS MONUMENT
Commemorative of these events,
And in memory of the actors in them,
Has been erected
OVER THE BONES OF THE SLAIN
By their descendants and others who gratefully appreciated
The services and sacrifices of their patriot ancestors.
Giving a succinct history lesson that stressed Patriot virtue and bravery, highlighted the “savage”
ways of the enemy, and demonstrated the gratitude of modern residents, this epitaph quite
literally set in stone this patriotic interpretation of the battle. A visual testament to Revolutionary
sacrifice and bravery, this monument to Wyoming’s memory would remind succeeding
generations of the costs of liberty and independence both in the past and in the present. As one
speaker declared at the 1878 celebration, “never did lofty column rest upon the bones of braver
or more patriotic men whose names are carved upon its tablets. It is the monument of our Bunker
Hill…The hundred thousand people who today are residents of the Wyoming Valley claim this
monument, and the glories which cluster around it, as their common property, and their joint
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inheritance.”72 Showcasing local contributions to the Revolution, this monument allowed locals
to look to their regional (and national) past with pride.
Along with connecting regional history with the nation’s Revolutionary mythology,
locals used the commemorative space provided by the monument to reaffirm the community’s
values and connect their history with other national narratives. For example, in an 1833 speech,
Chester Butler used the Battle of Wyoming to articulate a vision of American identity and defend
his ancestor’s actions. Extolling the region’s sturdy pioneer ancestors for escaping the “vices
or…follies of the old world” and representing the virtues of the New World, he presented the
settlers of the Wyoming Valley as the best of American civilization—conveniently forgetting the
violent clashes between Pennamite and Yankee settlers that had plagued the valley for decades.
With this positive depiction cemented in his mind, Chester could easily justify white conquest of
the valley. “Unlike many who first invaded the secluded retreats of the natives of the forest,”
Chester remarked, “it was by honorable purchase, and not by force or fraud that our ancestors
sought to possess themselves of the country. Unwilling to endure oppression themselves, they
could not practice it against others.” While largely inaccurate, Chester’s reasoning provided a
comforting narrative that minimized white complicity in one of the community’s darker
moments.73 Just one example of how locals could take meaning from the battle and apply it to
present realities, Chester Butler’s speech reveals how commemoration, much like regional
history, used the memory of the Battle of Wyoming for local purposes—and how those purposes
were often undergirded via connections to larger national ideas.
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Queen Esther’s myth helped locals further cultivate a regional identity from the Battle of
Wyoming. Adding the Bloody Rock and Esther’s executions to the typical narrative of the battle,
residents could use her to accentuate different aspects of the story depending on what message
they hoped to get across. For example, one orator in 1878 used Queen Esther to highlight the
“barbaric deeds” of Loyalists and Native Americans and to show how Patriots suffered.
Presenting the modern day as an achievement made possible by the sacrifices of these suffering
Patriots, the orator also utilized Esther to present a contrast between the past and present that
ultimately supported his vision of progress.74 The legend additionally reinforced the common
portrayal of the battle—practically identical to the one inscribed on the monument—that brave
Patriot soldiers fought against a wicked enemy. Merely confirming what locals already claimed
to know, the addition of Queen Esther proved that the Loyalist and Native American forces who
attacked their region in 1778 were savage, merciless invaders. Such depictions of the enemy
ultimately allowed locals to paint their ancestors as both victims and heroes. The Patriots of
1778, in their eyes, valiantly suffered the full wrath of savage raiders, capable of all the horrors
of the Bloody Rock, and died so “that we might be free,” prosperous, and in control of the
valley.75 In this sense, local commemorative events so frequently employed Queen Esther’s
legend because it aligned so well with the regional and national narratives of progress, Indian
removal, and patriotism to which they already subscribed. Able to speak to local concerns,
Esther’s myth proved equally applicable to national ones.
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Nineteenth-century Americans’ penchant for stories about native people also fed into the
outpouring of popular stories about Wyoming and the eventual emergence of Esther on the
national scene. In the first half of the century, the reading public eagerly consumed numerous
stories related to Native Americans, such as James Fenimore Cooper’s Leatherstocking Tales.
For Romantic fiction and regional folklore alike, Native Americans were indeed the perfect
characters. Lurking in the wild and dark forests of the frontier, the strange and violent customs of
Indians added to the evocative power of these stories, and natives’ perceived “vanishing” at the
end of many of these tales enhanced the emotional effects that authors wished to elicit.76
Possessing a dark history with natives and a picturesque and wild environment, Wyoming thus
offered Romantic authors and local boosters with a readymade formula for compelling fiction
and interesting anecdotes. Queen Esther merely enhanced Wyoming’s allure to authors, and it
provided local promoters with another shocking Indian character capable of appealing to the
public’s voracious appetite for stories featuring Native Americans.
The fantastical and romantic elements of native characters, however, do not totally
explain the obsession that antebellum Americans displayed for literature featuring Native
Americans, Wyoming, and later Esther. Rather, like locals who used the Battle of Wyoming to
craft a regional identity, more literary minded authors hoped to use natives to forge a distinct
national literary style. As part of this, many writers turned to native people to highlight what they
saw as uniquely American themes, commonly presenting Indians “as metaphors in the struggle
between savagery and civilization.” Through this literary exploration, according to Robert
Berkhofer, authors grappled with one of the chief paradoxes of nineteenth century American
identity: the struggle to find a balance between European civilization and the regenerative yet
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potentially savage nature of the American wilderness.77 These authors also wrestled with
conflicting ideas about American Indians as they sought to explain and defend the triumph of
white civilization in their present. In the view of scholar Roy Harvey Pearce, Americans
eventually justified their conquest of native people by altering or contesting the idea of the
“noble savage,” a stock literary character that stood outside of and uncorrupted by the vices of
civilization. American literary works slowly transformed this idea “replacing it with the
conception of a savage in whom nobility was one with ignobility” or by simply discarding the
idea of Indian nobility all together. Still others made the noble savage “a prehistorical culture
hero” in order “to save history, or at least modern history, for his own civilization.” Presenting
Native American history as equivalent to North America’s childhood, authors sentimentalized
the Indian of the past while also arguing that their disappearance ultimately benefitted the whole,
since it brought on the United States’ adulthood—understood as white civilization.78
As a familiar and dramatic frontier battle with conspicuous (if not actually present)
Indian villains, the Battle of Wyoming provided authors with the elements to craft a narrative
that could articulate a new national style and grapple with these issues. For example, one literary
critic lauded Jacob McCoy’s 1819 epic poem, The Frontier Maid, or, A Tale of Wyoming, for
contributing to the nation’s incipient literary scene. The 1820 reviewer wrote, “at a time when
the citizens of the United States are actively endeavoring to absolve themselves from a
dependence on foreign artists…, it is truly gratifying to behold the literati of the country joining
in the march, and conducting the rising muses, clad in ‘American Scenes and incidents,’ to the
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grateful land of independence.” 79 Self-conscious in his use of American history, McCoy, like
other American authors, turned to the Battle of Wyoming to show that the new nation’s history
could provide proper material for high literary forms. A local poet from the Wyoming Valley,
McCoy also used the poem to speak to both the region’s and nation’s Revolutionary experience.
His poem revealingly, according to Pearce, “center[ed] on the attack of British-maddened
Indians on idyllic frontier farmers.” Playing up the contrast between the peaceful white settlers
and savage Indians, the poem spoke to the related themes of progress, civilization, and savagery,
ultimately helping to justify the displacement of Native Americans in favor of supposedly
peaceable whites.80 In coming decades, other literature about the Battle of Wyoming also helped
Americans reaffirm the nation’s independence and its expansion.81 Both aesthetically and
thematically, the battle represented an authentically American story that some believed could
help explore the nation’s character and defend its conduct.
Like other elements of the Battle of the Wyoming, Esther’s story met the needs of
American authors during this period. Used to exploring larger themes through Wyoming’s
history, many authors subsumed Queen Esther into the wider mythos surrounding the battle and
started including her in their fiction, spreading the legend even further. In an 1854 short story,
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for instance, the executions of Esther provided the author with a thrilling scene and an evil
villain—a “weird and horrible-looking squaw.” The suspenseful scene, replete with descriptions
of Esther as “the female monster” or “the crimson queen,” ultimately ended when the protagonist
escaped by killing Esther and evading “the savage actors” who had assisted in her bloody work.
An 1858 novel, Mary Derwent, similarly included scenes of Esther as a savage Indian intent on
brutally killing whites, taking no prisoners, and urging her followers to commit atrocities.82
While these authors likely included Esther for dramatic reasons, their depictions, nonetheless,
give voice to certain cultural attitudes and narratives prevalent at the time. Indeed, both these
stories did the same cultural work as the Frontier Maid and regional histories in that they
touched on themes of savagery, progress, and settlement. Most noticeably, these works
dehumanized Esther and other Native Americans as savage, bloodthirsty monsters, which made
it easier to justify their expulsion and defend past actions against them. By defending retribution
in the past, these authors justified the present reality of white settler control while also
legitimizing violence against natives in the present. The legend of Queen Esther, just like other
accounts of Wyoming’s history, helped justify backcountry violence and reinforce the legitimacy
of the United States’ claims to native land.
These stories shaped ideas about American identity as well. This becomes most apparent
when comparing the depictions of whites and most Native American characters in such stories.
Overwhelmingly, whites appear much more favorably, and they are practically always the
protagonists. Mary Derwent’s title character serves as a prime example. Described as a “lovely
and unselfish character” by one reviewer, Derwent purposefully stands out from the bloodthirsty
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Esther.83 Such depictions of virtuous white characters seem to suggest that white settlers had
successfully struck a balance between the good qualities of European and American life.
Unsullied by the extreme vices of civilization or the savagery of natives, these characters
represented an American ideal. Native American villains, such as Queen Esther, served to
highlight this ideal through noticeable contrast, vividly displaying the one extreme of
unrestrained savagery in the process. Clearly, Esther’s story attracted authors not just for its
romance but for its ability to speak to American themes and identity.
As the antebellum period progressed and eventually gave way to the Gilded Age, the
eccentric Queen Esther easily took place alongside more established villains of Wyoming’s
history and legend, and her fantastically bloody execution scene attracted attention across the
nation. Originating from within the region, Esther’s legend became accepted on the local level in
part because of Wyoming’s long history of fabrication and fantasy, the antebellum push for
literature about American locales, and the local commemorative furor of the mid-nineteenth
century. The legend than spread through media that accepted local’s testimony or took regional
historians at their word. Fiction and tourist promotion alike capitalized on Esther’s story, adding
her to attract readers or visitors and occasionally using her to connect to national arguments
about Native Americans or American identity. Just like regional historians, those that utilized the
Battle of Wyoming and Queen Esther in their fiction, their travel narratives, or their celebrations
show how antebellum culture influenced the memory of the Battle of Wyoming and the telling of
Queen Esther’s story.

Conclusion
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From its humble origins in Revolutionary rumor and the testimony of two aged veterans,
Queen Esther’s legend grew tremendously over the course of the antebellum period. By the late
1850s and especially by 1878, Esther’s myth had become an integral part of the Battle of
Wyoming’s public memory, even more so than the original legend of the Wyoming Massacre.
Indeed, as regional historians began to banish this first legend of the Wyoming Massacre—born
from the unverified claims of Holt and Avery—to the dustbin of history, they paved the way for
the equally sensational story of Queen Esther to take its place. This new story replaced the old
but still provided a way for Americans to take meaning from the battle. For local historians and
speakers, Esther’s myth could help them extoll progress, justify the removal of Native
Americans, or highlight the patriotic devotion of valley residents. Just as importantly, Esther’s
fantastical story attracted visitors by contributing to the region’s romantic allure. On the national
scene, authors and travel writers turned to Wyoming and Esther for similar reasons. Looking for
interesting events, exotic Indian characters, and a way to discuss American issues, these writers
utilized Esther for their own purposes, introducing her to readers far and wide.
Diffusing via regional history, travel literature, popular fiction, and local promotion,
Esther’s myth originated within the community before reaching Americans across the country.
The process by which the legend emerged, however, is no simple narrative of transmission from
a locality to the nation. Instead, the process of diffusion—as seen above—reveals how local and
national trends often overlapped and interacted. For one, the process that led to this myth’s wide
acceptance in the community complicates the narrative. Local developments, of course,
influenced the acceptance of Queen Esther’s story, especially the increasing interest in
commemoration and the desire to record the sacrifices of the valley’s Revolutionary veterans.
National trends, however, played an equally important role. In this, the national desire for
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regional romance and the propensity to fictionalize aspects of Wyoming’s history for literary
effect created an environment where locals were more likely to accept Esther’s legend. Since the
atmosphere of romance and fantasy surrounding the valley contributed to the myth’s acceptance,
national trends and writings clearly disposed locals first to believe Esther’s myth and then spread
it. The multiple meanings that residents and other Americans took from Esther similarly attests
to this overlap between regional and national narratives. On the one hand, valley residents
worked hard to connect the local history of
Wyoming to national values and narratives, yet, on
the other, American writers tried fashion a more
national identity by referencing these regional
events. No simple narrative of transmission seems
to apply in these cases, and neither local nor
national trends necessarily influenced the memory
of the Battle of Wyoming more than the other.
Rather, the development of Queen Esther’s legend
suggests that one cannot fully understand the
remembrance of this battle without reference to
both.
The confluence of both regional and
national ideas that helped birth Esther’s myth,
eventually led to her ascendancy in the public

Figure 3: Howard Pyle's Painting of Queen Esther. From Scribner’s
Magazine 31 (April 1902): 413.

memory of the battle. By 1878, one promotional handbook could write that “none of the tragic
events connected with the struggle of July 3, 1778 retains a stronger hold on the popular mind
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than the treacherous and brutal murder[s]” of Queen Esther.84 Indeed, as the nineteenth century
progressed, Esther increasing became the story of the Battle of Wyoming as one well-meaning
historian’s comments reveal. Rejecting the “monstrous falsehoods…published concerning the
battle and the massacre” in its immediate aftermath, this 1878 historian went on to mistakenly
argue that Esther’s “unlawful, wicked, cruel, and brutal murder of prisoners captured after the
battle…has given to history and posterity the name, ‘Wyoming Massacre.’”85 While mistaken,
his remarks certainly illustrate how Esther’s legend would effectively replace the earlier myth
and continue to wreak havoc on the public’s understanding of the event.
By the beginning of the twentieth century, Esther’s myth undoubtedly reigned. Painted by
the popular illustrator Howard Pyle at the turn of the century, Queen Esther’s hideous image
became chiefly associated with the battle, so much so that the official souvenir booklet for the
1928 sesquicentennial celebration included it on its cover. Esther’s story was everywhere in
1928, especially inside the booklet where an article told the history of Esther, “the wickedest
woman in American history,” and included a short story about her. Tapping into an early
twentieth century fascination with Indians and the tropes commonly associated with dime novels,
this short story presented “in the form of stirring fiction the perils and privations of the hardy
pioneers of the Wyoming Valley and the sinister character of wicked Queen Esther.”86 Though
decades removed, Esther’s myth remained potent, appealing to early twentieth century
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Davidsburg, Pittston Gazette Centennial Hand-Book, 1778-1878, 33-34.
Hakes, Wyoming: Synopsis of the Battle and Massacre for the Information of the People.
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Catherine McNelis and Hugh Weir, Official Souvenir: Sesqui-Centennial of the Battle of Wyoming 1778-1928
(Wilkes-Barre: McNelis and Weir, 1928), from the collections of the Luzerne County Historical Society, box 4,
shelf 15. Locals even printed 100,000 copies of Pyle’s painting to distribute during the event. See, “Famous Painting
to Be Exhibited,” Wilkes-Barre Record, June 24-28, 1928, from the collections of Luzerne County Historical
Society, box 4, shelf 15. Article found within the Notebook Containing Clippings on Celebrations, pp. 99.
85

Tharp 139
Americans in much the same way it had originally enthralled their antebellum predecessors. Like
Holt’s 1778 fabrication, this legend aged well.87
Perhaps too well. In 1962, locals “partially absolved Queen Esther of killings at
Wyoming in 1778,” changing the wording on a historic sign at the site of the Bloody Rock to
reflect their uncertainty as to the identity of the Indian woman responsible 88 This changed
wording, though a step in the right direction, ultimately still affirmed the myth’s essence. Late
twentieth-century locals may have challenged certain details of the legend, but they still believed
that an Indian woman had massacred Patriots around the Bloody Rock.
This much maligned woman—alternatively called a Hecate, a fury, a monster, and a
demon incarnate for more than a century—lived on in popular remembrance of the Battle of
Wyoming, whether as Queen Esther or as a more anonymous Native American woman.
Her legend endures even today.
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Even in 1959, textbook companies sent letters to the Wilkes-Barre and Luzerne community to ascertain the
truthfulness of Queen Esther’s legend. See, Muriel Bisbee to Luzerne County Chamber of Commerce, February 2,
1959, from the collections of the Luzerne County Historical Society, Queen Esther Vertical File.
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Epilogue

While the remembrance of the Battle of Wyoming eventually faded on the national level,
it remained robust in the late nineteenth century. Remembered through a large celebration in
1878 and remaining a popular historical and literary topic, Wyoming was not in danger of being
forgotten. Rather, many Americans still referenced the battle to explain or make sense of their
present until at least the 1930s. Although Americans in the period between 1878 and the first
decades of the twentieth century often relied on similar references to progress, Indian removal, or
patriotism when discussing Wyoming, they still modified their interpretations to reflect the
concerns of the Gilded Age or the early twentieth century. Once again, the changing perceptions
of the battle reflected larger societal trends. The battle’s remembrance, however, gradually faded
from the national scene and lost its place within the nation’s Revolutionary mythology. By the
mid-twentieth century, Wyoming had become increasingly obscure.
The 1878 centennial celebration marked a high point in the battle’s memory. Attracting
tens of thousands of visitors to the valley and garnering national publicity, the event proved
wildly successful, and the attention it garnered indicates its familiarity to many.1 While some
came to the celebrations for costumed pageants, fireworks, parades, and musical performances,
others earnestly sought to commemorate this well-known Revolutionary battle.2 Bringing people
together to celebrate and remember the sacrifices of those who had died during the battle, this
massive event further enshrined a patriotic vision of American history that placed Wyoming at
its center. “This is no empty and unmeaning pageant,” asserted one 1878 speaker, “it is an

Francavilla, “The Wyoming Valley Battle and ‘Massacre,’” 30-46.
Francavilla, “The Wyoming Valley Battle and ‘Massacre,’” 35-45. Regardless of their own personal motives,
Americans who attended these commemorations would still have come away with a certain view of the past as the
activities at these events often featured patriotic history lessons as part of their appeal.
1
2

Tharp 141
electric cord that binds the living to the dead.”3 Ultimately, such pageantry helped the battle
retain importance in the nation’s cultural and political atmosphere.
To connect Wyoming with larger Revolutionary and cultural narratives, later nineteenthcentury Americans relied on much of the same rhetoric in use earlier in the century. Like
previous generations, these later Americans presented the brave Patriot defenders of Wyoming as
models to emulate or commemorated their sacrifice in creating a better nation. For instance, local
leader Steuben Jenkins’s keynote address in 1878 connected Revolutionary sacrifices with
modern freedoms and the country’s current greatness. According to him, “the nation they [the
Wyoming veterans] fought and sacrificed and died to establish, is great and mighty, the home of
freemen, the abode of liberty.”4 Far from a new sentiment, this patriotic interpretation of
sacrifice and devotion could have easily aligned with those of Revolutionary Patriots, early
nineteenth century Democratic-Republicans, or local speakers at the Wyoming Monument in the
1830s or 1840s. Mentions of Native Americans and the settling of America also proved longlasting. Many Gilded Age Americans, including President Rutherford B. Hayes in his brief
remarks at the 1878 event, referenced Wyoming to articulate ideas about ongoing Native
American policy and progress, much like earlier antebellum writers and speakers.5 Whatever
their purpose, references to Wyoming in the late nineteenth century followed patterns akin to the
ones first laid out in the century between the battle and the 1878 commemoration.
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Johnson, Wyoming: A Record of the One Hundredth Year Commemorative Observance of the Battle and Massacre,
113. The speaker was Colonel Wright.
4
Jenkins, Historical Address at the Wyoming Monument, 65-67, 75. In a poem he also performed during the
festivities, he similarly explicated the lesson the battle “taught posterity: ‘Tis sweet and glorious to die/ For country,
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5
For summary of Haye’s remarks, see “Wyoming’s Martyrs: Second Day’s Celebration of the Massacre,”
Washington Post, July 5, 1878, 1.
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Of course, those who used Wyoming’s memory in the years between 1878 and the early
1900s did so with an eye towards influencing their present, and they were likewise affected by
societal trends at work in this period. Hayes’s speech in 1878, for instance, reflected some of his
era’s chief concerns, such as westward expansion and Native American policy, and was
influenced by prevailing ideas about race and civilization. Comparing the settlement of the
Wyoming Valley with current expansion into Idaho, Arizona, and Colorado, Hayes argued “that
the settlers of Western frontier were undergoing the same trials to-day that beset those pioneers
of Wyoming a century ago.” In Hayes’s speech, these settlers—supposedly bringing civilization
out of the savage wilderness—signified progress and spoke to white America’s superior moral
character. The settlers’ example also furnished Hayes with lessons about current policies related
to Native Americans. In his interpretation of Wyoming’s history, Hayes asserted that the
pioneers of Wyoming, while ready to go to war if necessary, had engaged with Native
Americans “in good faith” and that the modern nation should follow their example. Connecting
the national narrative of westward expansion to Wyoming’s history, Hayes’s speech mirrored the
work of antebellum historians and speakers in that he drew on this regional history to discuss
national occurrences. Nonetheless, his utilization of the battle’s memory reinterpreted the event
in light of current circumstances.6 Despite a changing cultural and political atmosphere, Hayes’s
speech shows how Wyoming’s memory remained adaptable enough to stay culturally relevant in
the final decades of the nineteenth century.
For more than one hundred years, Wyoming’s memory stayed powerful in the American
imagination. As we have seen, narratives about the Wyoming Massacre fueled pro-Patriot

“Wyoming’s Martyrs: Second Day’s Celebration of the Massacre,” Washington Post, July 5, 1878, 1. See also,
Johnson, Wyoming: A Record of the One Hundredth Year Commemorative Observance of the Battle and Massacre,
110-112.
6
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sentiment during the Revolution, anti-Indian rhetoric after the war, and reinvigorated American
nationalism during the War of 1812. The addition of the Queen Esther story provided new ways
for later nineteenth century Americans to adapt the battle’s remembrance to their changing
circumstances. Utilized in a myriad of ways, narratives about the battle and Queen Esther
supported diverse objectives—from justifying Indian removal to enhancing the romantic appeal
of popular literature in the mid-nineteenth century. Americans took so many meanings from the
Battle of Wyoming because its stories were capable of speaking to a variety of anxieties and
contradictions within American culture and politics in the century between 1778 and 1878. Most
notably, Americans readily connected with narratives about Wyoming because many still used
the British, Loyalists (or those accused of aiding America’s enemies), and Native Americans as
reference points in the search for American identity. Whether working to distinguish themselves
from the British during the Revolution or seeking to justify white possession of the valley in the
antebellum period, Americans relied on narratives about the Battle of Wyoming to understand
themselves and their place in the world.
The world that eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Americans inhabited, however,
changed rapidly during the twentieth century. New concerns and political struggles increasingly
overshadowed the battle’s memory, leading to a slow decline in the battle’s importance to
national audiences. Though it received some attention in literature during the first half of the
1900s, remembering the Battle of Wyoming became an almost exclusively regional affair in the
large Wilkes-Barre area starting in the twentieth century.7 The battle became replaced by more

7

Even after the closing of the frontier around the turn of the century, Americans still occasionally recalled the
memory of this frontier battle even as it began to fade from national consciousness. Much like their antebellum
counterparts, some writers returned to Wyoming because it could interest American readers, who continued to
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westward expansion at the time. The stock image of savage Indians attacking upright frontier families became
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recent events, and it lost its political and cultural relevancy as the concerns of Americans shifted.
In part, the passage of time doomed Wyoming’s memory on the national level. As William
Lewis has written, Wyoming’s importance diminished because more contemporary events like
the Civil War, Spanish American War, and World War I understandably took attention away
from smaller Revolutionary conflicts like the Battle of Wyoming.8 The battle’s memory also
declined because of the nation’s markedly different political atmosphere. With frontier war no
longer a threat and independence secure beyond a doubt, the Battle of Wyoming lost much of the
political potency it had enjoyed during the Revolution, the War of 1812, and the antebellum
period. In 1900, a Philadelphia newspaper asked, “is it well to keep alive the memory of the
massacre of Wyoming…?” Questioning the relevance of Wyoming’s memory to the present, the
newspaper continued, “the orator of the occasion last Tuesday could draw from it no lesson but
revenge. Revenge on whom? Not on the Indians—they were exterminated long ago. Not on the
Tories—they are dead and no grudge is felt against their descendants.” Indeed, the newspaper
could identify no one deserving revenge.9 In the twentieth century, Americans no longer had any
need to retaliate against any British, Loyalists, or Native Americans. As a result, the Battle of
Wyoming simply did not seem to matter as much.
As the battle slowly retreated from national memory, its remembrance shifted almost
exclusively to local commemorations, publications, and the occasional newspaper reference.
After the success of the 1878 celebration, locals began to hold an event at the Wyoming

applied to Wyoming, leaving out Loyalists and much of the Revolutionary War context of the battle. While
Wyoming’s memory still spoke to British savagery, its remembrance increasingly centered more on the interaction
between natives and whites. See, Ellis, Red Jacket, 213-216, 240-242; Alfred Matthews, “A Story of Three States,”
Scribner’s Magazine 31 (April 1902): 407-419; “Prisoners of Esther” by J. M. Hoffman in McNelis and Weir,
Official Souvenir: Sesqui-Centennial of the Battle of Wyoming 1778-1928.
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Monument every year, and this eventually became the chief means of remembering the battle.
Not only did this yearly event manage to bring locals together but it also received modest
national news coverage and created a forum for scholars to discuss the battle’s importance.10 In
1928, the Sesquicentennial celebration of the battle even helped bring about a brief popular
resurgence in the battle’s memory. Bringing 250,000 visitors to the valley, the celebration
replicated many of the activities of the hugely successful 1878 commemoration. Its success
proved short lived, however. By the early 1930s, William Lewis reports, “even the annual
ceremonies…became less focused on the Battle,” and no celebration ever matched 1928’s
success again.11 For the rest of the twentieth century, the memory of Wyoming became
overwhelmingly local with many in the Wilkes-Barre region continuing to participate in yearly
anniversaries to honor their Patriot ancestors or their region’s part in the Revolution. Interrupted
only twice since 1878, memorial services continue at the Wyoming Monument today.12

The Wyoming Massacre’s staying power in American history and memory ultimately
demonstrates both the importance and fallibility of historical narratives in shaping conceptions of
the present. Throughout the century covered in this thesis, the groundless legends that emerged
from the Wyoming Valley exerted remarkable influence in determining how Americans
conceived of the nation. That such baseless, often partisan rumors intimately informed this
process offers a warning to modern readers in an age awash with misinformation and rancorous

Lewis, “The Changing Story and Historical Importance of the Battle of Wyoming” (unpublished manuscript,
2020), 17, provided and cited with permission of the author.
11
For quote, see Lewis, “The Changing Story and Historical Importance of the Battle of Wyoming” (unpublished
manuscript, 2020), 19-20, provided and cited with permission of the author. See also, Francavilla, “The Wyoming
Valley Battle and ‘Massacre,’” 38-46.
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partisanship. As this thesis shows, stories matter and can have long-lasting effects. In the case of
Wyoming, narratives that demonized or exaggerated the misdeeds of the “villains” of the battle
assisted Americans in articulating a nascent national identity. This came at a frightful cost,
however, especially for Native Americans. In the modern era, Americans must again contend
with partisan narratives that threaten to negatively shape public discourse by demonizing others
and propagating unsubstantiated claims. Learning from Wyoming’s example, citizens of the
modern United States must be wary of such stories and sensitive to the contexts in which
information emerges.
Above all else, the legends related to the Battle of Wyoming underscore that Americans,
historians or not, should be critical of what they accept as accurate information—it just might be
the beginning of a new, unfounded American legend.
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